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GOD AND REASON 


SOME THESES FROM NATURAL THEOLOGY 


BY 
WILLIAM J. ‘BROSNAN, S.J., Ph.D. 


Professor of Natural Theology 
Woodstock College 
Woodstock, Maryland 


e 


New York 
FORDHAM UNIVERSITY. PRESS. 
1924 


Imprimt Potest: 
LAURENTIUS J. KELLY, S.J., 
Praepositus Prov. Maryland.—Neo-E bor. 


Nihil Obstet: 
ARTHURUS J. SCANLAN, S.T.D., 
Librorum Censor 


Imprimatur: 
t PATRICIUS CARDINALIS HAYES, 
Archiepiscopus Neo-Eboracensts. 


New York, May 10th, 1924. 


COPYRIGHT, 1924, By ForDHAM UNIVERSITY 
FoRDHAM UNIVERSITY PRESS 
Printed in the United States of America. 






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CONTENTS 


INTRODUCTION, 
BIBLIOGRAPHY. ; ; ; 
NATURAL THEOLOGY, 
Definition; Importance; Relation to Dogmatic 
Theology; Division. q ’ : j ; : 
GENERAL PRENOTES, 
The name of God; The concept of God; Popular, 
Scientific; Other concepts 
Various opinions concerning God; htnetedt! Polythe- 
ism, Pantheism, Deism, Monotheism. 


Various erroneous opinions as to how man new 
God; The Ontological (a simultaneo) argument, 
Ontologism, Innate Idea, Traditionalism, Kantian 
Practical Reason, Sentimentalism, Blind Instinct of 
the Intellect, Modernistic Dain of Vital Imman- 
ence, Pragmatism. 


THESIS I. The source of our jaf ae of Goa is veither 
an ontological intuition of Him, nor an innate or 
divinely infused idea, nor any of the subjective 
mediums invented by the Kantians, Reidians, Senti- 
mentalists, Modernists or Pragmatists, nor is it 
necessarily revelation and a consequent tradition. 
Terms of the thesis explained; Adversaries (cf. 
above; Erroneous opinions); Proofs of the thesis; 
Difficulties and their solutions; attention to be di- 
rected specially to the difficulties drawn from, 


1. Universal ideas; 2. Common consent of mankind, 


in admitting the existence of God; 3. Tendency of 
the will towards limitless good. : : 

Tuesis II. That God exists is a truth which is tiimediatoly 

evident in itself though not immediately evident 
to us. It can be proved neither a simultaneo nor 
a priori. 
Terms of the thesis explained; Adversaries; Proofs 
of the thesis; Scholion, giving the argument a 
simultaneo under three different forms, and cor- 
responding solutions. 

TuHeEsIs III. The existence of God, as Aas Rar oducedie cause 
of all things existing in the world, is proved from 
the fact that all existing beings cannot be produced 
beings. : 

General prenotes to the proofs for God’s existence; 
Terms and scope of the thesis explained; Adver- 
saries; Proof of the thesis; Difficulties, with refer- 
ences to, and extracts from the works of, modern 
authors who urge them; Solutions of difficulites; 


1 


PAGE 
5-14 
15-20 


21-22 


23-25 


25-29 


29-56 


D7-63 


64-69 


attention be directed specially to Kant’s arguments 
founded on false notions concerning time and space, 
and to the Materialists’ unwarranted assumption 
that the ultimate source of all reality is eternal 
matter evolving itself from eternity. 


TuHesis IV. An unproduced cause exists of itself and en 


absolute necessity. 

Terms of the thesis explained; Adversaries; Proofs 
of the thesis; Corollary I, A necessary being is 
eternal; Corollary II, How it is that our proofs of 
God’s eternity and other perfections, derived from 
the concept of a necessary being, do not involve the 
fallacy of the ontological (a simultaneo) argument. 


Tuesis V. There exists, and can exist, only one absolutely 


THESIS 


necessary being; only one God. 

Brief summary of the method of argumentation 
used in developing our thesis, with a few words 
showing again the falsity of Kant’s assertion, so 
frequently repeated by his followers, namely, that in 
deriving God’s perfections from the concept of 
necessary being, we make use of the invalid onto- 
logical (a simultaneo) argument. Terms of the 
thesis explained; The difference, with regard to 
singularity, between the nature of a contingent and 
that of a necessary being, shown; Adversaries; 
Reason for the rise of Ditheism; False solutions 
of the “Problem of Evil;” The prevalence of Poly- 
theism, with reasons why too gloomy a view of it 
should not be taken; Prenotes to the proof of the 
thesis; Proof of the thesis; Scholion, The unicity of 
God and the Mystery of the most Blessed Trinity; 
Difficulties and their solutions; attention to be di- 
rected specially to the solution of the “Problem of 
Evil.” , 


VI. The unproduced, necessarily existing, first 
cause of all things produced, God, one and only 
one is an intelligent, personal being. 

A preliminary note about the principal argument 
we use in proving the intelligence of God, i.e., the 
teleological argument; also called the argument 
from design, from finality, from final causes; Order 
and its divisions; The teleological argument con- 
cludes from the presence in the world of finality 
materially taken to the presence there of finality 
formally taken; Various forms of the argument; 
The argument is conclusive even though it could be 
proved that nature is not orderly in all its works; 
The argument, as we develop it, is derived from 
the order of finality in the world, looked at in its 
entirety; Our main argument is not analogical; 
The argument from analogy is not invalid; Our 
argument, since it is to conclude directly from 


2 


PAGE 


70-86 


87-89 


90-104 


PAGE 


order, is drawn from an order which could not have 
been produced non-intelligently; The end or result 
of the action of an efficient cause considered as a 
final cause; How it can be known that an efficient 
cause acts for\ the accomplishment of an end; 
Chance, its nature, its properties; Scope of the 
teleological argument when combined with the cos- 
mological argument; when uncombined; Personal- 
ity defined; Adversaries; Proofs of the thesis; 
Scholion I, The existence of God, as popularly con- 
ceived, proved by the teleological argument apart 
from all other arguments; Scholion II, The teleo- 
logical argument as viewed by its enemies; Scholion 
III, The teleological argument and Evolution; 
Scholion IV, Examples showing design in nature,— 
The atmosphere, and plant and animal life; The 
human heart; the circulation of the blood; the 
blood; A bird and its flight; Instinct as shown in 
the case of the Sphex, Sitaris humeralis, Rhyncites 
pubescens, the Bee, the Spider, the building of 
birds’ nests; Difficulties; with references to some of 
the many modern authors who urge them; Solutions 
of these difficulties; with pertinent quotations from 
modern authors, some of them non-Catholics, who 
defend the argument from design; attention to be 
directed specially to the following difficulties, 
1. That proposed by Kant, and reiterated ceaselessly 
by his followers, namely, that the teleological ar- 
gument involves the invalid ontological (a simul- 
taneo) argument; 2. Those based on the erroneous 
assumption that the teleological argument uncom- 
bined is used to prove that the intelligence govern- 
ing the world is one, creative, infinite; 3. That of 
the materialistic Monists; to the solution of which 
is added a denunciation of Haeckel, their latter-day 
leader, by Professor Dwight and Professor His; 
4. That derived from the presence in the world of 
many so-called purposeless things, for example, 
seeds that never grow, and, in living beings, rudi- 
mentary organs and organs fully developed but 
functionless; 5. That the designs of God would have 
to descend to countless minute particulars; 5. That 
God would be responsible for the evil in the world. 105-180 


THEsIS VII. The existence of God, as a being superior to 
the world, on whom the world and all its creatures, 
including man, depend, a being to be supplicated, 
propitiated, worshipped, is proved from the fact 
that mankind at all times has admitted the exist- 
ence of such a being. 

Introductory note; The common consent of mankind 
in acknowledging God’s existence; its nature, uni- 
versality and constancy; The fact, that both civil- 


3 


PAGE 
ized and uncivilized peoples, without exception, are 
as one in acknowledging God’s existence, estab- 
lished; The common consent of mankind as a source 
of certain knowledge; Adversaries; Proof of the 
thesis; The proof confirmed by a rejection of the 
puerile reasons given by our adversaries in ex- 
planation of the admitted fact that God’s existence 
is universally affirmed by mankind; Scholion I, 
A brief description of some of the erroneous, rela- 
tively primitive, religious beliefs; Scholion II, 
Examples of the religious beliefs of uncultured, 
relatively primitive haat Difficulties and their 
solutions. ; : ; . 181-205 


ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS MaThOT BERTIE the Pabriles i of 
God, 1. From motion; 2. From contingent being; 
3. From the different degrees of perfections in 
creatures; 4. From mankind’s acknowledgement of 
moral obligation, i.e., of a law binding in conscience. 206-211 
CONCLUSION, consisting principally of excerpts from the 
Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, 
August 4, 1879, on The Study of Scholastic Phil- 
osophy according to the mind of St. Thomas 


Aquinas. i : . . 212-218 
APPENDIX, explaining tuncertatione ee in hi ttette and solu- 

tions of difficulties. . : , ; . . : . 219-222 
INDEX OF MATTER. ‘ : A 2 ; 4 : : ; . 2238-225 
INDEX OF AUTHORS. : : , ; ; ; : : ; . 226-227 


INTRODUCTION 


Modern philosophy has emphatically turned its face away 
from reason as a guide to man in any of the weightier in- 
terests of life. It boasts of its deliverance from the teachings 
of the “naive and pre-scientific believers of the primitive Chris- 
tian Gospel.” It will have nothing to do with a reason-proved, 
personal, infinite God, the Creator and Ruler of the physical 
and moral world. Make God anything else you please, even 
a symbol with a changing ideal value for your changing sub- 
jective moods, and modern philosophy will tolerate you. He 
who runs may read the message. It is written in no uncertain 
terms, as the following typical quotations, and others to be 
given later, will show. 


Hocking (Professor at Yale University when the work from 
which we cite was written, now at Harvard University), The 
Meaning of God in Human Experience, rejects a reason- 
proved God and tells us “that the original source of the 
knowledge of God is an experience of not being alone in 
knowing the world, and especially the world of nature... . 
God is known as that of which I am primarily certain; and 
being certain, am certain of self and of my world of men 
and men’s objects.” Pp. 236, 296. Professor Hocking appears 
to be an Ontologist. He has been said to be, and probably 1s, 
a Pantheist. Not only does he reject a reason-proved God, 
but, as we shall see later, he is in hearty agreement with the 
general tendency in modern philosophy to judge “of uncertain 
AVOT EMH rebireii'al haba ve the labors of reason in behalf of any of 
our weightier human interests.’ Not reasoned knowledge, 
then, but “faith-knowledge”’ makes God naturally known to 
us. What an unreasonable, unstable, subjective thing this 
experience-born faith-knowledge is Professor Hocking him- 
self ingenuously tells us. 


6 GOD AND REASON 


“Ror it is not simply the case that these attributes which 
religion ascribes to reality (divinity, beneficence, soul-preserving 
or value-conserving properties) are invisible, spiritual, inaccessible 
to observation: it is the case that these ideas, so far as reasons go, 
are in apparent equilibrium—neither provable nor disprovable. The 
world would be consistent without God; it would also be consistent 
with God: whichever hypothesis a man adopts will fit experience 
equally well; neither one, so far as accounting for visible facts is 
concerned, works better than the other. I have often wondered 
whether in these supermundane matters the universe may not be 
so nicely adjusted (and withal so justly) that each man finds true 
the things he believes in and wills for; why should not man find 
hig religion true, in so far as he has indeed set his heart upon it 
and makes sacrifices for it? However this may be, the religious 
objects (the predicates given by religion to reality) stand at a pass 
of intellectual equipoise: it may well seem that some other faculty 
must enter in to give determination to reason at the point where 
reason halts, without deciding voice of its own. The birth of the 
idea of God in the mind—the judgment ‘Reality is living, divine, a 
God exists’—is so subtle, like the faintest breath of the spirit upon 
the face of the waters, that no look within can tell whether God 
is here revealing Himself to man, or man creating God. 

“It is because of this position of subtle equilibrium that the 
religious consciousness is evanescent; faith is unstable as empirical 
knowledge is not. Though at any time I find my world sacred, it 
only needs a touch of passivity on my part and it will again become 
secular: I cannot recover nor understand its former worth. My 
faith in God is subject to fluctuation as my faith in other objects 
is not, even though these other objects are equally inaccessible (as 
my faith in China or in the conservation of energy). And note- 
worthy about this fluctuation is that it passes from extreme to 
extreme . . .the existence of God is to me either wholly certain or 
wholly absurd. 

“Likewise of immortality: it seems to me at times that a man 
is a fool to believe it, at other times that a man is a fool not 
to believe it. . . . But alternations like these belong rather to the 
will or disposition of the spirit than to the estimating mind, And 
further, the one thing which is most sure to dispel faith and sub- 
stitute the secular world-picture is precisely intellectual scrutiny. 
Faith is not only difficult for reason; it is distinctly diffident 
towards reason. Its origin, then, and its firmness must be due to 


some other power, presumably to will . . . the thought of God 
comes and goes; it is often lost and often recovered, both in racial 
and in individual experience...” Pp. 148—145. 


James (Harvard University), The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, 


“Rationalism insists that all our beliefs ought ultimately to 
find for themselves articulate grounds. . . .Vague impressions of 
something indefinable have no place in the rationalistic system, . . 


INTRODUCTION 7 


nevertheless, if we look on man’s whole mental life as it exists, 
on the life of men that lies in them apart from their learning 
and science, and that they inwardly and privately follow [James 
is speaking here principally of man’s religious lite], we have to 
confess that the part of it of which rationalism can give an 
account is relatively superficial. It is the part that has the prestige 
undoubtedly, for it has the loquacity, it can challenge you for 
proofs, and chop logic, and put you down with words. But it will 
fail to convince or convert you ail the same, if your dumb intuitions 
[ ?] are opposed to its conclusions. If you have intuitions at all, 
they come from a deeper level of your nature than the loquacious 
level which rationalism inhabits. . 


“This inferiority of the rationalistic level in founding belief 
is just as manifest when rationalism argues for religion as when 
it argues against it. That vast literature of proofs for God’s exist- 
ence drawn from the order of nature, which a century ago seemed 
so overwhelmingly convincing, to-day does little more than gather 
dust in our libraries, for the simple reason that our generation has 
ceased to believe in the kind of God it argued for. Whatever sort 
of a being God may be, we know to-day that he is nevermore that 
mere external inventor of ‘contrivances’ intended to make manifest 
his ‘glory’ in which our great-grandfathers took such satisfaction, 
though just how we know this we cannot possibly make clear by 
words either to others or to ourselves... . 


“Can philosophy stamp a warrant of veracity upon the religious 
man’s sense of the divine? . . . Religion, you expect to hear me 
conclude, is nothing but an affair of faith, based either on vague 
sentiment, or on that vivid sense of the reality of things unseen... 
In short, you suspect that I am planning to defend feeling, at the 
expense of reason . . . To a certain extent I have to admit you 
guess rightly. I do believe that feeling is the deeper source of 
Feveone. Gee ED 1G.) 14, 4002-401. 


In A Pluralistic Universe, he adds, 


“God in the religious life of ordinary men is the name 
only of the ideal tendency in things, believed in as a super-human 
person . . . The theological machinery that spoke so livingly to 
our ancestors, with its finite age of the world, its creation out of 
nothing, its juridical morality and eschatology, its relish for re- 
wards and punishments, its treatment of God as an external con- 
triver, an ‘intelligent and moral governor,’ sounds as odd to most 
of us as if it were some outlandish savage religion. The vaster 
vistas which scientific evolutionism has opened, and the rising tide 
of social democratic ideals, have changed the type of our imagina- 
tion, and the older monarchical theism is obsolete or obsolescent 
.., An external creator and his institutions may still be verbally 
confessed at church in formulas that linger by their mere jnertia, 
but the life is out of them, we avoid dwelling on them, the sincere 
heart of us is elsewhere.” Pp. 124, 29, 


8 GOD AND REASON 


Blind sentiment, then, leads James to reject the reasoned » 
God our philosophy offers; we shall see farther on that for 
James it puts in His stead a god that may be anything you 
please, and gives birth to a faith that is a mere hypothesis, 
and to a creed that he who professes it may always doubt. 


Drake (Professor at Vassar College), Seekers after God, 
Harvard Theological Review, January, 1919, writing in full 
sympathy with the religious chaos to which modern philosophy 
has given birth, and of which this article is a sad object-lesson, 
tells us, 


“Ambiguous the word ‘God’ hopelessly is . . . However this 
may be, any conception which has had such a checkered history, 
might well suffer, one would suppose, a few ,‘more changes.” 
Pp. 80, 81. 

“It seems now rather needless to be an atheist. There are so 
many conceptions of God afloat that anyone at all widely read can 
scarcely fail to find one suited to his mental outlook and con- 
victions . . . One feels that the rejection of the orthodox conception 
leaves clear room for the preaching of the naturalistic God of con- 
temporary thought.” P. 69. 


“For certain types of mind pantheism will doubtless always be 
alluring . . . God seems [by others to be] relegated to the realm 
of the ideal . . . No one, except the uncritical adherents of tra- 
ditional dogma [and among these Professor Drake would most cer- 
tainly include Catholics] believes to-day in such a God as the 
ancient Jews worshipped; and it is doubtful if many really believe 
in the grim potter-God of Saint Paul. Mature thought . .. must 
put away childish things. It is impossible that the great truths 
which science has revealed in the past nineteen centuries should 
not have profoundly altered our views of the ultimate realities 
from that of the naive and pre-scientific believers of the primitive 
Christian gospel . . . Perhaps our modern God-ideas have realiy 
more of the spirit of the Master’s teaching than the Hellenic 
subtleties of the Nicene creed—or even of the Fourth Nid Fl Pp. 
Rhy Gd Oso es e 


“What matters, however, in the last analysis, is not how cloue 
our conception may approach, or how far it may veer from the 
thought of earlier days; or even whether we are to use the term 
‘God’ or not; what is vital is that we should retain the sense of 
the worth and meaning of life which the sacred word connotes. 
Of the men of the future Mr. Lowes Dickinson writes, ‘It may be 
a personal God they conceive, it may be a tendency in the universe; 
it may be something which they prefer to call the ‘Earth’ or 
‘Nature’; it may be an Absolute; but in any case, it is something 
not themselves and greater than themselves, something which . 


INTRODUCTION 9 


concentrates and satisfies in itself those ideal impulses that other- 
wise would be tortured and broken about an imperfect self.” P. 82. 

“Are we going to abandon religion in the ardor of our new 
tasks? Are we to turn with renewed zeal to religion, but free it 
more and more from theolatry |i.e. God-worship|? Or are we per- 
haps at the verge of a great new vision of God, which shall lead 
us into ways that it hath not entered into our hearts to conceive?” 
Pyiss: 


An affirmative answer to either of the first two questions 
means no religion at all or a religion in which the worship of 
God is to be reduced to a vanishing-point. Either way spells 
Atheism. And “the new vision of God” looked for in the third 
question is certainly not one of “the God of orthodox dogma, 
with His omniscience, omnipotence, aseity [1.e., self-existence], 
and what not’, for Professor Drake insists that “the vast 
theological library”, which furnishes “supposed proofs” for the 
existence of such a God, 


“Is, for progressive thinkers, simply shelved. The question 
has become, not, can we believe in this cut-and dried conception 
of mediaeval and modern orthodoxy, but rather, is there any con- 
ception of God that we can accept? In other words, the God-idea 
has become fluid again, the God of the future is in the making” 
to be moulded “into a form more consonant with man’s maturer 
experience and more servicable for his spiritual life.’ Pp. 67, 68. 


It would appear that for these philosophers the eternal, 
changeless God has not the reality and stability even of a 
mortal, changeable man, but is a plaything for them, to be 
conceived and moulded in whatever fashion happens to suit 
their varying individual whims or fancies. 


Leuba (Professor at Bryn Mawr College), The Belief in 
God and Immortality, writes even more destructively, if that 
be possible, of religion and morality: 

“It hardly need be said here that the abandonment of the 
belief in a personal God and in personal immortality, though it 
involved the disappearance of the existing religions, need not bring 
to an end religious life. Religion is not to be identified with its 
present forms . . . The sources of the religious life, its funda- 
mental realities, lie deeper than the conceptional forms [one of 
which is the concept of a personal God] in which they find ex- 
pression.” Pp. X, XI. 

“It is, therefore, of the greatest practical importance that those 
who have become convinced of the absence of sufficient ground 
for these two beliefs [namely, in a personal God and personal 


10 GOD AND REASON 


immortality] and of their apparent unavoidable disappearance if 
humanity continues in its present course, realize that morality is 
essentially independent of them. They must know with the clear- 
ness that brings persuasion that moral ideals and moral energy 
have their source in social life...” Pp. 821, 322. 

“We are now, fortunately, almost done with the absurd tradi- 
tion that formal religion is the essential means of moral education 
. . . Belief in transcendental objects [God is one of them], bearers 
of perfection, is of no greater value in artistic education than in 
ethical culture, it is . . . in the presence of noble characters and 
fine conduct that we learn to know and love the good. Those who 
exaggerate the usefulness of the beliefs in immortality, and in 
God conceived as the perfect embodiment of all the values discovered 
on earth, fail to realize the inherent disadvantages of these beliefs. 
The evils they breed may be called by the general name of ‘other- 
worldliness.’ It would be difficult to evaluate the harm done to 
humanity in the past by the conviction that the real destination 
of man is the world to come... I know religious life too favor- 
ably to insinuate that those who preach the Kingdom of Heaven 
are enemies of mankind, but I think that on the whole they would 
serve it better if they were able to forget not only hell but also 
heaven. There is always some discrepancy between that which is 
best for the God of the Christian worship and life in heaven, and 
that which is best for the individual and society on earth: one 
cannot serve perfectly man and the traditional God.” Pp. 327, 
328, 329. 

“The conviction that we must know whence we come and 
whither we are going, and that we must possess the assurance 
of a complete realization of our ideals on earth or elsewhere in 
order to lead a contented and worthy existence, is childish and 
mischievous.” P, 3380. 


“Of the sense of a real, immediate dependence upon a per- 
sonal divinity, there remain in Christian states but a few pitiable 
remnants. In the United States the most conspicuous one is the 
yearly proclamation of a day of thanksgiving, by which the members 
of the nation are called upon to return thanks to God for the 
good that has fallen to their lot and that of the country during the 
year. From an expression of genuine belief, this custom has be- 
come an objectionable tradition, which the sooner it is abandoned, 
the better for those who keep it up and for those to whom it is 
addressed.” P. 324. 


A further insight into Leuba’s destructive views on religion 
is given us in the following passage from James, The Varieties 
of Religious Experience, which contains an abridged quotation 
from an article published by Leuba, viz., The Contents of Re- 


ligious Consciousness, in The Monist, July, 1901. James 
writes, 


INTRODUCTION 11 


“Taking creeds and faith-state together, as forming ‘religions,’ 
and treating these as purely subjective phenomena, without regard 
to the question of their ‘truth,’ we are obliged, on account of their 
extraordinary influence on action and endurance, to class them 
amongst the most important biological functions of mankind. Their 
stimulant and anaesthetic effect is so great that Professor Leuba 
in a recent article [mentioned above], goes so far as to say that 
as long as men can use their God, they care very little who he is, 
or even whether he is at all. ‘The truth of the matter can be put,’ 
says Leuba, ‘in this way: God is not known, he is not understood, 
he is used—sometimes as a meat-purveyor, sometimes as a moral 
support, sometimes as a friend, sometimes as an object of love. 
If he proves himself useful, the religious consciousness asks for 
no more than that. Does he exist? How does he exist? What 
is he? are so many irrelevant questions. Not God, but life, more 
life, a larger, richer, more satisfying life is, in the last analysis, 
the end of religion.’” Pp. 506, 507. 

Could anything be conceived more subversive of true re- 
ligion and morality than the views expressed by these men? 
Nevertheless, this is the philosophy which is being taught 
to-day in non-Catholic colleges and universities, at home and 
abroad. It monopolizes the current non-Catholic philosophic 
magazines, it is reflected in our literature, our press, and the 
lives of the people. Its evil effect cannot be exaggerated. One 
would be led to surmise that the very chaos, intellectual, re- 
ligious and moral, into which it has plunged its followers, 
would be reason enough for.its rejection by them. But it is 
not; and for the simple fact, that having rejected reason as a 
guide, they have ceased to be reasonable, and have, as a con- 
sequence, no appreciation of the state of utter confusion in 


which they live. 


To help to counteract in some measure the deadly influence, 
especially on religion and morality, of this fundamentally 
false philosophy, the present work was planned. Its aim is to 
establish the existence of the reason-proved, personal God, 
who has been rejected with mockery by modern philosophy. 

This is accomplished, in the first place, negatively, that is, 
by refuting the principal erroneous opinions advanced by var- 
ious philosophic systems to explain how our first knowledge of 
God is acquired. It is to be noted, however, that as these 


12 GOD AND REASON 


opinions, in as far as they touch our present subject-matter, 
namely, God, are, for the most part, but particular applications 
of general theories of knowledge, the falsity of which is sup- 
posed to have been fully exposed and demonstrated in previous 
parts of philosophy, our explanation and refutation of them 
will be brief. 

In the positive treatment of our subject, which follows, 
theses affirming the existence of God, as the first and unpro- 
duced, absolutely self-sufficient, necessarily existing cause of 
all other existing beings, together with the necessary oneness 
of His nature, His intelligence and His personality, are quite 
fully explained, proved, and defended against the objections of 
adversaries. 

As an aid to greater clearness the matter has been developed 
in thesis-form. For the same reason the syllogism has been 
generally employed in the proofs of theses and in the presenta- 
tion of difficulties; terms requiring definition have been form- 
ally and strictly defined; and in the solution of difficulties 
logical form has been everywhere employed. In this last case, 
however, where a surer grasp of the point at issue appeared 
to demand it, to these formal solutions informal explanations 
have been added. This severely Scholastic method of treat- 
ment was adopted not only because it seemed to make for 
greater clearness and more accurate thinking, but also because 
it was judged best suited to a book intended rather for class- 
room work or private study than for mere cursory reading. 

A not at all unimportant part of our work are the many 
quotations from more modern philosophical writers, furnish- 
ing as they do a fairly good idea of the attitude of; present-day 
philosophy towards God, and so giving a proper setting to 
our theses, and point to the difficulties urged against them. 
These quotations will be found to have been taken from articles 
and books offering brief and striking passages suitable for our 
purpose, and principally from those published in this country 
and of non-Catholic authorship. The reason for this choice 
was, that quotations from these writers, whilst making clear 


INTRODUCTION 13 


how far contemporary philosophy has wandered from God, 
seemed, in addition, best fitted to bring home to us in this 
country the vital need we have of a thorough acquaintance 
with a sane, reason-proved Theodicy, and at the same time to 
give a guarantee that the picture we present of the deplorable 
state into which modern philosophy has sunk, in its estimation 
of God and His attributes, has not been overdrawn. 


It is scarcely necessary to add, in this matter of quotations, 
that, unless the contrary is clearly stated or clearly implied, 
neither approval nor disapproval of any author is to be con- 
sidered as applying in general to the doctrine taught by him, 
or in particular to any part of such doctrines other than that 
at the time referred to. 

It may be well, finally, to note just how far our defense of 
God takes us. The theses we present for development and 
demonstration are but the initial theses of Natural Theology. 
Many others, and very important ones, have been left prac- 
tically untouched; to be treated, perhaps, some future day. 
Notwithstanding this, however, by proving, as we do, the 
existence of God as the one, and only possible one, intelligent, 
personal, unproduced, and hence self-existing and necessarily 
existing, first cause of all other existing things, the ruler of 
the world and of man, we have excluded, as absolutely false, 
all kinds of Atheism, Polytheism and Pantheism. 


The exclusion of Pantheism is both explicit and implicit, 
Attention is called to the implicit exclusion. This is contained, 
and with immediate clearness, in the proved conclusion that 
God is an unproduced, necessarily existing being, for as such 
He can in no way be identified with the produced, contingent 
world. 

Deism also, with its exclusion of God from the world of His 
creation, is refuted by our theses, not explicitly though, but im- 
plicitly. This implication also is contained in the proved con- 
clusion that God is the unproduced, necessarily existing cause 
of the world, seeing that without the continued and intimate 


14 GOD AND REASON 


presence and action in the world of its necessary cause, God, 
and without the direction of His all-wise providence, neither 
the ordered world could exist, nor could any single creature 
in it continue in existence or perform action of any kind. 

What is more, by proving that God exists by His very 
essence and with absolute necessity, we have established the 
fundamental or root perfection from which Natural Theology 
derives, either immediately or mediately, all the other great 
perfections of God which human reason left to itself is capable 
of knowing. Not a few of these will be found enumerated 
in the description which will be given later of the more fully 
developed scientific concept of God. It seems scarcely neces- 
sary to add that when this concept has been fully proved and 
defended, the falsity of Atheism, Polytheism, Pantheism, 
Deism and other erroneous opinions concerning God will be 
more clearly and completely evident. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 15 


BIBLIOGRAPHY? 


*AVELING, Rev., Francis, D.D., The God of Philosophy. 
st) Louis's) B. Herdera1 906: 

Batrour, Rt. Hon. ArtHurR JAMES, M.A., F.R.S., LL.D., 
D.C.L.,Theism and Humanism, Being the Gifford 
Lectures, 1914. London and New York: Hodder 
and Stoughton, 1915. 

BECKWITH, CLARENCE AUGUSTINE, The Idea of God. New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. 

*BOEDDER, BERNARD, S.J., Natural Theology. New York: 
Benziger Brothers, 1891. 

CaLxins, Mary WuitTon, The Persistent Problems of Phiil- 
osophy. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1908. 

CHRISTLIEB, THEODORE, D.D., Modern Doubt and Christian 
Behef. Translated, with author’s sanction, chiefly 
by Rev. H. U. Weitbrecht, Ph. D., Edited by 
Rev. T. L. Kingsbury, M.A. Edinburgh: T. and 
T. Clark. Agents in New York: Charles Scrib- 
ner’s Sons. 

Dian, J. Lewis, D.D., The Theistic Argument. New York: 
Houghton Mifflin Company. 

*Donat, JosePH, S.J., D.D., The Freedom of Science. New 
York: Joseph F. Wagner. 

DrakE, Durant, Seekers after God, The Harvard Theological 
Review, January, 1919. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press. 

*DRISCOLL, REv. Joun T., S.T.L., God. New York: Benziger 
Brothers, 1904. 


1. Approval is given only to those books and articles marked with an 
asterisk. The others are listed in return for permission kindly granted 
to quote from them. The bibliography offered, though not complete, will 
be found sufficient; a complete one would include many other books and 
articles in English and in other languages. 


16 GOD AND REASON 


*Dwicut, THomas, M.D., LL.D., Thoughts of a Catholic 
Anatomist. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 
1911, 


*GANNON, P.J., S.J., Comparative Religion, The Irish The- 
ological Quarterly, October, 1916. Dublin: 
M. H. Gill & Co. 


*GERARD, JOHN, S.J., Science and Scientists. London: The 
Catholic Truth Society, 1889. 


*GiLL, H. V., S.J.,Lord Kelvin and the Existence of God. 
The Catholic Mind, January 8, 1909. New York: 
The America Press. 


HaAgcKEL, Ernest, The Riddle of the Universe, Translated 
by Joseph McCabe. London: Watts & Co., 1913. 


Hatt, Rev. Francis J., D.D., The Being and Attributes of 
God. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. 


*HAMMERSTEIN, L. von, S.J., Foundations of Faith; Part J, 
The Extstence of God, Translated from the 
German. New York: Benziger Brothers, 1897. 


Hockine, Witt1AM Ernest, Pu.D., The Meaning of God in 
Human Experience. New Haven: Yale Uni- 
versity Press, 1912. 


*HULL, Ernest R., S.J., God, Man and Religion. Bombay: 
The Examiner Press, 1914. 

James, WitiiaAmM, The Varieties of Religious Experience, 
Gifford Lectures, 1901, 1902. New York: Long- 
mans, Green & Co., 1912. 

James, WILLIAM, Pragmatism. New York; Longmans, Green 
& Co., 1907. 

JAMES, WiLLtAM, The Will to Believe and other Essays. New 
York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1912. 


James, Witi1AM, 4 Pluralistic Universe. New York: Long-. 
mans, Green & Co., 1909. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 17 


*Joyce, GeorceE Haywarp, S.J., Principles of Natural The- 
ology. London and New York: Longmans, 
Green & Co., 1923. 

Kant, IMMANUEL, The Critique of Pure Reason, Translated 
into English by F. Max Miller. New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1907. 

Knicut, WitiiamM, LL.D., Aspects of Theism. New York: 
The Macmillan Co., 1893. 

Lanc, AnprEw, M.A., LL.D., The Making of Religion. New 
York; Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. 

*Lemius, Rev. J. B., O.M.IL, A Catechism of Modernism 
founded on the Encyclical, Pascendi Dominici 
Gregis, of His Holiness, Pope Pius X., Trans- 
lated from the French at St. Joseph’s Seminary, 
Dunwoodie, N. Y. New York: Society for the 
Propagation of the Faith. 

*Lro XIII, Pore, Encychcal, Aeterni Patris, Translated by 
Fathers of the English Dominican Province, as a 
Preface to Vol. I of their translation of the 
Summa Theologica of St. Thomas. London: 
Randel) Washbourne) Ltd) 1912: 

*Lro XIII, Pore, The Great Encyclical Letters of Pope Leo 
XIII, Translations from approved sources, with 
a Preface by Rev. John J. Wynne, S.J. New 
York: Benziger Brothers, 1903. 

*LeRoy, Most Rev. ALEXANDER, The Religion of the Primi- 
tives, Translated by Rev. Newton Thompson. 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1922. 

*Lessius, VEN. LEONARD, S.J., The Names of God, Translated 
by T. J. Campbell, S.J. New York: The America 
ress mola 

Leusa, JAMES H., The Belief in God and Immortality. Boston: 
Sherman, French and Company, 1916. Present 
publishers: The Open Court Publishing Com- 
pany, Chicago. 


18 GOD AND REASON 


MaRrTINEAU, JAMES, D.D., LL.D., A Study of Religion, 2 Vols. 
New York: The Macmillan Co., 1888. 

*Miits, Puito Laos, S.T.L., Prehistoric Religion. Wash- 
ington, D. C.: Capital Publishers, Inc., 1918. 

*MUCKERMANN, H., S.J., Attitude of Catholics towards Dar- 
winism and Evolution. St. Louis: B. Herder, 
1906. 

*MuNtTScH, ALBERT, S.J., Evolution and Culture. St. Louis: 
B. Herder Book Co., 1923. 

PAULSEN, FRIEDRICH, Introduction to Philosophy, Second 
American from the third German edition, Trans- 
lated with the author’s sanction by Frank Thilly. 
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1907. 

PHIN, JoHN, The Evolution of the Atmosphere, as a proof of 
Design and Purpose in the Creation. New 
York: The Industrial Publication Company, 1908. 

*Prus X, Pope, Encyclical, Pascendi Dominici Gregis. Trans- 
lated in The American Catholic Quarterly Re- 
view, October, 1907. 

*RICKABY, JOSEPH, S.J., Studies on God and His Creatures. 
New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924. 

*RONAYNE, Maurice, S.J., God Known and Knowable. New 
York: Benziger Brothers, 1888. 

Royce, Jostan, PuH.D., The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. 
New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 

Royce, JosAH, Pu.D., The Religious Aspect of Philosophy. 
New York: Houghton Mifflin Company. 

SCHILLER, F.C.S., M.A., D.Sc., Riddles of the Sphinx. New 
York: The Macmillan Co., 1910. 

*SHALLO, MicHagt, S.J., Scholastic Philosophy, Philadelphia : 
Peter Reilly, 1915. 

*SHARPE, Rey., A.B., M.A., The Principles of Christianity. 
St. Louis: B. Herder, 1906. 

SHEARMAN, J. N., The Natural Theology of Evolution. 
London: George Allen and Unwin, Ltd., 1915. 
Agents in New York: E. P. Dutton & Co. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 19 


*THOMAS AQUINAS, SAINT, The Summa Contra Gentiles, 
Literally translated by the English Dominican 
Fathers from the latest Leonine Edition. Lon- 
don: Burns, Oates and Washbourne, Ltd., 1923. 

*THOMAS AQUINAS, SAINT, The Summa Theologica, Literally 
translated by Fathers of the English Dom- 
inican Province. London: R. and T. Wash- 
bourne, Ltd., 1912. 

TIspALL, W. St. Crartr, D.D., Comparative Religion. New 
York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1909. 

TYRRELL, GEORGE, Through Scylla and Charybdis. New York: 
Longmans, Green & Co., 1907. 

WALTER, JOHNSTON Estep, Kant’s Moral Theology, The 
Harvard Theological Review, July, 1917. Cam- 
bridge: Harvard University Press. 

Warp, JAMES, Sc.D., Hon. LL.D., Hon. D.Sc., The Realm 
of Ends or Pluralism and Theism.. Cambridge, 
England: The University Press, 1912. Agents 
in New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons. 

*WaARD, WILLIAM GEORGE, PH.D., Essays on the Philosophy of 
Theism, 2 Vols., Edited by Wilfrid Ward. Lon- 
don: Kegan Paul, Trench & Co., 1884. 

WEBER, ALFRED, History of Philosophy, Authorized transla- 
tion from the Sixth French Edition by Frank 
hilly Amv he Phaby ) New! \Vork:)/:Charles 
Scribner’s Sons. 

*¥____________. Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XVI, Index and 
Reading Lists; Lists of Reading in Theodicy, 
Cosmology, Psychology, and the History of Phil- 
osophy. New York: The Encyclopedia Press, 
Ine, 

4___________.  Fncyclopedia Americana, Articles on The 
Blood; The Circulation of the Blood; The Heart. 
New York: Encyclopedia Americana Corpora- 
tion. 


20 


GOD AND REASON 


, Nature and her Author, The Month, August, 

1910. London and New York: Longmans, Green 
& Co. 
, The Programme of Modernism, A reply to the 
Encyclical of Pius X, Pascendt Dominici Gregts 
(with text of the Encyclical in an English ver- 
sion), Translated from the Italian by Rev. Father 
George Tyrrell. New York: G. P. Putnam’s 
Sons. 1908. 


NATURAL THEOLOGY DEFINED 21 


GOD AND REASON 


SOME THESES FROM NATURAL THEOLOGY 
| NATURAL THEOLOGY—DEFINITION. 

Natural Theology (Theos, God; logos, reasonable ac- 
count) is a scientific, i.e, ordered, certain, reasoned, 
knowledge of God, acquired by unaided (and so differing 
from Dogmatic Theology) human reason 

It is called also Theodicy (Theos, God; diké, right; 
dikaiod, I set right, I justify), ie, a justification, for 
believers and against the attacks of unbelievers, of the 
existence, attributes and works of God. This name was 
first used by Leibnitz in the title “Essais de Théodicée 
sur la bonté de Dieu” etc., under which he published 
a treatise in answer to Bayle and others, who impugned 
God’s existence because of the presence in the world of 
moral evil. It should be noted that Leibnitz held the 
erroneous opinion that the present world is absolutely 
the best world that could be made, even by God. 


II. IMPORTANCE. 
1. It is the highest of the naturally acquired sciences. 
It treats of God. 
2. It is the complement of other parts of Philosophy. 
Without it 

a. Cosmology cannot give a complete explanation 
of the origin and final cause of the world, the 
necessity of nature’s laws, miracles; 

b. Psychology finds it impossible to adequately 
explain the origin and immortality of the hu- 
man soul, the freedom of the human will; 

c. Ethics is without foundation. 

3. It supplies the truths necessary as a basis for a 
reasonable supernatural faith. 


22 


GOD AND REASON 


III. RELATION TO DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. 


It is subordinate to Dogmatic Theology and subject 
to its negative direction, and this, because the word of 
God is an extrinsic norm to Natural Theology, and is 
absolutely infallible, whilst reason, which is its intrinsic 
norm, may fall into error. Hence, as reason may err, it 
is held to the truth by Revelation; negatively, however, 
not positively. It is told that it must not attempt to 
teach anything which goes counter to the word of God, or 
the teaching of His infallible Church. 

The great value of this negative direction of Dogmatic 
Theology will become apparent when we view the count- 
less errors concerning religion and morality to which 
misguided reason, unchecked by Divine Revelation, has 
given birth. Scarcely a page of the history of philosophy, 
ancient and especially modern, is free from them. 


IV. DIVISION. 


1. The existence of God, one and personal. This part 
only is treated in the present volume. 

2. The essence and attributes of God. 

3. The action of God in the world. 


CONCEPT OF GOD 23 


THE EXISTENCE OF GOD, ONE AND PERSONAL 
GENERAL PRENOTES 


I. THE NAME OF GOD. 

Anglo-Saxon, God; German and Swiss, Gott; Dutch, 
Godt; Flemish, Goed; Danish and Swedish, Gude; the 
one invoked, the one to whom sacrifice is offered. From 
the Gothic root, gheu, to invoke, to sacrifice to. Akin 
to Hindu, Khooda, and Persian, Khoda. 

Latin, Deus; Sanskrit, Dyaus (gen. Divas); Indo- 
Iranian, Deva; Gallic, Diu; French, Dieu; Spanish, 
Dios; Portuguese, Deos; Italian, Dio; Irish and Gaelic, 
Dia; Greek, Zeus (gen. Dios) and Theos; Old Teutonic, 
Tiu (Tuesday). Probably from Indo-Germanic roots, 
div, to shine, to give light; and thes, in thessasthai, to 
implore. 

Hebrew, £/; Babylonian, //u; Arabic, [lah (Al-Ilah, 
Allah) ; the strong or mighty one. By the Hebrews God 
was also called Jahveh (the unutterable name), He who 
is; Adonai, Lord; Elohim, probably, the Almighty. 


II. THE CONCEPT OF GOD. 

Popular. This concept represents God, at least, as a 
supreme being, sttperior to the world and on whom the 
world depends; its ruler and the ruler of man, and the 
object of man’s prayer and veneration. It may, and does 
in many instances, represent additional perfections of 
God; at times, also, it is partially erroneous in represent- 
ing His nature, as, for instance, when it represents His 
nature as existing in many beings. 

This concept, which, morally speaking, all who have 
the use of their reason tenaciously possess, is derived, 
almost spontaneously and through an informal reasoning 


24 


GOD AND REASON 


process, from a consideration of ourselves and things 
round about us. 


Speaking of this concept of God, Fr. Kleutgen, S. J., 
Philosophie Scholastique, nn. 226 ff. (quoted by William 
George Ward, The Philosophy of Theism, Vol. 2, pp. 
133 ff.), says, ; 

“In many places Scripture declares, in the most express 
manner, that even for those to whom God has not manifested 
Himself by His Prophets or by His Son, there exists a revela- 
tion of God in His works, and even within the mind of men, 
whereby they can without any difficulty cognize God, their 
Creator and Maker, as well as His sovereign law. 

“It is not necessary to point out that Scripture does not 
in this speak of any (supposable) first cause, but of the 
living and true God, who has created heaven and earth, and 
inscribed His law in the heart of man; and that, con- 
sequently, it speaks also of the moral order. 

“Now, it says in the same passages that men who do not 
thus cognize their God are without excuse; that they are 
insengate; that they deserve God’s wrath and all His chastise- 
ments. It necessarily follows, then, that this manifestation of 
God by His works is such, that man cannot fail by this means 
to cognize God with certitude, unless he commit a grave fault. 

“Assuredly this does not mean that it is philosophical 
researches, continued laboriously through obstacles and doubts, 
which can alone lead to knowledge of God. Very few men, in 
fact, are capable of these laborious researches; whereas Scrip- 
ture speaks of all the heathens in general; and in the Book 
of Wisdom it is said expressly (13:1), ‘All men are vanity 
who do not possess the knowledge of God.’.. . 

“It necessarily follows, therefore, that there is a knowledge 
of God different from philosophical knowledge; a knowledge 
so easy to acquire and so certain, that ignorance and doubt 
on that head cannot be explained, except either by culpable 
carelessness or proud obstinacy. Suchis also... the common 
doctrine of the holy Fathers: they distinguish that knowledge, 
of God which is obtained by philosopical research, from that 
which springs up spontaneously in every man at the very sight 
of creation. This latter kind of knowledge is called by them.. 
‘an endowment of nature’. ..a knowledge which springs up 
in some sense of itself, in proportion as reason is developed. 

. . And when the Fathers of the Church declare unanimously 
on this head that this knowledge is really found and established 
in all men, the importance of their testimony is better under- 
stood by remembering that they lived in the midst of heathen 
populations. . . . Since that moral and religious life for which 
man was created is founded on a knowledge of the truths 


. whereof we speak, God watches over man, in order that reason, 


{II. 


1b 


CONCEPT OF GOD 25 


as it is developed, may come to know them with facility and 
certainty. Observe the question here is not of supernatural 
grace, but is of the natural order.” 


Scientific. This concept represents God as the unpro- 
duced first cause of the world, existing of Himself and 
with absolute necessity, one and, of necessity, only one, 
intelligent, and consequently a personal being. 

When more fully developed, it further shows God to 
be absolutely infinite, i. e., actually possessing all possible 
perfections limitlessly, absolutely simple, intrinsically 
immutable, immense, eternal, with an infinitely perfect 
knowledge from all eternity of absolutely everything 
knowable, even the free future acts of man, all holy, 
all merciful, all just, all mighty, the creator of the world, 
on whom all creatures absolutely depend for their coming 
into existence, and in every action they perform, whose 
wise providence continually governs all things and is in 
no way to be impugned because of the evils in the world, 
be they physical or moral. 

This concept is the fruit of careful analysis and 
formal, scientific demonstration. 


Other Concepts of God. Besides these two concepts of 
God which unaided reason derives through a posteriori 
demonstration from a consideration of the visible uni- 
verse, man knows God in two other ways; in this life, 
through Revelation; in the life to come, seeing God face 
to face in the Beatific Vision. These two concepts, how- 
ever, being supernatural, are outside the province of Nat- 
ural Theology. 


VARIOUS OPINIONS CONCERNING GOD. 
Atheist. One who, having the use of reason, does not 
admit the existence of God. 
Practical, One who lives as if there were no God, and 
so practically rejects Him. 


26 


GOD AND REASON 


Theoretical, One who intellectually does not admit 

God’s existence. 

Negative, When this non-admission is due to a 

want of all knowledge of God. 

Positive, When it is an explicit act. 
Agnostic, One who asserts that to man’s un- 
aided reason, God, the ultimate source of real- 
ity, must ever remain unknown. He is fre- 
quently called merely an Agnostic. 
Sceptic, One who positively doubts of God’s 
existence, 
Dogmatic, One who positively denies God’s 
existence. 

As a genuine concept of God must at least represent 
Him as a supreme being, superior to the world and on 
whom it depends, a being to be supplicated and venera- 
ted, we class as Atheists not only those just mentioned 
but also those who place God on a level with the 
world, or with any part of it. 

“No Theist” says Ward, J., Pluralism and Theism, p. 
243, “can pretend that the world is co-ordinate with 
God; the divine transcendence is essential to the whole 
theistic position.” 

Hence Pantheists, as will appear below, are Atheists, 
and also many present day non-Catholic philosophers, 
who would resent the name of Atheist, but who admit 
at least that they have no knowledge of the actual exist- 
ence of the being called God, and some of whom make 
Him to be not a real being at all, but a shadowy some- 
thing, an ideal, an inspiration, “a symbol of our highest 
human values,” the “Common Will” of men, and the 
like. In this, they follow the lead of the father of 
modern philosophy, Kant, who, no matter what he called 
himself, was really an Atheist. From the viewpoint of 
his “pure reason,’ he was an Agnostic, and the god he 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 27 


postulated, through his “practical reason,’ was really 
man himself. 


In a brief summary of his doctrine concerning God, 
to be given shortly, Kant’s Atheism will be clearly shown. 
Some idea of the atheistic trend of the philosophy of 
to-day, which even a casual reading will discover, may 
be gathered from two articles, and a lately published 
(1922) book, to which we refer: Seekers after God, by 
Durant Drake, Professor of Philosophy and Education, 
Vassar College, The Harvard Theological Review, 
January, 1919; The Theological Trend of Pragmatism, 
by A. Eustace Haydon, Chicago University, The 
American Journal of Theology (Chicago University), 
October, 1919; and The Idea of God, by Clarence A. 
Beckwith, Illinois Professor of Christian Theology, 
Chicago Theological Seminary. These three writers 
’ seem to have minds elastic enough to tolerate any con- 
cept of God, except that offered by Scholastic Phil- 
osophy. And modern philosophy is almost at one with 
them in this tolerance. Some passages from Professor 
Drake’s article have already been cited in our intro- 
duction; other passages to be cited later will further 
emphasize present-day philosophy’s rejection of God. 


. Polytheist. One who admits the existence of many 
gods. 


Pantheist. One who either partially or wholly identifles 

God with the world. A Pantheist is really an Atheist. 
Not a few philosophers of the present day profess Pan- 
theism of the idealistic type. 


Deist. One who admits the existence of God but denies 
His providence over the world, either totally, or only His 
special providence, i.e., miracles and supernatural revela- 
tion. 


bo 


on 


GOD AND REASON 


Christlieb, Modern Doubt and Christian Belief, gives a 
brief but clear picture of the Deist and incidentally also 
of the Pantheist. 


“This [Deism] is in many respects the antithesis of Pan- 
theism. According to Pantheism, God exists only in the 
world as its soul; according to Deism, He exists only above 
the world as a personal spirit, who, after creating the world 
by His will, now acts towards it like an artificer with a 
finished machine, which mechanically pursues its natural 
course according to the laws laid down for it, and no longer 
requires the immediate assistance or interference of its 
maker. . 

“The being, personality and supramundane nature of 
the Deity, and the creation of the world by Him, are thus 
acknowledged; while, on the other hand, any continuous 
active presence of God in the world, and any living inter- 
position in its affairs are denied. The world has outgrown 
its leading-strings, and emancipated from divine control is 
now left to itself. There is no special providence; miracles 
are an impossibility. Everything takes place in harmonv 
with natural laws, which are implanted in the universe and 
suffer no alteration whatsoever. This is the chief character 
of the deistical theory. 

“Ror the Pantheist, God is too near to seem to be above 
him: for the Deist, too far off to be recognized as exercising 
any direct rule over the world which He has made. Rele- 
gating God, as it were. to the uttermost confines of heing. 
he seeks to keep Him off as far as possible, in order to follow 
the light of natural reason, unmolested by the cross lights 
of a higher revelation. 

“The first and immediate consequence of this is, that. 
every special manifestation of God. no matter what, must 
he denied, all supernatural elements in the Christian helief. 
even those involved in the person and work of Christ, must 
be excluded, and anything in Scripture, bearing on these 
points must be explained away by a reference to natural 
eauses. In all essentials, then, Deism coincides entirely with 
that which was formerly denominated Naturalism, for it pro- 
nounces the laws of nature to be adequate to the continuous 
existence of the world, and natural religion to he the only 
essential form of belief, even in connection with Christianity. 
Tt likewise agrees in princinle with Rationalism. the essence of 
which consists in the position that reason is not merely the 
formal but also the material princinle of religion. and sunreme 
arbiter over the whole substance of the Christian faith.” P. 191. 


Monotheist (Theist). One who admits the existence 
of only one God, the creator and ruler of the world, over 


IV. 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 29 


which He exercises both general and special providence. 
The numerous erroneous views briefly stated above 
will be rejected later, either explicitly or implicitly. 


VARIOUS ERRONEOUS OPINIONS AS TO HOW MAN 
KNOWS GOD. 


Erring by Excess: holding that God’s existence is im- 
mediately evident to us. 

a. The Defenders of the Argument ‘A Simultaneo’ 
(though called also the Ontological argument, it is not 
the argument of the Ontologists), who hold that the 
proposition,—God, a being whose existence is absolutely 
necessary, exists,—is immediately evident to us, i. e., by 
analysis and comparison of its subject and predicate we 
come to a knowledge of God’s real and actual existence. 

St. Anselm and St. Bonaventure, Descartes and Leib- 
nitz, the two last holding the idea of God to be innate, 
used this argument. 

Some think, however, and with reason, that St. Anselm 
and St. Bonaventure presupposing God’s existence proved, 
and hence the idea of God a true one, used the argu- 
ment, not as a means of gaining a primary knowledge 
of God, but rather to show that one who conceives God 
through a concept known to be valid, must by that very 
fact know Him to exist. 


b. The Ontologists, who hold that the first knowledge 
man has, is a direct, immediate, though obscure, knowl- 
edge of God, and that in Him so known is known every- 
thing else that man knows. This vision of God is had 
through an immediate objective union with Him, and its 
initial obscurity is due to distractions arising in the 
imagination, and to the shackling of the soul to the 
body. It cannot be evolved or perfected independently 
of the concurrent action of the imagination, and inter- 
communication through speech with other intellects. 


30 


GOD AND REASON 


Hence this vision differs from that of the Blessed in 
heaven. 

There are four varieties of Ontologism: Pantheistic, 
Rationalistic, Malebranchian, Gjiobertian. Pantheistic 
Ontologism identifies our intellect with God; Rational- 
istic, claims that we have an immediate vision of the 
essence of God. Both of these forms of Ontologism 
explicitly go counter to our faith. What is more, each 
of the other two forms contains implicitly the same two 
errors. Both of them hold that we have a direct vision 
of God through some attribute; but God’s essence and 
attributes are identical in reality and also in concept; 
therefore he who has a vision of an attribute has a 
vision of the essence of God. Moreover, both of these 
opinions are pantheistic, inasmuch as they make the 
reality represented in our universal concepts a thing 
divine. But this reality is identified with creatures. 

Malebranche, Gioberti, Rosmini, and, at one time, 
Brownson were Ontologists. Ontologism was con- 
demned by a decree of the Congregation of the Holy 
Office, September 18, 1861. Cf. Denzinger, Enchiridion 
Symbolorum, etc., Ed. 1913, n. 1659. Rosmini’s opinions 
were condemned by the same Congregation, Dec. 14, 
1887. Cf. Ibid., nn. 1891 ff., 1927. For more modern 
Ontologism, cf. Driscoll, God, p. 56. 

Some of the arguments for Ontologism will be an- 
swered at the end of Thesis I. 


c. The Defenders of Innate or Divinely Infused Ideas. 
Chief among these are Descartes, Leibnitz, both of 
whom advocate the argument a simultaneo, and Ros- 
mini, whose innate idea is an intuition of God. 
Descartes admitted three kinds of ideas: 1. Those 
formed by outside objects acting through the senses 
(adventitiae, adventitious); 2. Those fashioned by the 
intellect either arbitrarily or as the result of reasoning 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 31 


(factitiae, made); 3. Innate ideas, which are created 
with the intellectual faculty. These are either actual 
cognitions which lie dormant or shine clear as attention 
is not, or is given; or an innate capacity of the mind 
for eliciting certain cognitions distinct from and causally 
independent of adventitious and factitious knowledge. 
Among other things, God is known in this way. 

Leibnitz held that at the creation of the soul, God 
gave it ideas of all things knowable in the world. These 
ideas, however, when given, are confused and involved, 
and become distinct and are evolved, according to a pre- 
established harmony, only when the body to which that 
soul is joined is acted upon. 

Rosmini asserted that in the intellect of man is an 
innate idea of being, at first indeterminate, through the 
application of which to objects perceived by the senses, 
generic and specific ideas of things are gradually formed. 
Gradually Rosmini drifted into Ontologism implicitly 
pantheistic, for in a work published after his death, he 
held that this innate idea represented intuitively some- 
thing of being, necessary, eternal, and the creative cause 
of things. 


Erring by Defect: holding that man’s intellect 
of itself is incapable of any evidential knowledge of 
God, either immediate, or mediate i. e., acquired by 
demonstration. 


a. The Traditionalists (Fideists), who say, in part, 
that man to know God, even obscurely, or, according to 
a milder form of the doctrine, to know God clearly and 
distinctly, has an absolute need of Revelation. Given 
in the beginning, this Revelation has been perpetuated by 
tradition. The intellect, therefore, if not taught from 
without, cannot come to a knowledge of God, or at least 
to a clear knowledge of Him. 


32 


GOD AND REASON 


Inventors of different forms of this error were De 
Bonald, Bonnety, Ventura. Traditionalism is con- 
demned by the Church. 


b. A Host of Modern Philosophers, more or less 
Kantian, and in the true sense of the word Agnostics, 
who teach, in part, that God’s existence in the actual 
world cannot be demonstrated, but that, through a nat- 
ural though blind instinct, an existence of some kind is 
to be accorded to Him. And this by: 


i. The Practical Reason. Kant is the father of the 
system which attributes, to what in that system 1s called 
the Practical Reason, whatever belief or faith man has in 
the existence of God, the freedom of the human will, 
and the immortality of the human soul. We say what- 
ever belief man has, for according to Kant, man neither 
has, nor can have any knowledge of these matters. 
Whatever else, then, may be said later on of Kant’s 
Practical Reason, this may be said now, that it is in no 
sense a cognitive faculty, but the Will of man, which 
acts independently of reason, and with absolutely no 
reasonable foundation. It is a blind guide, born of a 
system that is destructive of all truth, morality and 
religion. What follows will make this only too evident. 

It is not our intention, however, to give here a full 
explanation and refutation of Kant’s system. That is 
done elsewhere in philosophy. It will be sufficient for 
our present purpose to view it briefly in its bearing on 
God, morality and religion, noting in the meanwhile, a 
point well worthy of note, namely, that, though abound- 
ing in glaring inconsistencies,—‘‘glorious inconsistencies” 
one of his admirers calls them—the influence of Kant’s 
system on modern thought is almost beyond estimation. 
Modern philosophy has all but rejected reason univer- 
sally as a guide to God, or in any of the weightier 
interests of life, and to Kant as to an infallible teache> 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 33 


it appeals for justification in this rejection. This is the 
destructive heritage that Kant has left to modern phil- 
osophy. 

Man’s knowledge according to Kant, is confined 
solely to phenomena, 1.e., to his own subjective sense 
experiences. He knows, and can know nothing out- 
side of them, nothing outside of himself. The Natural 
Sciences and Mathematics which have to do with phen- 
omena, either actual or possible, are real sciences. Meta- 
physics, on the contrary, as a science claiming to deal 
with extra-phenomenal reality, ie, with things-in- 
themselves, 1s useless. Cosmology, Psychology, Natural 
Theology, can know nothing of a world, a soul, a God, 
for these objects transcending man’s experience are alto- 
gether outside of his knowledge. True, the speculative 
reason, urged on by an uncontrollable impulse to seek 
for the unconditioned condition of all things conditioned, 
reaches out to the Being of beings, an infinite God; 
nevertheless, its labor is barren, for since it knows noth- 
ing, and can know nothing of a real God, it develops and 
can develop only an idea of God, to which corresponds 
no known or knowable reality. Kant’s speculative 
reason, then, as we noted before, brings man to agnostic 
Atheism. 

Kant’s system, however, does not stop here. The 
prime motive he had in destroying reason’s power to 
reach God, he tells us, was not to bring about Atheism, 
on the contrary, it was to protect God, religion and mor- 
ality from the many enemies who were making use of 


reason to destroy them. 

“T am not allowed, therefore,’ Kant says in the preface 
to the second edition of his Critique of Pure Reason, “even to 
assume for the sake of the necessary practical employment 
of reason, God, freedom and immortality, if I cannot deprive 
speculative reason of its pretensions to transcendent insights, 
because reason, in order to arrive at these, must use principles 
which are intended originally for objects of possible experience 
only, and which, if in spite of this, they are applied to what 


34 


GOD AND REASON 


cannot be an object of experience, really change this into a 
phenomenon, thus rendering all practical extension of pure 
reason impossible. J had therefore to remove knowledge to 
make room for belief. For the dogmatism of metaphysic, 
that is, the presumption that it is possible to achieve anything 
in metaphysic without a previous criticism of pure reason, 
is the source of all that unbelief, which is always very dog- 
matical, and wars against all morality...” 


“The greatest benefit, however, [of the Critique of Pure 
Reason] will be, that such a work will enable us to put an 
end forever to all objections to morality and religion, accord- 
ing to the Socratic method, namely, by the clearest proof of 
the ignorance of our opponents. Some kind of metaphysic 
has always existed, and will always exist, and with a dla- 
lectic of pure reason, as being natural to it. Jt is therefore 
the first and most important task of philosophy to deprive 
metaphysic, once for all, of its pernicious influence, by closing 
up the sources of its errors.’ (Max Miiller’s Translation, 
2nd edition, pp. 700, 701.) 


By removing, then, the fundamental truths of reit- 
gion and morality from the reach of reason, Kant wished 
to protect them, little seeing that such removal would 
necessarily destroy them. Heine saw with clear vision 
the result of Kant’s philosophy,—‘I can hear the bell. 
Kneel down. They are bringing the Sacraments to a 
dying God.” 

Having deprived speculative reason of the power to 
attack God, Kant now turns to his Practical Reason to 
bring God back again, to restore Him to His proper 
place in man’s life. How this is done, and what kind 
of god Kant has brought back, we shall now see. 

Man cannot know God, nevertheless man is a moral 
being, and the Practical Reason through the voice of 
conscience proclaiming the Categoric Imperative,—‘This 
must be done; this must be left undone,’—demands in- 
sistently man’s obedience. This obedience, however, 
cannot be justified, in other words, morality cannot 
be justified, unless the Practical Reason postulates the 
existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and the 
freedom of the will, i. e..—restricting our attention now 
merely to the postulate of God’s existence,—unless the 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 35 


Practical Reason commands man to act on the hypo- 
thesis (Kant denies that it is an hypothesis) that there 
is a God, to act as if there were a God, the while his 
cognitive or speculative reason tells him that it knows 
nothing of a God, and can discover no reasonable 
grounds for asserting the existence of one. Donat in 
The Freedom of Science, p. 45, justly remarks, 


“This dualism of ‘faith’ and ‘knowledge’ is as untenable 
as it is common. It is a psychological impossibility as well 
as a sad degradation of religion. How can I seriously believe 
and seriously hold for true, a view of the world which I do 
not know to be really true, when the intellect unceasingly 
whispers in my ear: it is all imagination. As long as faith 
is a conviction so long must it be an activity of the intellect. 
With my feeling and will I may indeed wish that something 
be true; but to wish simply that there be a God is not to 
be convinced that there actually is a God. By merely longing 
and desiring, I can be as little convinced, as I can make 
progress in virtue by walking, or repent of sins by a tooth- 
ache.”’ 


Man, then, according to Kant, postulates the exist- 
ence of a god, capable of satisfying a need which man 
judges himself to have. As the nature of this postulated 
being is not determined by anything that man knows 
to be objectively true, then every individual man being 
the judge of his own needs may postulate a god to 
suit himself. Whether the god so postulated exists or 
not makes little or no difference. That this is the prac- 
tical outcome of Kant’s philosophy we shall show pres- 
ently. 

Before doing so, however, let us see what kind of god 
Kant postulated to explain the moral law. Time and again 
he insists that God is not the source of morality, that 
there is no eternal, divine law that man is bound to obey, 
that man is a law unto himself, and is bound to obey 
not God but himself. Man is morally autonomous, just 
as in Kant’s system he is intellecually autonomous, God’s 
existence, then, is postulated by Kant not because with- 
out Him, as man’s moral superior and the supreme law- 
giver, the moral order could not be explained, but because 


GOD AND REASON 


without Him, as ruler of physical nature, all-powerful to 
harmonize it with man’s moral endeavors, man could not 
hope to reach that happiness which he merits by obeying 
not God, but his own nature. Man, therefore, in the 
moral order, and in the religious order also,—for, accord- 
ing to Kant, religion and morality are one and the same 
thing—is not merely independent of God, but is His 
superior, for God is only an agent of man, postulated 
to give to man the happiness which man has deserved 
independently of Him. (Cf. Kant’s Theory of Ethics, 
Abbott's’ translation, 6 Ed., pp. 16,17, 18; Shee 
BOG Ce 2h tun od) eA Ott, } 

Johnston Estep Walter in an article on Kant’s Moral 
Theology, Harvard Theological Review, July, 1917, 
writes very clearly and forcibly on this point: | 


“The moral law [according to Kant] commands us to 
make the summum bonum the ultimate object of our en- 
deavors. The summum bonum consists of two elements, mor- 
ality or virtue and happiness. Virtue is the ‘first and princi- 
pal element’ (‘it is the worth of the person, and his worthiness 
to be happy’); happiness is the inferior element, it is con- 
ditioned by virtue . . . It should be attentively observed 
that Kant assumes the existence of God, not as necessary to 
the possibility of the whole of the summum bonum, but of 
only one of its elements, and that, the inferior element, 
namely, happiness. Kant never postulates a God as _ nec- 
essary to the ‘first and principal element’ of the summum 
bonum, virtue or morality. 

“More fully it should be noted, that he does not treat 
God as the author of the community of moral agents in the 
world, or as the supreme object of their moral reverence, or 
as the producer of moral law, or the inspirer of moral life, 
or as Himself having ordained that virtue shall be accom- 
nanied by proportionate happiness, or as having made it a 
duty to promote the summuim bonum; that is to say, he does 
not postulate a God as necessary for any of the greater objects 
and concerns of morality, but only, or primarily, as the agent 
of the rather subordinate office of securing for the virtuous 
the happiness which they think they ought to have. 

“Kant regards man as morally autonomous, ag giving 
moral law to himself and obeying it himself, as the sole 
author of his own virtue. To assume that men are dependent 
on God for the moral law and for virtue would be posulating 
a species of heteronomy to which Kant is always decidedly 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 37 


opposed. He will not accept the moral law even from God; 
he firmly claims autonomy. The supreme moral object for 
men is the moral law, which they produce of themselves and 
impose upon themselves. In his moral theory the finite 
rational agent is greater than God.” 


Briefly, Kant’s Practical Reason,—which is not reason 
at all, but the Will demanding and commanding 
obedience to moral laws,—blindly postulates a god of 
a kind to render service to man such, that man may find 
it possible to obey laws which emanate from himself. 
It is an act of the will, then, setting up a god with a 
man-fashioned nature to serve a man-created desire. 
The intellect, therefore, no longer discovers a God exist- 
ing outside of man, whose existence and attributes are 
His by divine right, eternally and absolutely, on whom 
man utterly depends, whose supreme will man is bound 
to obey, who is to be reverenced, worshipped and adored ; 
but the will of man conjures up a god, whose existence 
is not known and cannot be known, and who cannot con- 
sequently be treated as a real being, and whose nature 
and attributes are fashioned by man to suit man’s self- 
made needs. 

Kant’s speculative reason makes of man an Agnostic, 
his practical reason goes further. When its work ts 
done, man no longer merely confesses ignorance of God, 
but to his ignorance he has added the insult of setting 
up in place of the true God, a postulated or supposititious 
god, man-made and man’s inferior. It will not sur- 
prise us, then, if, as the subjoined excerpts will show, we 
find religion a sham for Kant, and for the many present- 
day philosophers who, following his lead, reject a 
reason-proved God, and substitute a god of their own 
making, or choose one from the many man-made gods 
already fashioned. | 

Of Kant’s religion, Donat, The Freedom of Science, 


writes, citing in places Kant’s own words: 


“Kant himself the father of agnostic mysticism, has 
made it clear that his postulates of faith concerning the 


38 


GOD AND REASON 


existence of God and the immortality of the soul, have never 
taken in him the place of earnest conviction. Thus, in the 
first place, Kant holds that there are no duties towards God, 
since He is merely a creature of our mind. ‘Since this idea 
[of God] proceeds entirely from ourselves, and is a product 
of ours, we have here before us a postulated being towards 
whom we can have no obligation; for its reality would first 
have to be proved by experience, . . . to have religion is a 
duty man owes to himself.’ ‘Prayer, as an internal form of 
cult, and therefore, considered aS a means of grace, is a 
superstitious delusion . . . A disposition present in all our 
actions to perform them as if in the service of God, is a spirit 
of prayer that can and ought to be our perpetual guide . 

By this . . . spirit of prayer man seeks to influence only 
himself; by prayer, since man expresses himself in words, 
hence outwardly, he seeks to influence God. In the former 
sense a prayer can be made with all sincerity, though man 
does not pretend to assert the existence of God fully estab- 
lished; in the latter form, as an address, he assumes the 
highest Being is personally present, or at least pretends that 
he is convinced of his presence, in the belief, that even should 
he not be, it can do him no harm, on the contrary it may 
win him favor; hence in the latter form of actual prayer we 
shall not find the sincerity as perfect as in the former.’” P. 46. 


Kant’s followers are more outspoken and some even 
blasphemous in their rejection of God. It will be suffi- 
cient to cite a few. 

Kleinpeter, Kantstudien, VIII, p. 314, 

“It is important to hold fast to the idea that a self- 
existent, divine truth, independent of the subject, objectively 
binding, enthroned, so to say, above men and gods, is mean- 
ingless, . . . Such a Truth is nonsense.” (Cited by Donat, 
Le preb). 

Niebergall, Christliche Welt, 1909, p. 43, 


“The fundamental idea of religion can neither be created 
nor destroyed by teaching; it has its seat in sentiment, like 
—excuse the term—an insane idea.” (Cited by Donat, l.c., 
p. 45). 

E. Von Hartmann, 


“From the viewpoint of authority, autonomy does not 
mean anything else but that in ethical matters I am for my- 
self the highest court of appeal . . . The God, who in the 
beginning spoke to his children from a fiery cloud ... has 
descended into our bosom, and, transformed into our being, 
speaks out of us as a moral autonomy.” (Cited by Donat, lL.c., 
p. 250). 

“We cannot help attributing a religious character, as far 
as the animal is concerned, to the relation between the in- 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 39 


telligent domestic animals and their master.” (Cited by 
Donat, l.c., p. 290). 
Plate, 


“The universe is the expression of a uniform, original 
principle, which may be termed God, Nature, primitive force, 


or anything else, . . . These fundamental ideas of monism 
are by no means atheistic.” (Cited by Donat, l.c., p. 287). 
Jodl, 


“As the realm of science is the real, and the realm of 
art the possible, so the realm of religion is the impossible.” 
(Cited by Donat, l.c., p. 290). 


Leuba, 


“The truth of the matter can be put in this way: Godt 
is not known, he is not understood; he is used—sometimes 
as a meat-purveyor, sometimes as a moral support, sometimes 
as a friend, sometimes as an object of love. If he proves 
himself useful the religious consciousness asks for no more 
than that. Does God really exist? What is he? are so many 
irrelevant questions.” (Cited by James, The Varieties of 
Religious Hxperience, p. 506. What James thought of God 
we have seen in our Introduction, and shall further see 
below, in the section entitled Pragmatism). 


W. Bender, 


“Not the question about God, and not the inquiry into 
the origin and purpose of the world is religion, but the 
question about man. All religious views of life are anthropo- 
centric.” (Cited by James, l.c., p. 507). 

Durant Drake, Seekers After God, Harvard Theo- 
logical Review, January, 1919, has already witnessed to 
the hopeless confusion concerning God into which mod- 
ern philosophy has been led by its Kantian rejection of 
reason as a guide in man’s search for Him. A few 
more confirmatory passages from the same article will 
close our present inquiry. 

“It now seems rather needless to be an atheist. There are 
so many conceptions of God afloat that anyone at all widely 
read can scarcely fail to find someone suited to his mental 
outlook and convictions.” P. 69. 

“For certain types of mind pantheism will always be 
alluring. . . . The veteran and beloved John Burroughs 
equates the terms ‘God’ and ‘Nature.’ ‘We must get rid of the 
great moral governor and head director. He is a fiction of 
our own brains. We must recognize only Nature, the All: 
call it God if we will . . .’ 


“Similarly ex-President Elliot, in his famous address 
on The Religion of the Future (Delivered at the Harvard 


40) 


GOD AND REASON 


Summer School of Theology, 1909), declares that ‘the new 
thought of God will be its most characteristic element.’ ‘The 
Infinite Spirit pervades the universe, just as the spirit of man 
pervades his body, and acts consciously or unconsciously in 
every atom of it.’ It is ‘one, omnipotent, eternal Energy, in- 
forming and inspiring the whole creation at every instant of 
time and throughout the infinite spaces.’” P. 71. 

“In his last great work (The Problem of Christianity) 
Royce. . defined God, more in accord with the new dominant 
tendency, as ‘ the spirit of the beloved community.’” P. 72. 

“At last Mr. Wells.. has succeeded in forming his con- 
ception of God, . . . ‘He is the undying human memory, 
the increasing human will’ This is reminiscent of earlier 
expressions by a scholarly American writer (H, A. Overstreet, 
Hibbert » Journal, Vol. Spy 3947 Vols MITT. i.) bai 
defined ‘God’ as ‘our own ideal of life,’ ‘the finer life that lives 
potentially in ourselves, ‘the deeper, more comprehensive 
self in all men that is urging to realization.’ ... Is that 
the conception, so eloquently presented by F, H. Green (V'he 
Witness of God), of God, as ‘our unrealized ideal of a besi’? 

‘The word God is a symbol to designate the universe 
in its ideal-achieving capacity.’ (So Forster, The Function 
of Religion in Man’s Struggle for Existence.) Pp. 74, 75, 76. 

“Mr. Bernard Shaw, who, in that delightful play, Andro- 
cles and the Lion, showed his ability to appreciate the 
Christian spirit, tells us in its preface that ‘Jesus declared 
that the reality behind the popular belief in God was a 
creative spirit in ourselves called by Him the Heavenly 
Father and by us Evolution, Blan Vital, Life Force, and 
other names.’” P. 79. 


ii. Sentiment, i.e., by a blind irresistible feeling of a 
faculty superior to the intellect. This faculty is called 
the divine sense, the religious sense. Jacobi, Schleier- 
macher, Gratry and many present-day philosophers hold 
this opinion. 


ui. A Blind Instinct of the Intellect, called the com- 
mon sense, the faculty of inspiration, of intuition. So 
think Reid, Oswald, Dugald Stewart and others. 


iv. The Principle of Vital Immanence. This prin- 
ciple is proposed by the Modernists as the source of man’s 
knowledge of God, and of religious truths in general. The 
system they have built up in support of it, philosophically, 
bristles with error; theologically, it has been rightly styled 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 41 


in the Encyclical of Pius X, Pascendi Dominici gregts, 
Sept. 8, 1907, (Denzinger, op. c., nn. 2071 ff.) condemn- 
ing it, “a synthesis of all heresies.” Many of its errors, 
therefore, are in direct opposition to the revealed word of 
God, and have been condemned by not a few Councils of 
the Church. The above-mentioned Encyclical gives a very 
full exposition of its erroneous doctrines and its methods 
of propagandism, and points out the means to be taken to 
nullify its baneful influence. One of these means ts a 
solid grounding in Scholastic Philosophy. 


The following are some of the principal errors of Mod- 
ernism: 
a. Man by the natural light of human reason cannot come 
to a knowledge of God. Hence all proofs for God’s 
existence advanced in Natural Theology are worthless. 
Neither can the word of man, nor the teaching of man 
reveal God to us. God is the object of faith-knowledge, 
and as such is known only by a direct revelation made 
by God to each individual man. 
b. As God is not known previous to, or outside of the 
act of faith-knowledge, there can be no question of a 
revelation accepted on the word of an all-knowing, all- 
truthful God, hence this revelation of Himself which 
God makes to each individual man is not an objective 
or external revelation, i. e., one made transiently or from 
without, as, for example, when one man reveals some- 
thing to another, but a subjective revelation made by God 
immanent in the heart, i. e., the desires or affections of 
man, by which man has an actual vital experience of God 
working within him. This vital experience then, is 
not an intellectual vision of God as a being external to 
man, but a sense or emotional feeling which is produced 
in the heart, i.e., the affective faculty, without any pre- 
vious advertence of the mind, and possesses within itself, 
as its own object and as its imtrinsic cause, the reality of 


42 


GOD AND REASON 


the divine. In other words, man is emotionally conscious 
of God’s presence within him, God being the imtrinsic 
cause of this emotion, the intrinsic Revealer, and also 
the object revealed in it. 


Now as man can be conscious only of fis own vital 
acts, and of himself as the cause concretely revealed in 
them, it follows that if man is conscious of an emotion 
intrinsically caused by God, and revealing God, man’s 
vital act and God’s vital act are one and the same act; 
God and man are identified. This is pure Pantheism. 


In justification of these statements we cite a few pas- 
sages from [he Programme of Modernism (Translated 
by Tyrrell) and from Tyrrell, Through Scylla and Char- 
ybdis, at the same time calling attention to the panthe- 
istic implications involved in the supreme eminence in 
religious matters given by the Modernists to the indi- 
vidual and collective religious consciousness because of 
the immanence of God in that consciousness. 


The Programme of Modernism: 


“Religious knowledge is our actual experience of the 
divine which works in ourselves and in the whole world.” 
P. 596. 

“Religion is shown to be the spontaneous result of irre- 
pressible needs of man’s spirit which finds satisfaction in 
the inward and emotional experience of the presence of God 
within us.” P. 100. 

“Long years . . . have. . . driven us [Modernista) 
to adopt a new theory as to the development of dogma from 
the teaching of Christ, preferring to see everywhere the 
continual and secret workings of a divine indwelling spirit 
rather than contradict plain facts by admitting an abrupt 
and complete revelation which never took place.” P. 17. 

“That this revelation [ie., revelation as explained by 
the Modernists] can only be transmitted by external 
signs is beyond question. But this does not alter the fact 
that our adhesion to these supernatural realities, which are 
the theme and argument of the said revelation is a result 
of internal experience.” P. 109. 

“It cannot be denied that our [the Modernists’] postu- 
lates are inspired by the principles of immanentism, for they 
all assume that the subject is not purely passive in its pro- 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 43 


cesses of knowledge and in its religious experiences, but 
brings forth from its own spiritual nature both the witness 
to a higher reality intuitively perceived and the abstract 
formulation of the same.” P. 99. 

“Modernists . . . examine them [the Scriptures] with 
two faculties: the scientific faculty . . . and the faculty of 
faith, or religious intuition, which strives by assimilation 
and self-adaptation to re-experience within itself that religi- 
ous experience of which the Bible is the written record.” 
P. 125: 

“According to this principle [the immanental], nothing 
can enter into and get hold of man’s spirit that does not 
spring from it and in some way correspond to its need 
of self-expansion. For there is no fixed truth, no unalterable 
principle, that is not in some way self-imposed and innate.”’ 
Peo 2: 


Through Scylla and Charybdis : 


“Revelation is not so much a representation of some- 
thing experienced, as one of the elements of a complex spiri- 
tual experience—an experience made up of feelings and 
impulses and imaginings; which reverberates in every corner 
of the soul and leaves its impress everywhere; in the mind 
no less than in the heart and will . . . It would be a 
mistake to regard these latter ag the exclusive substance 
and reality of the experience, or as the ‘content’ or significa- 
tion of that so-called ‘representation.’ It is as much a part 
of the experience as they are, . . . it is, together with 
them, the subject matter of a subsequent act of reflection 
which strives to understand the whole complex experience 
in the interests of theology and philosophy.” P. 283. 

“Revelation is not statement but experience . . . When, 
therefore, God reveals Himself to the spirit in an extra- 
ordinary way and degree, it is in the total experience that 
we are to look for the revelation and not merely in the 
mental element. In this total experience He is revealed, 
not as a fact is revealed in a statement, but as a cause is 
revealed in its effect . . . Revelation is not a statement, 
but a ‘showing.’ God speaks by deeds, not by words.” Pp. 
285, 287. 

“On the ears of the hearer, prophetic utterances must 
fall dead, unless there be within him a capacity to be evoked 
and directed by the Divine Word, a spirit to answer the 
Spirit . . . In other words, the teaching from outside must 
evoke a revelation in us. It is to this evoked revelation 
that we answer by the act of Faith, recognizing it as God’s 
word in us from outside, it can be occasioned, but it cannot 
be caused, by instruction.” Pp. 304, 305, 306. 

“For us once freed from our imaginative representation 
of an external God, who works upon humanity from outside; 


44 


GOD AND REASON 


for us who recognize that the Divine Spirit is to be sought 
{fn the human spirit, where alone iit speaks to us and 
reveals itself, the question as to whether authority (civil or 
religious) is from heaven or of men assumes a new complexion, 
and needs a new formulation. . . 

“Tf then the community to be governed is a higher organ, 
a fuller manifestation of the immanent Deity than any of 
the laws, council or rulers, by which it is governed; if God 
{s never to be found by man so truly outside as inside 
humanity—in conscience, both individual and collective—there 
is no such thing as an authority for whose use or abuse its 
bearer is accountable solely to an absentee external God and 
to an indefinitely distant assize. He is accountable, in a 
sense, to God alone, but it is to God immanent in the 
collective mind and conscience of the community.” P. 370. 

“The priest is not only for the people but from the 
people; his baptism is indeed from Heaven, but it is also 
from men. ‘That it is from the Spirit, through the com- 
munity is inevitably implied in the practice of ceremonial 
ordination. That it is from the Spirit in the communty is 
only the rational interpretation of the symbolic and pictorial 
account which religion gives us. It is from Him Who dwells 
not in temples made with human hands, but in that human 
temple which His own hands have made. The priest stands 
above the layman solely as the representative of the whole 
organism of the Church of which he and the layman alike 
are constituent members. From that organism, as from 
God, all his spiritual powers are derived, and to it, as to 
God, he is responsible for their use or abuse.” P. 371. 

“The vital question is—Where is that God to whom alone 
both Pope and Council claim to be responsible? Is He im- 
manent in the whole Church where we can ultimately learn 
His mind and will, or is He away beyond the stars where 
we can know nothing of either .. . ? Bvyv what vehicle 
does He speak and communicate with us? By voices from 
the clouds or by the gradual evolution of His Mind and 
Will in the collective spirit of mankind?” P. 380. 

“It is said reforms must come from below. Let us 
rather say they must come from above, from God immanent 
in the entire community which stands above priesthood and 
in laity.” P. 385. 

What interpretation is to be put on these statements 


the Encyclical mentioned above tells us: 


“Concerning immanence it is not easy to determine what 
Modernists precisely mean by it, for their own opinions 
on the subject vary. Some understand it. . ., others, finally, 
explain it in a way which savors of Pantheism, and this, in 
truth, is the sense which best fits in with the rest of their 
doctrines . . . And to Pantheism pure and simple that other 
doctrine of the divine immanence leads directly. For this 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 45 


is the question we ask: Does or does not this immanence 
leave God distinct from man? If it does, in what does it 
differ from the Catholic doctrine of external revelation? If 
it does not, it is Pantheism. Now the doctrine of immanence 
in the Modernist acceptation holds and professes that every 
phenomenon of conscience proceeds from man as man. The 
rigorous conclusion of this is the identity of man with God, 
which means Pantheism.”’ 


Furthermore, as this sentimental feeling of the divine 
is, and can be, preceded in man by no natural knowledge 
of God, and as it is the sole source of the only knowledge 
man can have of God, 1.e., faith-knowledge,—which really 
is not intellectual knowledge, since God, according to 
the Modernists, cannot be reached by man’s intellect,—it 
must be, as far as man is concerned, a blind emotional 
feeling for an intellectually unknown and unknowable 
object. 


The Encyclical continues: 


“The object of science they [the Modernists] say, is 
the reality of the knowable; the object of faith, on the 
contrary, is the reality of the unknowable. Now, what makes 
the unknowable unknowable is its disproportion with the in- 
telligible, a disproportion which nothing whatever, even in 
the doctrine of the Modernists, can suppress. Hence the 
unknowable remains and will eternally remain unknowable 
to the believer as well as to the philosopher. Therefore, 
if any religion at all is possible, it can only be the religion 
of an unknown reality.” 


c. This vital experience or sense of the divine reality. 
this subjective revelation of Himself is produced by the 
immanent God in the heart of man in answer to a 
longing, a desire for God initially hidden in man’s sub- 
consciousness. And how does this longing emerge into 
consciousness, satisfied by the vital experience of God’s 
presence, and how does that experience grow and de- 
velop? The occasion for all this, not in any sense the 
cause,—God vitally immanent in man is the cause,—is 
some event in man’s life, a sickness, maybe, or a reverse 
of fortune, or something he has read, or something he 
has heard, say, from a friend or in a sermon. What ts 
more, man’s daily experience may also furnish him with 


46 


GOD AND REASON 


objects on which faith-knowledge works, in which case, 
however, those objects are disfigured and transfigured 
by faith into something higher, and so removed into the 
realm of faith-knowledge. A notable example of this 
is had in the person of Christ. As an historic person- 
age Christ was a mere man, and not God. As such He 
was an object falling within the experience of His 
fellow-men. Faith, however, disfiguring and transfigur- 
ing the man Christ, sees in Him God. What the Mod- 
ernist means, when he professes a belief in the divinity 
of Christ, we shall see shortly. 


d. The work of the intellect and reason in the origin 
and growth of man’s faith-knowledge, is neither to 
discover God nor argumentatively to increase man’s 
knowledge of God, but merely to examine and analyze 
the initial revelation, the emotional sense of the divine, 
in which God discovers Himself to man; to represent 
intellectually and clearly God discovered there, and there- 
after systematically to arrange and express in intellect- 
ual formulas or categories the growing experiences of 
the divine which as time goes on are produced in man 
by the action of God vitally immanent in him. 


e. What the Modernist considers truth and knowledge 
in general to be, and what, in general, the work of the 
intellect and reason in man, will be best stated in their 
own words. Their views will be found to be subversive, 
utterly destructive of all knowledge. 

We quote from The Programme of Modernism: 


“First of all we distinguish different orders of knowledge, 
—phenomenal, scientific, philosophic, religious. Phenomenal 
embraces all sense-objects in their particularity; scientific 
knowledge applies its calculations to the various groupings of 
perceived phenomena, and gives expression to the constant 
laws of their changes; philosophical knowledge is the inter- 
pretation of the universe according to certain inborn cata- 
gories of the human mind, and having regard to the deep- 
seated, unchanging demands of life and action; religious 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 47 


knowledge, in fine, is our actual experience of the divine 
which works in ourselves and in the whole world. 

“Naturally this does away with the old definitions, in- 
herited by scholasticism, . . . by which science wags con- 
ceived as ‘the knowledge of an object according to its causes 
—efficient, final, material, formal,’ and philosophy as ‘the 
knowledge of things human and divine in their ultimate causes.’ 
But it is not our fault ... if psychological analysis ... 
has shown the subjective and personal elements which con- 
tribute to the formation of abstract knowledge. So that to-day 
it is no longer possible to speak of a cognitive faculty 
which functions in complete independence of our subjective 
needs and interests and arrives at a certainty and a truth 
which is ‘an equation of thought to thing’ (adaequatio rei 
et intellectus.) 

“To-day speculation is recognized to be a sort of action, 
in the more general sense of the term, and to be subservient 
to action. ‘The act of knowledge is the result of a laborious 
effort of the spirit to dominate reality and turn it to its 
own service by aid of certain mental schemata, or plans, in 
which it represents the useful relations and connections of 
objects. 

“Such a conception is liberating in the broadest sense. 
Considering the cognitive faculty as a function of man’s 
whole inward life; always remembering the relation of strict 
solidarity between abstract thought and action; breaking 
down the fictitious barriers raised between thought and will 
by scholastic philosophy, we contrive to give an enormous 
expansion to the region of the knowable, and to show that 
man is able, although by forms of knowledge hitherto little 
appreciated, to attain to those higher realities, the intimate 
apprehension of which augments the value of life and 
enriches it with new possibilities.’ Pp. 96, 97, 98. 

“For us it matterg little to attain to God through the 
demonstrations of mediaeval metaphysics or through argu- 
ments from miracles and prophecies which offend rather than 
impress the modern mind, and evade the control of ex- 
DEPIeNee. wires, 

“The arguments for the existence of God, drawn by 
scholastic metaphysic from change and movement, from the 
finite and contingent nature of things, from the degrees of 
perfection, and from the design and purpose of the world 
have lost all value nowadays.” Pp. 98, 100. 

“It is impossible for us of to-day to conceive a purely 
intellectual and speculative faculty, immune from all in- 
fluences of the will and the emotions. To the latest psy- 
chology reason seems more and more to be a sort of instru- 
ment of formulation and definition which human nature has 
instinctively fashioned for itself, and which it uses uncon- 
sciously in order to arrange, express, and control the ex- 
periences of the more elementary faculties of will and feeling 


48 


GOD AND REASON 


CeO 
and external sensation . . . For us reason does not exist as 


something abstract and apart. It exists only as a function 
of the instinctive faculties whose wants and successes it 
registers and classifies for future use.” Pp. 107, 108. 


f. According to the Modernists, then, an act of knowl- 
edge, a judgment, may be true when the object whose 
actual existence is affirmed does not exist at all, for, as 
we have seen, they insist that truth does not consist in 
a correspondence or equation between the intellect judg- 
ing and the object of its judgment. What, then, is the 
truth-value of such a judgment? In reality it has no 
such value, for the Modernists have destroyed the notion 
of truth. They call it a true judgment, however, even 
though it in no way corresponds to reality, if it is use- 
ful or helpful to man intellectually, morally, religiously, 
etc. 7 hpi 

If you ask the Modernist, then: “Does God exist?” 
he will answer, speaking as a believer with the knowl- 
edge of faith: “Yes;” speaking from the knowledge that 
he has gathered from his reading even of the Scriptures, 
or from what other men have told him, or from his 
reasoning on the world round about him, he will an- 
swer: “I do not know. Neither science, nor philosophy, 
nor the word of man, nor his teaching can give me any 
certainty on that point.” If you ask him, further: “Is 
your faith-judgment, ‘God exists,’ a true judgment?” 
he should answer: “It is true, even though there be no 
person called God; it is true with a symbolic value, be- 
cause it voices in a concrete way a sentiment, a thought, 
an inspiration, which is useful, which satisfies my re- 
ligious yearnings and urges me on to action.” If you 
ask him further: “Is the judgment, ‘Christ is God’ a 
true judgment?” he will answer as a believer: “Yes;” 
as a reader of history he will answer: “No, the person 
Christ who lived many years ago in the flesh, was a mere 
man, and not God.” And so, in the same way, to the 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 49 


questions: ‘Did Christ perform miracles?” “Yes’’ and 
No.) Was Christ) bornyot al virgin / Mother?” "Yes 
and “No,” “Did Christ rise from the dead?” “Yes” and 
“No,” etc. It may be well, however, to let the Modern- 
ists tell us all this in their own words. 


The Programme of Modernism: 

“It is certain, however, that faith-truth is not always 
historical truth, but often only historical fiction.” P. 64. 

“As the supernatural life of Christ in the faithful and in 
the church has been clothed in an historical form which has 
given birth to what we might somewhat loosely call the 
Christ of legend, so the same life has been submitted to a 
doctrinal elaboration which has given birth to the Christ of 
theology or dogma.” P. 70. 

“By means of history we see in him [Christ] a man 
who has taught us by word and example: by means of faith 
we experience in Him the Saviour whose death and resur- 
rection have given us a new life.” P. 73. 

“It matters little to faith whether or no criticism can 
prove the virgin-birth of Christ, His more strikiag miracles, 
or even His resurrection; whether or no it sanctions the 
attribution to Christ of certain dogmas, or of the direct 
institution of the Church. As ultra-phenomenal, these former 
facts evade the grasp of experimental and historical criticism, 
while of the /atter it finds, as a fact, no proof. But both 
these and those possess a reality for faith superior to that 
of physical and historical facts. Without them, without such 
an expression of ultimate moral values, Christian experience 
would have lacked one of its most solid supports.” P. 112. 

“This way [the pragmatic] of conceiving the legitimacy 
of the development of Christianity is rebuked by the Encyc- 
lical as subjectivism and symbolism. But subjectivism and 
symbolism can no longer be reproaches. The latest criticism 
of the various knowledge-theories points to everything in the 
realm of knowledge—the laws of science and the theories of 
metaphysics—as being subjective and symbolic. But this 
does not hinder every such creation of the human spirit in 
the various departments of its activity from having an 
absolute value. Also the world constructed by faith has 
its life-giving value, and is therefore something absolute in 
its own kind. As for symbolism, a symbol no longer means 
a fictitious, and perhaps fraudulent, substitution connected 
with ignorant or erroneous beliefs. It too is a reality of its 
own peculiar kind whereon faith confers an inestimable value 
by which it becomes the real vehicle and beneficent occasion 
of an uplifting of the spirit and of a deeper religious 
insight. And since our own life is—for each one of us— 
something absolute, nay, the only absolute of our direct 


50 


GOD AND REASON 


experience, all that proceeds from it and returns to it, all that 
feeds it and expands it more fruitfully, has, in like manner, 
the value of something absolute.” P. 114. 


v. Pragmatism. Pragmatism rejects the definition of 
logical or intellectual truth as an equation, a correspond- 
ence, between the thinkirig intellect and the object of its 
thought, and calls that true which is useful, helpful, up- 
building. Logical truth, then, for the Pragmatist has 
no objective, absolute, permanent value, independent of 
the thinker, but a subjective, relative value; relative to 
the varying conditions of the thinker, and hence, which 
changes as they change. This system, therefore, in 
reality does away with the notion of truth altogether, 
and substitutes for it that of utility. Now, whilst truth 
may be very useful and have a practical value, never- 
theless truth is not utility. 

Many who are, strictly speaking, not Pragmatists, 


adopt this pragmatic norm of truth. The Modernists, 


for example, have done so, and with what results we 
have seen. Its use must lead to intellectual chaos, 
and countless other evils. For no matter how much 
its defenders may try to limit its application, it logically 
gives every individual the right to hold as true what- 
ever he considers helpful, and to act accordingly. What 
is true for me, then, may be false for you; what is true 
for me to-day may be false to-morrow; what is true 
for me according to faith-knowledge to-day, may, at the 
same time, be absolutely false, so the Modernists insist, 
as an historical fact. A man, then, who would use the 
pragmatic norm of truth, might assert the judgment, “God 
exists,’ to be a true judgment, giving it any meaning he 
pleased, even insisting that he had no knowledge of the 
objective existence of any being called God, provided 
he found such a judgment helpful to him. In fact, 
James has told us in A Pluralistic Universe, p. 124, that 
“God in the religious life of ordinary men is the name 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 51 


. only of the ideal tendency of things, believed in as 
a isuper-human person.” 
All this, of course, is but making a mockery of truth 
and knowledge. A few examples will show this. 


The Pragmatic writer of the unsigned article 
on Polytheism in the Encyclopedia Americana gives 
this definition of Deity: “What one ought to mean 
by the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of Deity is not 
the reality or otherwise of any events which are associa- 
ted with its rise; but on the contrary, the adequacy of 
the idea to inspire just such feelings and to constrain 
to just such religious behavior as will give expression to 
a believer’s conscious relation to the ultimate grounds 
of existence, the abiding, in the measure that he knows 
them.” It may be well to note in passing that this 
whole article is very vague, and not free from errors 
which, from a Catholic viewpoint, make it dangerous. 


Kant, though not a Pragmatist, used, however, the 
pragmatic norm in the postulates of his Practical Rea- 
son—the existence of God, etc. And what kind of god 
did Kant fashion for himself? Kant tells us: ‘The 
righteous man may say: ‘I will that there be a god’.” 
Kant himself, therefore, said: “J will that there be a 
god,” and, as we saw above, this is the god he willed: 
“Since this idea [of god] proceeds entirely from our- 
selves, and is a product of ours, we have here before 
us a postulated being towards whom we cannot have an 
obligation, . . . to have religion is a duty man owes 
himself . . . Prayer as an internal form of cult, and, 
therefore, considered as a means of grace, is a super- 


stitious delusion.” Cf. Donat, Freedom of Science, p. 
46. 


James tells us that 


_ “, , . anyone who insists that there is a designer [of 
the world] and who is sure [?] he is a divine one, gets a 


52 


GOD AND REASON 


certain pragmatic benefit from the term—the same, in fact, 
which we saw that the terms God, Spirit, or the Absolute 
yield. ‘Design,’ worthless though it be, as a mere ration- 
istic principle, set above or behind things for our admiration, 
becomes, if our faith concretes it into something theistic, 
a term of promise . . . Other than this practical significance, 
the words, God, free-will, design, etc., have none. Yet, dark 
though they be in themselves, or intellectualistically taken, 
when we bear them into life’s thicket with us, the darkness 
there grows light about us.” Pragmatism, pp. 114, 121. 

“Faith is synonomous with working hypothesis ; 
now in such questions as God, immortality, absolute morality 
and free will, no non-papal believer at the present day pre- 
tends his faith to be of an essentially different complexion; 
he can always doubt his creed.” The Will to Believe, P. 95. 

“Meanwhile the practical needs and experiences of reli- 
gion seem to be sufficiently met by the belief that beyond 
each man and in a fashion continuous with him there exists 
a higher power which is friendly to him and to his ideals 

. anything larger will do, if it be only large enough to 
trust for the next step. It need not be infinite, it need not 
be solitary. It might even be a more Godlike self, of which 
the present self would then be but the mutilated expression, 
and the universe might conceivably be a collection of such 
selves . . . with no absolute unity realized in it at all. 
Thus would a sort of polytheism return upon us—a poly- 
theism which I do not on this occasion defend, for my only 
aim at present is to keep the testimony of religious experi- 
ence within its proper bounds.” The Varieties of Religious 
Experience, pp. 525, 526. 


In all these passages James, a thorough-going Prag- 
matist, speaks true to form. He realized that for a Prag- 
matist the name God may mean anything and everything, 
in other words, every man has a right to make a god 
to suit himself. And that every man has a right to make 
his own god, or to choose one from the many already 
made, Drake in the article previously cited, affirms in so 


many words,— 

“It now seems rather needless to be an atheist. There 
are s0 many conceptions of God afloat that anyone at all 
widely read can scarcely fail to find one suited to his mental 
outlook and convictions.” P. 69. 

Clarence A. Beckwith, Illinois Professor of Chris- 
tian Theology, Chicago Theological Seminary, is a 
Sentimentalist, a Pragmatist, and, though he calls him- 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 53 


self an “ethical monotheist’”’, the doctrine he advances in 
The Idea of God, published in 1922, would seem to jus- 
tify one who would class him among the Pantheists. 


His initial idea of God he discovers in feeling and 
sentiment. The fuller meaning of that idea he strives to 
determine by endeavoring to find out not what God is, 
but what it pleases man to make Him to be. Truth, for 
Professor Beckwith, has no permanent worth; it is 
measured not by the object it should represent, but by 
what it suits man to think of that object, by man’s in- 
dividual experiences, views, theories, value-judgments, 
fancies, etc., which, under varying conditions, are ever 
shifting and changing, and are different for different 
men at the same time, and for the same men at different 
times. 


With this working principle of Pragmatism, Professor 
Beckwith judges that the God of the Nicene Creed does 
not suit the modern man at all. Hence he rejects Him 
absolutely and utterly, and if obliged to choose between 
Him and Atheism, he would take Atheism. He denies 
the Divinity of Christ, and rejects the doctrine of crea- 
tion and miracles, as “antiquated and indefensible’ and 
not “found either in the Old or New Testament”. He 
gives, however, a sympathetic hearing to the host of 
fanciful, false, and for the most part, crude concepts of 
God which modern philosophy has brought forth. The 
god, finally, who suits Professor Beckwith’s individual 
views of the universe, is one who is immanent in the 
world and yet transcends it. As immanent, he is not a 
changeless, eternal, substantial being, but ever-changing 
Energy, the Purposive Will or Creative Good Will, 
energizing the world from within; as transcendent, he is 
not real at all, but an ideal, a goal, towards which the 
- Purposive Will, which at no time is fully realized in the 
world, is ever pushing onward and upward. We give a 


54 


GOD AND REASON 


few brief, typical quotations from The Idea of God in 
confirmation. 


“We have never stopped to define what the idea [of God] 
means to us, but we have taken it for granted, as we take 
the air, friendship, education and democracy. We have 
shrunk from exact definition, since we preferred to leave it 
in the region of feeling; in its very vagueness lies much of 
its power to quicken reverence and awe and to appeal to 
simple trust: . . . Moreover there is the feeling that to 
drag this sentiment out from its reticent retreat and turn 
on it the cold light of reason, force it to give an account of 
itself and to justify its existence on pain of rejecting it, {s 
nothing less than the unpardonable sin” P. V. 

“This work aims at such a presentation of the idea of 
God as will enable it to function anew in the life of to-day.” 
Envi; 

“Since the idea of God is functional and conditions have 
arisen far different from those in the early centuries, we must 
expect a corresponding change in this idea . ... Meantime 
we must remind ourselves that an attempt so to define the 
idea of God as to keep it aloof from the modern view of the 
world is to place it in extreme jeopardy. All the sciences 
have been born since the fourth century, and have changed 
the meaning of the universe for all thoughtful men. The 
social order has undergone profound modification. The simple 
fact is that the Nicene idea of God does not interpret the 
world to the modern man; between that idea and the world 
of to-day is an impassable gulf. If the alternative is either 
that idea of God unmodified or none, then the conclusion must 
be—no God. Such an idea cast in irreformable dogma is 
the greatest possible encouragement to atheism.” P. 3. 

“The [modern] scientific spirit is marked by certain 
characteristic tendencies and habits . . . It relies upon in- 
ductive verification. All questions which involve human be- 
liefs, customs and ideals are subjected to historical inquiry 

. . The presumption is thus created that a doctrine such 
as the idea of God, which originated in modes of thought 
alien to the modern scientific spirit and world-view, requires 
restatement to become acceptable to the scientific temper and 
intelligence of to-day.” P. 6. 

“The naive notion of him [God] revealed in the beautiful 
story of the garden of Eden is unworkable and out of place 
in relation to conditions of civic and industrial communities.” 
be 

“Religious education is in exigent need of a restatement 


of the idea of God. . . . What is required is some conception 
of God which shall make him real, attractive and helpful . 
The historic creeds do not answer here. . . . We want no 


Deity who can be snugly imprisoned in cast-iron formulas 
and imposed by any body of men. Nor for religious education 
can we tolerate an idea of God [fi.e. the Nicene] which is 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS CONCERNING GOD 55 


belied by the highest intelligence of the age, inconsistent with 
every or even any science, from which in later years, if one 
will think in terms of modern thought, one frees himself 
only by a violent wrench.” P. 382. 

“An idea of God which suffices for one people cannot 
answer for another people at the same time or at another 
age of the world, nor indeed for the same people at a further 
age in its own history..... Since all ideas are functional 
and no idea of God meets all the varied needs of all Christian 
peoples at a given time, there must be many variations of 
it to embody the requirements of the different groups. A 
cross-section of present-day religious thinking discloses a 
rather bewildering diversity of ideas of God, as these appear 
in Calvinism, Arminianism, Socinianism, monism, panlogism, 
voluntarism, vitalism, pluralistic pragmatism, and the New 
Realism,—each an attempt to solve the problem of existence 
from a particular point of view and in answer to a particular 
set of needs. Nor are we at the end of these endeavors, which 
should be welcomed by all who are in search of truth whose 
only function is to serve the well-being of man.” P. 17. 

“If we are to assign any meaning to [divine] transcendence 
we must avoid the assumption that God is independent of the 
universe, that his life would be complete without it and that 
he is in any degree separated from it. Apart from the uni- 
verse, God is inconceivable: no content can ‘be attributed to 
his being. . . . Moreover, we believe that there is no ‘beyond,’ 
no Epicurean heaven removed from the world, as a dwelling 
place.” P. 266. 

“God is immanent [in the universe] so far as he is the 
pervasive principle or energy by which the creative process 
is carried forward: he ig transcendent so far as there are 
infinite possibilities in the creative process which may be 
realized under temporal, spatial and conscious forms. The 
immanent God is ‘The God of things as they are’; the trans- 
cendent God is the God of things as they are to become. 
Since, however, being is ever passing into becoming, God as 
immanent is not static but dynamic; and because becoming 
riges out of and fulfils being, God as transcendent is not de- 
tached from the actual. If he is the changing, he is also the 
permanent, real One.” P. 269. 

“The being of God is not other than his will, and his will 
does not exist outside of a world of space and time and con- 
scious beings. Nowhere is God more real and never will he 
be more active than in the immediate circle of our conscious 
life. . . . With a world which transcends experience, and a 
conception of God which alleges something in him which is 
other than what is manifest in our world we can have no 
concern.” P. 134. 


“The One exists only in and through the many.” P, 381. 
All these views are a simple declaration of mental bank- 
ruptcy, and, in principle at least, of moral and religious bank- 


56 GOD AND REASON 


ruptcy also. And all systems of philosophy that desert reason 
in their search for God, and in its place install some blind 
guide, must necessarily make this same declaration. How 
widespread to-day is that desertion may be gathered from the 
following passages taken from Hocking, The Meaning of God 
in Human Experience. Professor Hocking is in full sym- 


pathy with the movement against reason. He writes: 

“The services of thought to religion nave been subject to a 
justified distrust. Of uncertain worth, especially of uncertain recoil, 
are the labors of reason in behalf of any of our weightier human 
interests. By right instinct has religion from the beginning looked 
elsewhere for the brunt of support—say to revelation, to faith, to 
feeling. A bad defense is a betrayal, and what human philosophy 
of religion can be better than a bad defense? Present-day philosophy 
seems notably inclined to take this view of itself. 

“Our current science of religion may now assume without too 
much discussion that the grounds of religion are supra-rational; and 
we find philosophy undertaking to define what those other-than- 
rational grounds are,—grounds moral, perhaps or psychological or 
social or historical: grounds pragmatic or even mystic. 

“Various and variously combined as are these several Philo- 
sophic trends they agree in accepting the judgment that religion 
lies close to the primitive moving force of life: deeper, then, than 
reason, or any work of reason. But a vague territory, still, is 
this Beyond-Reason or Deeper-than-Reason. Once singly named 
Faith, now it has many names,—instinct, the subconscious, the 
co-conscious, feeling, will, value judgment, social sense, intuition, 
mystic reasyu, perhaps ‘l’élan vital.’” P. V 


All the erroneous opinions above mentioned, excluding, 
however, that advancing the argument a simultaneo, are fully 
explained and refuted in previous parts of Philosophy, viz., in 
Criteriology and Rational Psychology. Still, as their rejection 
is necessary for a full treatment of our matter, they are given 
a passing mention here, and will be again refuted, but briefly. 
In the difficulties at the end of Thesis I, some of their main 
arguments will be answered. The argument a simultaneo, or 
Ontological argument, will be refuted in a separate thesis. 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS REJECTED 57 


THESIS I. 


The source of our knowledge of God is neither an on- 
tological intuition of Him, nor an innate or divinely in- 
fused idea, nor any of the subjective mediums invented by 
Kantians, Reidians, Sentimentalists, Modernists or Prag- 
matists, nor is it necessarily revelation and a consequent 
tradition. be ee 


PRENOTES TO THE THESIS. 
A sufficient knowledge of the sense of the thesis and 
its adversaries may be gathered from the exposition given 
above of the opinions rejected in the thesis. 


As the false Theories of Knowledge advancing these 
opinions are fully and specifically refuted elsewhere in 
Philosophy, the proofs of our thesis, whilst amply suffi- 
cient, are brief, and general rather than specific. 


PROOF OF THE THESIS. 


Parts I and II. Ontological intuition, and innate or divinely 
infused idea of God rejected, 


1. If God were so known, we should be conscious of 
the fact, especially on reflection, and we are not. 

2. If God were so known, our concepts of God should 
express perfections (notes) derived directly from Him, 
and not, as is the case, directly from creatures, to be 
afterwards applied to Him, mutatis mutandis, 1.e., so 
changed as to imply no imperfection. 

3. If God were so known, it is impossible to understand 
why a scientific knowledge of God is got with difficulty. 
4, The law of parsimony prohibits recourse to an extra- 
ordinary medium of knowledge when, as in the present 
case, we have an ordinary one, i.e., our reason. 


58 


GOD AND REASON 


Part III. The opinions of the Kantians, Reidians, Senti- 


mentalists, Modernists rejected. 


1. They all deny to reason the power to prove God’s 
existence, and falsely, as we shall show by proving His 
existence by a posteriori arguments. The substitutes 
they offer in reason’s stead can give no intellectual cer- 
tainty, for we know, that unless the assent of the in- 
tellect rest in some way on evidence, it must be doubtful. 


2. Again, the conscious contact with God, of whatever 
kind it may be, which is supposed to be made through 
these mediums, should be immediate, nevertheless, even 
after most careful reflection, it is impossible to discover 
any consciousness of such contact with an actually exist- 
ing being who is God. 


Part IV. The opinion of the Pragmatists rejected. 


The Pragmatists have rejected all objective knowledge. 
The measure of truth they offer is not an object to which 
the intellect must conform, but subjective utility. But 
what I judge useful to me, my neighbor may judge harm- 
ful to him. So the same judgment may be true for him, 
false for me, and there is no possibility of an absolute 
norm. What is true today, may be false tomorrow. Nay, 
even for the same person and at the same time, the same 
judgment may be true and false. The Modernists, who, 
in this regard follow the Pragmatists, tell us how. The 
belief, for example, that Christ 1s God, that Christ 
worked miracles, is true, in the world of faith, but in 
the world of fact, of history, in the actual order, these 
assertions are absolutetly false. 

It is quite evident that on pragmatic grounds Atheism, 
Pantheism, Deism, Polytheism, and a Monotheism that 
makes of God any kind of being we please,—‘‘anything 
larger will do if it be only large enough to trust for the 
next step—a larger and more God-like self,’ as James 
says, Varieties of Religious Experience, p. 525,—may 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS REJECTED 59 


all be justified. In other words there is no such thing 
as truth. 


Part V. The opinion of the Traditionalists rejected. 


Independently of revelation and tradition, we can ac- 
quire, by a posteriori demonstration, a certain, clear 
knowledge of God. Therefore, revelation and tradition 
are not necessarily the source of such knowledge. 


It is to be noted, however, that revelation is morally 
necessary that man, generally speaking, may acquire a 
fuller knowledge of God expeditiously, without error 
and surely. In other words, the difficulties to be over- 
come in acquiring expeditiously a sure, and accurate fuller 
knowledge of God are such that, though man has the 
physical power to surmount them, and though some men 
would actually and successfully use that power, still the 
general run of men would not do so. To give man, there- 
fore, a knowledge of God which he could acquire, but 
which, for one reason or other, in by far the greater 
number of instances he would not acquire, revelation is 
necessary. 

How true it is, that human reason, as we find it, when 
not held in check by the absolutely infallible guide of 
revelation would fall into many and grievous errors con- 
cerning God, is only too convincingly shown in the re- 
ligious beliefs and philosophical systems of those who 
have rejected the revealed word of God explicitly, or im- 
plicitly, that is, by rejecting its living infallible guardian, 
and interpreter, the Catholic Church. 


DIFFICULTIES 


1. We have an idea of the infinite. This cannot be derived 
by reason from things finite. Therefore its origin may 


be possibly either an intuition of God, or an innate idea 
of Him. 


60 


GOD AND REASON 


D. Maj. We have an idea of the infinite, wholly 
positive and derived through an intuition or an innate 
idea of God, N.; not wholly negative, i.e. not represent- 
ing God as a limitless blank, nor wholly positive, as it 
should be if we knew God immediately, but negativo- 
positive, e.g., representing God as a non-finite being, 1.e., 
a being possessing reality without limit, which idea is 
derived from finite things indirectly, C. . Cd. Min. 


True knowledge is the agreement of mind with the ob- 
ject known. Therefore as God is first in the order of 


' reality, if my knowledge is tobe true, He must be known 


first. Therefore Ontologism is to be admitted. 

D, Ant. The agreement required by truth is that, 
as far as the act of knowledge goes, it must represent 
things as they are, C.; it also requires that the genesis of 
my acts of knowledge follow the order of the genesis 
of things, NV. N. Con. 


I may truly know an effect before I know its 
causes; I may derive a knowledge of the existence of 
the cause from the effect. 


God is a being more intelligible than any other being, 
and closer to my intellect than any other being. There- 
fore He should be known first and intuitively. Hence 
Ontologism is true. 


D. Ant. God is in Himself and to Himself most 
intelligible; He is also in the physical order closer to me 
than any other being, and that, in virtue of His immens- 
ity, and His activity in creating and continuing in 
existence myself and all my faculties, and in concurring 
with me in all my actions, C.; God is more intelligible 
to me, i.e., closer to me in the intellectual order, than 
any other being, N. NieGan. 


My intellectual knowledge is derived directly through 
sense knowledge, rising above it, first, in those universal 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS REJECTED 61 


concepts which represent the essences of things sensible, 
and thereafter, by demonstration, coming to know things 
spiritual and even God Himself. 


Our universal concepts, formed prior to reasoning, repre- 
sent something which is necessary, immutable, eternal, in- 
finite. Such a thing, however, is divine and, as it is known 
prior to reasoning, these concepts must result from a 
direct knowledge or vision of God. Therefore Ontolo- 
gism is to be admitted. 


D. Maj. My universal concept represents something 
which, considered as it exists in the actual order, is an 
absolutely necessary and immutable being, who is in the 
strict sense eternal and possesses all perfections, who 1s 
God, N.; it represents something which, considered only 
as it exists objectively in the intellect, is not singular but 
universal, which, as such, cannot exist actually, and which 
may be said to be necessary, immutable, eternal, infinite, 
but not at all in the sense God is said to be, C. Cd. Min. 


My universal concept represents no singular, actual be- 
ing with such perfections. It is derived by an act of 
spontaneous or natural abstraction from a sensible ob- 
ject, representing only the nature which that object 
has in common with others, neglecting that which is 
proper to it as an individual. That which it represents 
may be looked at in two ways: as it exists in the object, 
and, as such, it is found in the actual order, singular, 
contingent, changeable, temporal, finite; or as it exists 
shorn of its individuating perfections, and, as such, it 
exists as a universal, not in the actual order but only 
objectively in the intellect, in which state only it may be 
said to be, in a very restricted sense, and in no way 
as God is said to be, necessary, immutable, eternal, in- 
finite. For example, the essence which is represented in 
the universal concept man, is necessary and immutable 
in the sense that every individual who is a man must of 


62 


GOD AND REASON 


necessity have and without any change the notes that con- 
stitute that essence, viz., animality and rationality; it is 
eternal and infinite in the sense that it is intrinsically 
possible for it to exist at any point of time and in any 
number of individuals. 


The admission of the existence of God, conceived at least 
as a being ruling the world and on whom man physically 
and morally depends, is so universal among races, nations, 
tribes and individuals, that it must be said to be natural 
to man. It can be explained only on the supposition that 
man has an innate knowledge of God. What is more, 
some of the Fathers of the Church admit such a knowl- 
edge. 

We grant the truth of the assertion, but deny its ex- 
planation, if it contends that man is born with an actual 
knowledge of God, or with a capacity for knowing Him 
directly and immediately. We deny also that any of 
the Fathers of the Church have so spoken. In fact, 
those who touch this question, substantially agree with 
the explanation we subjoin. 

Man is made for God. The natural and final end of 
his endeavors in this life is to give God reverence and 
service, and this presupposes a knowledge of Him. 
Until this knowledge is acquired, man is uneasy. He 
is conscious that what he as yet knows, does not satisfy, 
and by his nature he is impelled to seek for further 
enlightenment. 

An immediate evidence of God‘s existence is not 
granted him, but an intellect has been given him, so 
fashioned that, if mediate evidence of that existence be 
granted, it will discover it with ease and tenaciously cling 
to it; and this, because the discovery of that truth satis- 
fies a vital need of man’s nature. 

And this mediate evidence is bounteously given. For 
just as the ultimate and chiefest end of man in this life 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS REJECTED 63 


is to know God, in order that he may reverence and 
serve Him, so the ultimate end of all visible nature is 
to make God known to man. ‘The heavens, the earth, 
and all things in them show forth the glory of God. 
Hence, that universal, constant knowledge of God in all 
races, nations, tribes and individuals; not scientifically 
and laboriously worked out, but drawn from God's 
visible creation by a process of spontaneous reasoning, 
in many instances hard to analyze, in many instances 
erring as to the nature of God, but ever acknowledging 
_ His supremacy over the world, and the world’s physical 
and moral dependence on Him. (Cf. Kleutgen, cited 
above, under Popular Concept of God.) 


Man naturally seeks for the greatest good. But the 
greatest good is God. Therefore man naturally seeks 
God. Hence he has a natural, an innate knowledge of 
God. 

D. Maj. Man’s whole nature, by the very fact that 
it is made for God, tends towards the greatest good, 
which tendency therefore is independent of, and prior 
to all knowledge, C.; man in his actions naturally seeks 
the greatest good, Subd., as the aspect, under which the 
will seeks its object in all its actions, is that of goodness 
with no admixture of badness, so man may be said in 
all his actions naturally to tend towards the greatest 
good in the abstract, C.; man in his actions naturally 
tends towards that being in whom concretely is found 
all good, i.e., towards God, Subd., man in all his actions 
tends toward God, N.; in those actions in which he seeks 
his last end either immediately or mediately, and which 
actions in no way presuppose an innate knowledge of 
(odin G. Cd. Min. DACon: 


64 GOD AND REASON 


THESIS II. 


That God exists is a truth which is immediately evident 
in itself though not immediately evident to us. It can 
be proved neither a simultaneo nor a priori, 


PRENOTES TO THE THESIS. 


A truth immediately evident in itself is one contained in 
an analytical proposition, the necessary nexus between 
the subject and predicate of which is objectively or in 
itself immediate. In itself, therefore, this nexus is 
knowable immediately ; hence an intellect sufficiently per- 
fect could so know it. 

A truth immediately evident to us is one contained in an 
analytical proposition, the necessary nexus between the 
subject and predicate of which is not only objectively or 
in itself immediate, but also immediately knowableé to the 
human intellect. The human intellect, therefore, by a 
mere analysis and comparison of the subject and predi- 
cate of such a proposition, and hence without recourse to 
any middle term, could clearly see the necessary nexus 
between them. 

The argument a simultaneo essays to derive merely from 
the concept we have of God, e.g., as a being who is con- 
ceived as necessarily existing, the knowledge on our part 
of His actual existence. 

A priori proof draws its conclusion from a truth which 
in the real order, i.e., in the nature of things, is prior to 
that contained in the conclusion. We so argue when we 
derive from the existence and nature of a cause the 
existence and nature of its effects. 

A posteriori proof draws its conclusion from a truth 
which in the real order is posterior, i.e., subsequent, to 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS REJECTED 65 


that contained in the conclusion. In this way, as will be 
seen below, we argue from the existence and nature of 
things in the world to the existence of a first, unproduced, 
self-existing cause of them—God. 


ADVERSARIES. 


The first part of the thesis has no adversaries. As 


those who defend the argument a simultaneo really hold 
that the existence of God is a truth immediately evident 
to us they may be classed as adversaries to the second 
and third parts of the thesis. 


PROOF OF THE THHESIS. 


Part I. 


That God exists is a truth which is immediately 


evident in itself, 


In the proposition, God is existing, the predicate, as 


will appear below, is of the very essence of the subject, 
le., objectively the nexus between them is immediate. 


Therefore one who would fully understand the nature 


of the subject would also immediately see this necessary 
nexus, 


Part II. That God exists is not a truth which is immedi- 
ately evident to us. 


u 


Our consciousness testifies that by merely conceiving 
a being whose existence is essential to it, and actual 
existence, and comparing the two conceived objects, 
we are not forced to affirm that being’s actual 
existence. 

If our intellects were thus forced to affirm that be- 
ing’s existence, no one, after merely forming a con- 
cept of a being whose existence is essential to it, 
could doubt of that being’s actual existence. As a 
fact, however, there are many who after forming such 
a concept either doubt of God’s existence or embrace 
Agnosticism. 


66 


GOD AND REASON 


It is a law of logic that those perfections which are 
found after analysis to belong to any subject, can 
rightly be predicated of that subject only in the order 
in which it is found. But in the present instance the 
subject, as far as our knowledge yet goes, exists 
only objectively in concept, therefore the only judg- 
ment I can make with regard to its existence is this: 
a being, conceived as existing by its essence, must 
necessarily be conceived as actually existing. 


If. however, it be objected that, at least in the 
case of a subject whose essence is to exist, we may 
pass from the ideal to the actual order, for if that 
being did not exist, a concept of him would be im- 
possible, and yet we have a concept of him,—we 
answer (and this answer shows the fallacy in the 
argument a simultaneo ), that since the proofs we have 
given above are valid, and hence since the mere con- 
cept of a necessarily existing being does not give us 
a knowledge of his actual existence, that concept, as 
far as our knowledge goes, may, or may not, be a 
self contradictory one. In other words, the concept 
we have of a necessarily existing being, prior to, or 
prescinding from, a posteriori proof of that being’s 
actual existence, represents that being as one whom 
we merely do not see to be impossible and not as one 
whom we see not to be impossible, i.e., whom we see 
to be possible. 


Part III. The argument a simultaneo is invalid. 


If the concept we have of God prior to an a posteriori 
proof of His existence, may or may not, as far as our 
knowledge goes, represent an impossible being, the argu- 
ment a simultaneo is invalid. 

But the condition is true. 

Therefore, etc. 


Maj. 


Min. 


Partly: 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS REJECTED 67 


If, as far as our knowledge goes, the concept 
may or may not represent an impossible being, we 
certainly cannot get from it certain knowledge that 
he is a possible being, and hence that he exists. In 
that hypothesis, therefore, the argument a simul- 
taneo is invalid. 

That the concept we have of a necessarily exist- 
ing being, independent of all proof of that being’s 
existence, may, as far as our knowledge goes, repre- 
sent an impossible being, has been shown in the 
proofs of Part II. 


The existence of God cannot be proved a priori. 


There is nothing in the real order prior to God, He, 
as will be proved later, being the self existing first 
cause of all things. 


And even when in concept we distinguish, for our 
better understanding of Him, perfections in God, 
His existence is necessarily conceived as fundamental. 
Hence there is nothing in concept prior to it from which 
it may be derived. 

Therefore the existence of God cannot be proved a 
priors. 


Scholion. 


The argument a simultaneo is presented under 


several forms. We give the three best known with their 
solutions. As was stated above, it is not certain that 
St. Anselm or St. Bonaventure used it strictly. 


—— 


St. Anselm. If a being who is conceived as the great- 


est being thinkable does not exist, he is not the greatest 
being thinkable. 

But the being who is conceived as the greatest being 
thinkable, is the greatest being thinkable. Therefore he 
exists, 


68 


GOD AND REASON 


D. Maj. And the concept we have of such a being, in-. 
dependent of a posteriori proof of his existence, 
represents him as one who, as far as our knowledge 
goes, may or may not be impossible, C.; it shows 
him as a being known to us to be possible, hence 
actually existing, N, 

Cd. Min. And the concept I have of him indepen- 
dent of a posteriori proof of his existence represents 
him to me as a being who is known to me to 
exist, V.; who as far as my knowledge goes, may 
or may not be existing, C. 


Descartes. Whatever is contained in a clear and dis- 

tinct idea of any object must be affirmed of that object. 
But existence is contained in a clear and distinct idea 

of an absolutely perfect being. | 
Therefore existence must be affirmed of him. 

D. Maj. If the idea is known to represent a possible 
being, C.; if it may or may not, as far as our know- 
ledge goes, represent an impossible being, N. 

Cd. Min. Which idea, as far as our knowledge goes, 
may or may not represent an impossible being, C.; 
is known to represent a possible and hence an 
existing being, Subd., after a posteriori proof, C-; 
before, N. D. Con. After'a posteriori proof, 
C.; before, N. 


Leibnitz. If God is possible, He exists. 

But He is possible. 

Therefore He exists. 

D. Maj. If God is known to me to be a possible being 
I must affirm His existence, C.; if He is known to 
me as a being who may or may not be possible, I 
must affirm, etc., NV. 

Cd. Min. God is known to me as a being who may or 
may not be possible, C.; He is known to me as a 


ERRONEOUS VIEWS REJECTED 69 


being who is possible, Subd., after a posteriori proof 
of His existence, C.; before, N. 

D. Con. I must affirm His existence after a posteriori 
proof of it, C-; before, N. 


70 GOD AND REASON 


THESIS III. 


The existence of God, as the unproduced cause of all 
things existing in the world,,is proved from the fact that 
all existing beings cannot be produced beings. 


GENERAL PRENOTES TO THE PROOFS FOR GOD‘S 
EXISTENCE. 


. All our proofs of God’s existence are a posteriori. From 
a consideration, under different aspects, of the creatures 
that God has made, we demonstrate His existence under 
different aspects. 

sas These proofs are grouped under three general heads; 
Metaphysical, Physical, Moral. 


Metaphysical proofs draw their conclusion from the 
consideration of objective reasons which are derived from 
this sensible (physical) world, but which in themselves, 
and as used, are not restricted to, i.e., prescind from, 
its sensible or physical aspect, and so are universally 
applicable to any being in the world. Hence they are 
called metaphysical. For example, though our knowl- 
edge of produced being is acquired through a knowledge 
of the sensible, i.e., physical world about us, from the 
fact that even one such being exists, whether that being 
be sensible or not, the metaphysical argument proves 
the existence of a first unproduced cause. 


Physical proofs draw their conclusion from the con- 
sideration of some sensible (physical) aspect of the vis- 
ible world. For example, from the order we see in the 
universe. 


Moral proofs draw their conclusion from some com- 
mon, habitual, customary (mores, customs) way or man- 





COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 71 


ner of thinking or acting among men, te., from those 
judgments or actions of men which, from their univer- 
sality and constancy, which true knowledge has ever in- 
creased, may be said to spring from human nature itself, 
so that one who would go counter to them would be 
judged not-natural, i.e., unnatural, abnormal. Such an 
argument is that derived from the universal belief of 
mankind in the existence of a being or beings superior 
to the world, and on whom the world depends not only 
physically but morally and religiously. 


Of these proofs by far the most important are the meta- 
physical, for through them we derive the knowledge of 
the existence of God as an unproduced first cause, who 
exists of Himself and with absolute necessity. This con- 
cept having been established, through it we deduce His 
infinity and all those other perfections which are found 
in the fully developed, scientific concept of God, mentioned 
above. These arguments give us the seed-thought from 
which is developed the science of Natural Theology. The 
other arguments, however, are not by any means useless. 
That derived from the order of the universe, for example, 
proves emphatically the great intelligence of the First 
Cause, while the moral arguments present the testimony 
of the whole human race to the fact that a supreme being 
exists, 


We shall select one argument from each of these di- 
visions for full development; the more important of those 
which remain will be explained briefly later on. 


PRENOTES TO THE THESIS. 


17 


The argument developed in the present thesis is called 
the Cosmological (cosmos, the world; logos, a rational ex- 
planation) argument. It gives the final answer to the 
question: Whence come those countless produced beings, 
substantial and accidental, through whose springing into 


T2 


GOD AND REASON 


existence, the world is continually renewed and perpet- 
uated? 


We take for granted, therefore, and from internal and 
external experience it is self-evident, that in this world 
things are being continually produced: new combinations, 
both substantial and accidental, of the elements, new 
plants, new animals, new men, new thoughts, new de- 
sires, and all the wonderful effects of man’s endeavors. 

It is well to note, however, that if we knew of the 
existence of only one produced being, we could demon- 
state the existence of an unproduced first cause. 


Our proof draws all its force from the principles of 
causality and sufficient reason. 

The principle of causality is an analytical principle; 
one, namely, expressed in a judgment, between the sub- 
ject and the predicate of which exists an absolutely 
necessary nexus. 

It may be enunciated as follows: Whatever does not 
exist of absolute necessity, cannot exist without a pro- 
portionate physical efficient cause. Another form, which 
shows clearly that the principle of causality is but the 
principle of sufficient reason restricted to contingent be- 
ings, is: The only sufficient reason for the existence of a 
being whose existence is not absolutely necessary is a 
proportionate physical efficient cause. Since God, as will 
be shown, is an absolute necessary being, the principle of 
causality cannot be applied to Him. 

The truth and analytical character of the principle of 
causality may be briefly shown as follows: A being whose 
existence is not absolutely necessary,— and all change- 
able beings are such,—has the sufficient reason for its 
existence in itself, or in some other being. It cannot 
however, have such reason in itself. If it had, it would 
be either, a. because existence is essential to it, which is 
impossible, seeing that its existence is not absolutely 





COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 73 


necessary to it, or b. because it caused its own existence, 
which is also impossible, for to cause its own existence, 
it would have to exist before it existed. Therefore the 
reason for its existence must be found in some other be- 
ing. That being is its efficient cause. 

The principle of sufficient reason, also analytical, is 
absolutely universal in its application, not excluding even 
God. It states: Whatever is, must have a sufficient reason 
for being what it is. 


The sufficient reason assigned for the existence of a 
produced, 1.e., a contingent being, which is found in 
an efficient cause, may be adequate or inadequate. 
An adequately sufficient reason is one that fully satis- 
fies, and, beyond which no other reason can be given. 
An inadequately or partially sufficient reason is one 
which partially satisfies, and hence beyond which, or 
outside of which, some other must be given. 

In our thesis we contend, that although a partially 
sufficient reason for the existence of a produced being 
may be found in another produced being which is its 
proximate efficient cause, still a full and adequate reason 
for its existence can never be found, unless we admit the 
existence of an ultimate unproduced first cause. 


In our proof we prescind from the question of the im. 
possibility of an infinite series of actual, successively pro- 
duced beings. Hence even though its possibility were 
admitted, our proof would still be valid. Our aim in so 
doing is to make our proof, as far as possible, indepen- 
dent of the discussion of a question, which even some 
Catholic philosophers consider debatable. 

As a matter of fact, we hold that an infinite series, 
which is actual, of successively produced and producing 
beings is impossible. Indeed St. Thomas’ argument for 
the existence of an unproduced first cause of things 
produced is drawn from this impossibility. 


GOD AND REASON 


The scope of the thesis. It is true that the existence 
of an unproduced being having once been demonstrated, 
we can derive from the knowledge thus gained, His 
self-sufficiency, absolutely necessary existence, unicity, 
etc., still these conclusions are outside the scope of the 
present thesis. They will be proved later. Now we only 
wish to establish the existence of an unproduced being. 


ADVERSARIES. 


Atheists, Pantheists, Materialists, and an innumerable 
multitude of others who admit God’s existence, but who 
deny that it can be demonstrated. 

In this denial, and in particular in their attacks on this 
argument, many of our present day adversaries follow the 
lead of Kant, and most of them blindly. The mere fact 
that Kant has spoken is enough for them. Among these 
may be mentioned, the Modernists, Weber (Prof. of 
Phil., U. of Strasburg), James (Harvard U.) Bergson, 
Corrance, Loisy, Calkins (Wellesley C.), Conybeare 
(Oxford U.), Hoffding (Copenhagen U.), James Ward 
(Cambridge U.), Hocking (Harvard U.), Stewart 
(Prof. Phil., Dalhousie U., Halifax, N.S.), Miller (Prof. 
Biblical Instruction, Princeton U.), Troeltch (Heidel- 
berg U.), Youtz (Auburn Theol. Seminary), Royce 
(Harvard U.), Knight (Prof. Moral Phil., U. of St. 
Andrew), Mallock, Drake (Prof. Phil. and Education, 
Vassar C.), Johnson (Lincoln U.), Overstreet (N. Y. 
City C.), Paulsen (U. of Berlin), Schiller (Oxford U.), 
Herbert, Sabatier. 

The difficulties which Kant and others urge against 
our argument will be answered below. 


PROOF OF THE THESIS. 


There exist in this visible world produced beings. 

But the existence of even one produced being necessarily 
implies the existence of an unproduced first cause. 
Therefore such a cause exists. 





Maj. 


Min. 


COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 75 


The Major is evident from internal and ex- 
ternal experience. 


The cause of the being in question is either un- 
produced or produced. 
If unproduced, our conclusion stands. 
If produced, then the question recurs: Whence its 
producer? And the question, if further continued 
will finally stop at a first unproduced cause, and 
again our conclusion stands, or— 
We must admit an infinite series of successively 
produced causes which is dependent for its exist- 
ence on an unproduced cause, or which exists with- 
out such cause. 
If it depends for its existence on an unproduced 
cause, again our conclusion stands. 
If. however, it is asserted that such a series can 
exist without an unproduced cause, to finally es- 
tablish our conclusion, we must prove this assertion 
false. We must prove, then, that— 
An infinite series of successively produced causes 
without an unproduced cause of it is absolutely 
impossible. 
It is impossible if nowhere in it can be found an 
adequately sufficient reason for the existence of 
any one member of it. But nowhere in it can such 
a reason be found. 
It cannot be found in the being itself, which for 
the sake of clearness we shall call 4, for if left to 
itself A, being a produced being, would never have 
existed. 
Nor can it be found in any prior cause. For if the 
adequately sufficient reason for A’s existence could 
be found in such cause, I might consider, for the 
purposes of my investigation, all the causes in the 
series prior to this cause as non-existing, as I should 


6 


GOD AND REASON 


have an adequate reason for A’s existence without 
them. 


But if I consider any cause in the series as non- 
existing, I am forced to consider all that follow it 
in the series as non-existing, and hence 4 as non- 
existing. 

Hence the hypothesis, that any cause in the series 
can give me an adequately sufficient reason for A’s 
existence, results in the absurd conclusion that 4 
cannot be existing. 


An example will make this last part, the vital 
part, of our argument clear. I see a chain hanging 
in the air. Whence it comes I know not as its upper- 
most links are lost to vision in the distant sky. If 
you ask me why the lowest link hangs in the air, 
evidently I give a reason if I answer, that it is 
suported by the link above. And just as evidently 
my reason is not adequately sufficient, for till I 
know what supports the link above I do not fully 
know what supports the lowest one. And so mount- 
ing higher and higher I shall never get an adequately 
sufficient answer till I reach something which has 
not the fatal essential weakness of the links of 
the chain, i. e., till I reach something supporting 
but not supported. As such a thing can never be 
found in the chain, I may imagine the chain any 
length I please, even infinite, if such be possible, 
and I shall never find in it an adequate reason 
for the suspension in the air of the lowest, or of 
any link. 

Or this way may be clearer,—The lowest link 
of the chain is not self-supporting; no link of the 
chain is self-supporting. If, then, no link is self- 
supporting, no link in itself explains how it sup- 
ports those hanging from it. Therefore, nowhere 


i 


COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 77 


in the chain can I find an adequately sufficient 
reason for the suspension of any one of its links. 

Or this way,—lf in any link of the chain I could 
find an adequate reason for the support of the 
links below it, the links above could be done away 
with, and it and the links below it should still re- 
main hanging. 

But this is manifestly ridiculous. 


DIFFICULTIES 


a. The Cosmological argument extends invalidly the 
principle of causality beyond the phenomenal order. 
b. As it is of the essence of a cause that it be 
a produced being, the argument draws an impos- 
sible conclusion, viz., the existence of an unpro- 
duced cause. 

c. The Cosmological argument either leaves us with 
the knowledge of a “blank essence” which certainly 
is not a knowledge of God, or, if it attempts to 
fill out the concept of “unproduced being,’ and 
prove that being to be a person, infinitely intelli- 
gent, infinitely perfect, it necessarily makes use 
of the Ontological (a simultaneo) argument, which 
is invalid. 

Therefore the Cosmological argument fails to 
prove the existence of an unproduced cause of the 
universe, who is God. 

These are Kant’s arguments against our proof. 
They are repeated today, more or less blindly, by a 
host of Kantians, many of whom consider the very 
fact that Kant has spoken reason enough to satisfy 
anyone. It may be well to hear a few words from 
Kant and some of his followers. 

Kant, Pure Reason, (Max Miller, 2nd Ed., Mac- 
millan, 1907). 


Cl 


8 


GOD AND REASON 


“The whole conclusive strength of the so-called cos- 
mological proof rests therefore in reality on the onto- 
logical proof from mere concepts, while the appeal to 
experience is quite superfluous, and, though it may lead 
us on to the concept of absolute necessity, it cannot 
demonstrate it with any definite object.” P. 489. 

“The principle of causality has no meaning and no 
criterion of its use except in the world of sense [i.e., 
the world of subjective experience], while here [in the 
cosmological proof] we extend the principle beyond 
experience.” P. 491. 

Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, 

“Now, says Kant, both the cosmological and the 
physico-theological [teleological] proofs depend  ulti- 
mately on the ontological, and the ontological simply 
begs the question ... With regard to the cosmological 
it must be pointed out that until it has been connected 
with the ontological proofs, it does not specify what 
the ‘absolutely necessary being’ is, nor exclude the 
possibility of its being the world as a whole, or a 
Spencerian ‘Unknowable’ instead of a God.” P. 40. 


Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, 


“The absolute self simply does not cause the world. 
The very idea of causation belongs to things of finite 
experience.” P. 348. 

James, Varietics of Religious Experience, 

“The bare fact that all idealists since Kant have felt 
entitled to scout or neglect them [i.e., all our proofs 
for God’s existence] shows that they are not solid 
enough to serve as religion’s all-sufficient foundation. 
... Causation indeed is too obscure a principle to bear 
the weight of the whole structure of theology.” P. 437. 

“The fact is that these arguments prove nothing rigor- 
ously.” <P, 489; 


Ward, James, Pluralism and Theism, 


“Can we then prove the existence of God? Attempts 
innumerable to prove this have been made. . . all of 
them reducible to one or other of the three forms called, 
respectively, the ontological, the cosmological and the 
teleological argument. The fatal defects of all these 
have, it is almost univergally conceded, been clearly ex- 
posed once for all by Kant. The ontological argument, 
as has been shown, involves the common metaphysical 
fallacy of hypostatizing an idea; the teleological argu- 
ment does not carry us beyond pluralism; and the cos- 
mological only does so by implicitly assuming the 
ontological.” P. 230. 


Our answers to Kant’s assertions will be brief. 
a. N. Ant. The extension of the principle of 





COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 79 


causality beyond the phenomenal order,—which for 
Kant meant the order of subjective experiences,— 
is valid, when not to so extend it would be a 
violation of the principle of contradiction. In our 
argument we showed that the principle of contra- 
diction would be violated, if, in virtue of the prin- 
ciple of casuality, we did not assert the existence 
of an unproduced first cause. Moreover, Kant him- 
self with glaring (Calkins calls it “glorious”) in- 
consistency denies his own principle when he 
speaks of objects causing our external sensations, 
and even proves (Suppl. 21, 1. c., p. 778) that we 
can know objects to exist outside of ourselves. 

b. N. Ant. Because all the causes of which we 
have experience are themselves the effects of other 
causes, it does not follow that it is of the essence 
of a cause to be an effect. 

c. N. Ant. It is true that, having proved the 
existence of an unproduced first cause, and thus 
having made certain for ourselves that the concept 
of such a cause represents a real being, we can, and 
shall hereafter from such concept by analytical 
reasoning, prove that cause to be all-sufficient, 
necessary, one and only one, intelligent, infinite. 
In so doing, however, we in no way commit the 
fallacy found in the Ontological argument. That 
argument attempted, without prior proof of the 
existence of a necessary being, to draw from the 
concept of such being, which, prior to proof, could 
not be known to be a valid concept, certain knowl- 
edge of that being’s existence. 


The Cosmological argument derives the existence 
of an infinite being from finite beings. 

But the existence of the infinite cannot be got 
fromthe) finite,’ Therefore, etc. 


80 


GOD AND REASON 


Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, 


“No evidence can prove an infinite cause of the, 
world, for no evidence can prove anything but a cause 
adequate to the production of the world, but not infinite. 
To infer the infinite from the finite is a fallacy like 
inferring the unknowable from the known, and all ar- 
guments in favor of an infinite God must commit it. 
We argue with finite minds, from finite data, and our 
conclusions must be of a like nature.” P. 304. 


D. Maj. It derives the existence of a being 
who de facto is infinite, saying nothing, however, 
of his infinity, C.; it derives the existence of a 
being not merely who de facto is infinite, but ex- 
plicitly as infinite, Subd., directly, N.; indirectly, 
Onan Ors ee 

As everything produced is necessarily finite and 
as a finite cause is capable of producing a finite 
effect, we do not deduce the infinity of the first 
unproduced cause directly from the effects pro- 
duced by him. After having proved, however, 
directly, that such a cause exists, an analytical de- 
ductive inquiry into his nature reveals to us his 
infinity. 


To derive the infinite in any way from the finite 
supposes a proportion to exist between the two. 
But no proportion exists. Therefore, etc. 

D. Ant. It supposes that there should be a per- 
fect likeness, in essence and attributes between 
the two, i. e., that all the perfections of the infinite 
should be in finite beings, or that those which are, 
should be in them in the same way in which they 
are in the infinite, N.; it supposes that all the per- 
fections which are in the finite should be found in 
the infinite, in an infinite degree, and without any 
of their imperfections, and, moreover, that the 
existence of the finite being given, there exists a 
necessary relation, between it and the infinite, of 
effect to its cause, C. Cd. Min, 





COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 81 


Only after the infinity of God has been explained 
and established will it be possible to fully under- 
stand the solution just given and others, which pre- 
suppose a knowledge of the infinite and of its re- 
lation to the finite. 


If we could prove the existence of an unproduced 
being we should be able to form a valid concept 
of— 


a. <A self-existent being, 


b. A being who has already existed through an 
infinite stretch of time, 


c. A being who is the creator of space. 
But all these concepts are impossible. Therefore, 
etc. 


Corrance, Hibbert Journal, 1914: 

“The nature of the ultimate must ever transcend our 
categories.” P. 388. 

Spencer, first Principles: 

“Self-existence is rigorously inconceivable; and this 
holds true whatever be the nature of the object of which 
it is predicated. . . . [for] our conception of its self- 
existence can be formed only by joining with it the 
notion of unlimited duration through past time 
unlimited duration is inconceivable.’ Pp. 35, 36. 

If all beings that are, were made by an unproduced 
being, then ‘‘space was made in the same way that 
matter was made: [but this is impossible] for if space 
was created it must have been previously non-existent. 
The non-existence of space cannot, however, by any 
mental effort be imagined.” P. 34. 


a. D. Maj. We should be able to form a concept 
of a self-existing being expressing notes or per- 
fection of that being, gathered through an intuitional, 
i. e., a direct and immediate, knowledge of him, N.; 
expressing perfections not derived from him, but 
derived from finite beings, and ‘applied to him 
analogically (not in exactly the same sense), i. e., 
all imperfection and limit being removed, C. Cd. 
Min. 


82 


GOD AND REASON 


Finite beings contain perfections found in the 
infinite, their cause. These perfections, however, 
are found in him without imperfection and in an 
infinite degree. Knowing that the infinite must so 
contain those perfections, and all our knowledge 
being expressed through concepts derived directly 
from sensible things, we must necessarily have an 
analogical knowledge of the infinite. 


b. D. Maj. We should be able to form a concept 
of a being who has already existed through an in- 
finite stretch of time, i. e., our concept of the 
infinite must necessarily explicitly represent his 
eternal duration, N.; our concept which does repre- 
sent his eternal duration must represent an existence 
through an infinite stretch of time, Subd., con- 
celving that time to be intrinsic to God, N.; ex- 
trinsic, Subd., and actual, N.; and possible. C. 
Cd. Min. 


Time is continuous successive duration considered 
according to that which was, which is, which will be. 
It is said to be intrinsic to an object, when the con- 
tinuous, successive duration is that of the object it- 
self; extrinsic, when the duration of the object is 
measured by a continuous, successive duration which 
is extrinsic to it. As there is no motion or change 
of any kind in the infinite, time is not intrinsic to 
him. His duration is eternal in the strict sense, 
excluding as absolutely impossible any beginning 
or end, any before or after. However we may con- 
ceive the eternity of the infinite in terms of time 
which is extrinsic to it, just as we measure our own 
duration by the motion of the earth on its axis 
and around the sun. In this way we may say 
that the infinite has existed through an infinite 
time, with one other restriction, however, namely, 





COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 83 


that that infinite time be not conceived as actual 
but as possible. That is, as no moment in the past 
can be assigned as the first when time was possible, 
so possible time may be conceived as stretching 
back indefinitely, i. e., in a broad sense, infinitely. 
It has no limit in its possibility; the infinite’s 
duration has actually no limit. So the latter may 
be conceived in terms of the former. 


c. N. Maj. We deny that a concept of the in- 
finite should be able to represent him as the creator 
of space. And this, for the simple reason that 
space, as such, is not a real thing. It is a thing 
fashioned by our own intellect, not arbitrarily, how- 
ever, but with a foundation in reality, 1. e., in the 
real order, for so doing. It has an objective exist- 
ence in the intellect as a thing thought, but outside 
of the intellect it neither exists nor can it exist. 


The foundation in the real order of our concept 
of space are the extended objects we see about us 
with their length, breadth and depth. Our con- 
cept of a part of space is formed by supposing that 
such an extended object has dropped out of exist- 
ence and that nothing has taken its place, and con- 
ceiving the void it leaves——which has the exact 
dimensions of the body,—as a receptacle, i. e., the 
space, into which the body may be conceived to 
have been put. This space is called real space by 
reason of the reality of the surfaces of the body 
or bodies conceived as enclosing it. 


If we consider, further, that no matter how many 
extended objects exist, no matter how large any 
one of them may be, it is still possible that others 
and larger ones may be made, and that without 
end, we have a concept of the limitless vastness in 
length, breadth and depth of possible extension. 


84 


GOD AND REASON 


If now we conceive a void with these limitless 
dimensions as a receptacle into which extended 
objects may be put we have a concept of absolute 
or imaginary space; that space, namely, into which 
we may conceive the visible world to have been 
put when it was made. 

This is the space which Spencer tells us the in- 
finite would have to be conceived as creating. The 
difficulty is an absurdity to one who knows what 
space 1s. 

We have dwelt at some length on these notions 
of space and time, as an utterly false explanation of 
the way in which we form them lies at the very 
door of Kant’s destructive Critique of Pure Reason. 
He claims the notions of time and space are 
formed independently of experience, i. e., through 
a priort forms of them. We have shown how we 
derive them from _ experience, at the same 
time giving answer to our present adversary’s 
difficulties. 


If matter and the forces of matter existing from 
eternity, and in motion from eternity, and acting 
according to the immutable laws of nature, can by 
a gradual evolution form at first less perfect sub- 
stances, then more perfect ones, and finally man, 
there is no need of postulating the existence of an 
unproduced first cause of the world,—an intelligent, 
infinitely perfect being. 

But this hypothesis is true. Therefore, etc. 

This is the explanation of the world given by 
Biichner and other gross materialistic Atheists. 
Haeckel, who has been called “the high-priest of 
Monism,” though he claims that he is not a Material- 
ist (Cf. Riddle of the Universe, p. 16, Translated by 
McCabe; Watts & Co., London, 1913), really is 





COSMOLOGICAL ARGUMENT 85 


one, and holds practically the doctrine advanced in 
the difficulty. 
He says, l. c., 


“Monism recognizes one sole substance in the universe, 
which is at once ‘God and Nature’; body and spirit (or 
matter and energy) it holds to be inseparable. The 
extramundane God of dualism leads necessarily to The- 
ism; the intra-mundane God of the monist leads to 
Pantheism.” 


He calls himself a Pantheist, but he is honest 
enough farther on (1. c, p. 238) to admit that 
this Pantheism is Atheism. He quotes, approving- 
ly, the following from Schopenhauer : 


“Pantheism is only a polite form of Atheism. The 
truth of Pantheism lies in its destruction of the dualistic 
antithesis of God and the world, in its recognition that 
the world exists in virtue of its own inherent forces. 
The maxim of the Pantheist, ‘God and the world are 


one’ is merely a polite way of giving the Lord God his 
congé.” 


Of Haeckel’s doctrine, Calkins, Persistent Prob- 
lems of Philosophy, p. 402, writes: 


“Tf Haeckel were consistent in his teaching, it would 
be, indeed, unfair, to reckon him as a materialist. But 
the truth is as has been shown, that he actually defines 
the ‘one substance’ in terms of the material—as the sum 
of atoms, or of chemical and physical processes, and as 
phychoplasma. Similarly Herbert applied to what he 
calls the Unknown Reality specific attributes of the 
physical universe.” 


In answer then to our difficulty— 
N. Min. The explanation offered bristles with 
absurdities. 


The following reasons will suffice for its rejection. 
More could be given. 


1. The fundamental substance it postulates has 
all the attributes of a produced being, and yet it 
is said to be unproduced. 


2 The motion it postulates from eternity is 
impossible. It necessarily implies that an infinite 
duration of time has been passed in reaching the 


86 


GOD AND REASON 


present moment in the world’s history. This im- 
plication is impossible. 

3. Matter and material energy and motion can- 
not explain the lower forms of life, much less can 
they explain intellectual life, the origin of the soul, 
free-will, etc. 


What is outside of man’s experience cannot be 
demonstrated by man. 

But the existence of an unproduced cause is outside 
of man’s experience. Therefore, etc. 

John Stuart Mill and others who belittle man‘s 
reasoning power so argue. 

D. Maj. What is outside of man’s experience 
and not necessarily connected with what he ex- 
periences cannot be demonstrated, C.; what man 
does not experience, but what is necessarily con- 
nected with the objects of that experience, he can- 
not demonstrate, N. Cd. Min. 


As far as we know the elementary constituents 
of the world may have always existed. 

Therefore the existence of a first cause extrinsic 
to them cannot be demonstrated. Thus argues 
Mill. 

R. 1. Tr. Ant. N. Con. Even though the world 
had no beginning, still, as a mutable and contingent 
being, it is a produced thing. Hence it necessarily 
depends on the first unproduced cause of all things 


- produced. 


2. D. Ant. As far as we know, naturally and 
apart from the conclusions of reason, C.; including 
reason’s conclusions, JN. 





GOD’S EXISTENCE NECESSARY 87 


THESIS IV. 


An unproduced cause exists of itself and with absolute 
necessity. 


PRENOTES TO THE THESIS. 


Having demonstrated the existence of an unproduced first 
cause of the beings daily produced in the world, in the pres- 
ent thesis we derive from a consideration of the nature of 
that being two other attributes very closely allied to that of 
its being unproduced, viz., its self existence and its absolutely 
necessary existence. In fact, the connection is so close that 
the present thesis may be said to be but a corollary of the 
preceding one. 


A Self-Existing Being is one whose existence is from itself. 
Not in the sense, however, that it produces itself,— 
which is manifestly impossible,—but in the sense, that 
its existence is of its very essence or nature. Because 
it is what it is, it exists. 

An Absolutely Necessary Being is one which on no hypo- 
thesis can be, or can be conceived to be, non-existing. 

For brevity’s sake this being is most frequently 
called simply a necessary being. 


An Hypothetically Necessary Being is one which on the 
hypothesis that it be existing, cannot be non-existing. 
It might, however, have not existed, and it is absolutely 
possible for it to lose the existence it now has. It 
can, then, be fully conceived apart from existence. For 
example, I can have a perfect concept of a man, in 
a state of non-existence; I can never conceive a being 
whose existence is absolutely necessary in such a 
state. 


88 GOD AND REASON 


An hypothetically necessary being 1s commonly and 
briefly called a contingent being. 


ADVERSARIES. 


Kant and his followers, who claim that any logical 
deduction from the conclusion of the Cosmological 
argument, i. e., from the concept of an unproduced 
being, whose existence has been proved, necessarily in- 
volves the invalid Ontological argument. We have al- 
ready shown this claim to be false. 


PROOF OF THE THESIS. 


Part I. An unproduced cause is self-existing. 

An unproduced cause is either self-existing or derives 
its existence from another. 

But it does not derive its existence from another.. 
Therefore, etc. 
Maj. The truth of the Major follows immediately 
from the principle of causality. 
Min. If it derived its existence from another, it would 
not be unproduced. 


Part II. An unproduced cause exists with absolute 

necessity. 
An unproduced cause, whose existence is not absolutely 
necessary to it, could not exist. 
But an unproduced cause can exist. Therefore, etc. 
Maj. It could not exist, for there could be no suffi- 
cient reason for its existence. 

The reason could not be found in the being itself, 
for it would be a contingent being. 

It could not be found in any other being, for that 
being would be its cause; and it has no cause. 
Min, It not only can exist but must have existed, as 
we proved in the preceding thesis. 


Corollary I. A necessary being absolutely excludes the 
possibility of a beginning or an end to its existence. It always 





GOD’S EXISTENCE NECESSARY 89 


has existed, it now exists, it will exist forever. If it could 
ever be non-existing, it would not be a necessary being. 


Corollary II. From the study of the nature of a necessary 
being, we shall demonstrate the wonderful perfections of that 
nature; its umnicity, intelligence, personality, simplicity, im- 
mutability, infinity both in itself and in its attributes, etc. 

In none of these proofs drawn from the concept of neces- 
sary being, we insist in answer to the contrary assertions of 
Kant and his many present-day followers, is there any im- 
plication of the invalid Ontological argument. 

The Ontological argument attempts, prior to the establish- 
ment of the validity of the concept of a necessary being, and 
hence prior to an a posteriori proof of that being’s existence, 
to derive from that concept a knowledge of the actual exist- 
ence of that being. In doing this it commits the fallacy of 
drawing a certain conclusion from a concept which is not 
known to be a valid concept, and attempting, in so doing, to 
pass illegitimately from the ideal to the real and actual order. 

In the demonstrations mentioned above, no such fallacy 
is committed. We have proved the existence of an unproduced 
being, and, hence, have established the validity of the concept 
of that being. We have a perfect right now by deductive 
argumentation to draw whatever conclusions may legitimately 
be drawn from that concept. Exercising that right we have 
proved that an unproduced being is a self-existing and neces- 
sarily existing being, and continuing the same kind of argu- 
mentation we shall derive all the conclusions mentioned in 
these corallaries, and many more. 


90 GOD AND REASON 


THESIS V. 


There exists, and can exist, only one absolutely neces- 
sary being; only one God, 


PRENOTES TO THE THESIS. 


Our adversaries have told us that the Cosmological argu- 
ment, even if it could prove the existence of an unproduced 
first cause, is barren of results, inasmuch as any attempt to 
further develop it, and show that an unproduced first cause 
is not the eternally existing matter of the materialistic 
Atheists, nor the world-including god of the Pantheists, nor 
the finite god of many Pluralists, nor the multiplied god of | 
the Polytheists, necessarily introduces the Ontological argu- 
ment, the invalidity of which we have admitted. (Cf. Knight, 
Aspects of Theism, pp. 53 ff.) 

Though this difficulty has just been answered, it may be 
well to answer it again, as our adversaries, since the time of 
Kant, never grow weary of urging it. 

Our method of argumentation is this. Having derived from 
the existence of things produced the existence of an unpro- 
duced cause of them, whether one or many as yet we have not 
proved, we deduce, step by step, through a reasoned analysis 
of the nature of that cause, a concept of God, viz., our fully 
developed scientific concept, which distinguishes Him abso-- 
lutely from any being which a Materialist, Atheist, or Pan- 
theist, or illogical Pluralist or Polytheist may wish to put in 
His place. 

Nor in so doing are we guilty of the fallacy of the Onto- 
logical argument. Our deductions are drawn from a concept, 
the validity of which we have already established. Such, 
however, is not the method of those who advance the Onto- 
logical argument. They wish to pass from the ideal order to 





UNICITY OF GOD 91 


the real and actual order, and that through a concept which, 
as they use it, can not be known to be valid. What is more 
as a concept of a necessarily existing being cannot certainly 
be known by us to be valid without a knowledge of the existence 
of that being, any attempt to demonstrate the existence of 
such a being, even from a concept known to be valid is nec- 
essarily a petitio principu. 

In this thesis, then, in pursuance of our plan, we advance 
a step and show that the nature of a necessary being is such 
that it cannot be multiplied, hence there is, and can be, only 
one necessary being. Our thesis excludes Ditheism, Tritheism 
and all other forms of Polytheism. 


In a thesis to be explained and proved later on, we shall 
show that the oneness of God, which excludes the possibility 
of other gods, is a oneness of absolute simplicity, i. e., a one- 
ness which excludes composition of all kinds from God. 


Only One—That is said to be only one, which has no 
one to share that perfection of which it is said to be sole 
possessor. 


Only One, of Necessity—That is said to be necessarily 
only one, which has no one to share the said perfection, 
because any such one is impossible. It is this kind of 
unicity, only-oneness, we predicate of God’s nature in our 
thesis. 


Only One, In Fact—That is said to be only one im fact, 
i. e., merely in fact, which actually is without any one to 
share the said perfection, though such ones are possible. 


When we say a necessary being is of necessity one and 
only one, we affirm that a plurality of necessary beings is 
impossible, i. e., we affirm that a necessary being is in such 
wise one determined individual that there cannot be another 
individual of the same nature. Hence the very nature which 
makes a necessary being, considered merely as such, to be a 
necessary being, makes him also to be this necessary being. 


92 GOD AND REASON 


In other words, we assert that there is a great difference 
between, for example, human nature, looked at merely as 
such, and the nature of a necessary being, looked at in the 
same way. Human nature, looked at merely as such, is not 
in its concept restricted to one individual man, it may be 
found in countless men; the nature of a necessary being. 
on the contrary, looked at merely as such, in its concept is re- 
stricted to one definite, individual, necessary being. There- 
fore only one necessary being, one God, is possible. This one- 
ness or unity of the divine nature is a oneness of singularity. 


ADVERSARIES. 


Ditheists (Theistic Dualists), Tritheists, and Polytheists, 
both ancient and modern. William James, as far as words 
go, is polytheistically inclined; in reality he appears to be an 
Atheist. (Cf. A Pluralistic Universe, p. 124.) 


Ditheism, Philosophy has a problem to solve which 
is commonly called the problem of evil. It is a hard prob- 
lem; an age-old problem. James Ward calls it “the crux 
of theism,’ and F. C. Schiller tells us that it is “a stumbling 
block to all practical religion” and “is as insoluble a mystery 
to the theologians now as it was at the beginning.’ 

It may be stated thus: There are in the world evils in abun- 
dance, both physical and moral. Can their presence there 
be squared with the claim that there is one and only one ruler 
of the world, who is a God, infinitely good and infinitely 
powerful, or is some other solution to be sought for? 

It is not our intention to solve this problem here. We make 
mention of it merely to give the ground for the rise of 
Ditheism which sprang from a futile effort to solve it. 

This system explains the world and its evils as the result 
of the action of two eternally opposed principles; one essen- 
tially good and the author of all good in the world; the other, 
essentially bad, and the author of all the world’s evils. This 
error was prevalent in the East for several centuries before 





UNICITY OF GOD 93 


Christ, especially in Persia where Zoroaster gave it birth. 
In the third century after Christ, substantially the same error 
was taught by the Manicheans; named from their founder 
Manes, who for some time was a convert to Christianity. 

The problem is still with us, acutely so, in the face of the 
terrible sufferings and crimes that accompanied and have 
followed the world war. Ditheism failed to answer it. Di- 
theism is dead. And the principle of decay and death is in 
every answer that present-day non-Catholic philosophy has 
to offer; and they are many. 

The Atheist solves (?) the problem by removing God; the 
Christian Scientist, if he may be called a philosopher, by re- 
moving evil; the non-Catholic Pluralist, with very few ex- 
ceptions, by limiting God’s power and making Him finite; the 
Pantheist, in different ways; some, by ignoring evil; others, 
in evolutionary fashion, by saying that all will be well in the 
end, when the world will have evolved into a perfect state, 
and all evil will have vanished from it. 

All these so-called solutions of the problem of evil we re- 
ject. It is a hard problem to solve, but whatever its solution 
may be, it cannot be found in Atheism or so-called Christian 
Science, or in a denial either of the unicity of God, or of 
His infinite power or infinite goodness. Christian philosophy 
can tolerate no such solution. 

And yet more than one of our adversaries will tell us un- 
blushingly, as Durant Drake does, in Seekers After God, 
Harvard Theological Review, Jan., 1919: “The conception 
of Satan, taken over from the Persian religion, has prevented 
Christianity from becoming a clear-cut Monotheism, as Mo- 
hammedanism has been; many Christian writings depict their 
God, as a striving God, not unlike the Ahura-Mazda of Zoro- 
aster, or the finite God of William James, whose success is 
dependent in part on our faithfulness.” P. 74. 


Tritheism. This peculiar form of Polytheism arose from 
an incorrect interpretation of the mystery of the most Blessed 


94 GOD AND REASON 


Trinity. It taught that the divine nature is multiplied in the 
three divine Persons, and consequently that there are three 
Gods. 


Polytheism. Polytheism admits the existence of many, 
and, in some instances, of countless gods. Indian writers have 
boasted of thirty-three millions. It made its appearance some 
time after the Deluge, and gradually became so universal, that 
before long the Jews were practically the only nation which 
professed pure Monotheism. 

With the coming of Christ, our Saviour, and the founding 
of His church, began a warfare between that church and the 
religions of the false gods so fierce that the history of the 
early church may be said to be written in blood. This war- 
fare has gone on and is still going on. Countless souls have 
been brought to a knowledge of the one true God, but still 
countless souls remain to be won. Of all the inhabitants of 
the world at the present day fully sixty per cent. are still Poly- 
theists. The picture is a dark one yet there are many reasons 
for not taking an altogether pessimistic view of it. For: 


1. Though Polytheism be the belief of more than half the 
human race, it is an error neither as vicious nor as hard 
to eradicate as Atheism or Pantheism. 

It is not as vicious: for whilst the existence of a Su- 
preme Being on whom he depends, to whom he owes rey- 
erence, and by whom good and evil are given their deserts, 
is formally denied by the dogmatic Atheist, formally 
doubted by the Sceptic, formally ignored by the Agnostic, 
and virtually repudiated by the Pantheist, who by placing 
himself on the level with God, makes of Him no 
God,—the Polytheist, whatever his life may be, rec- 
ognizes that there is a Being above him, on whom he 
depends, whom he must reverence, and to whom he 
owes an accounting for the deeds of his life. 

In a word, the Atheist, Agnostic and Pantheist, hav- 
ing put aside God, have also put aside, theoretically at 





UNICITY OF GOD 95 


least, the law of God, and for that matter, the law of 
man also, seeing that all authority comes from God; the 
Polytheist, not so. 

Nor is the error of the Polytheist as hard to eradicate 
as those of the Atheist, dogmatic, sceptic and agnostic, 
or Pantheist. The error of the Polytheist, is the error 
of the over-credulous, the simple, the ignorant; the error 
of the Atheist, whatever his complexion may be, and 
Pantheist, is the error of the self-sufficient, over-wise 
philosopher, who, by a misuse of reason, has entrenched 
himself in his false position. 

History justifies this analysis, for while Atheism and 
Pantheism have their philosophic systems and cham- 
pions, Polytheism has not; or, to cite a concrete ex- 
ample, while the philosophic school of the Brahmanists is 
pantheistic, and that of the Buddhists, atheistic, the 
millions of the common, ignorant followers of Brahma 
and Buddha are frankly polytheistic. 


A careful study of the religions, both ancient and mod- 
ern, of the non-christian world, based upon information 
furnished by historical records of the past, and reliable 
data gathered painstakingly in these later days by mis- 
sioners, explorers and followers of the new science of 
Comparative Religion, shows clearly enough that, as far 
as our knowledge goes, no such thing as a pure Poly- 
theism has ever existed. For among the many gods of 
the Polytheists, even of those Polytheists at the lowest 
level of culture and intellectual development, one God 
is always found who is acknowledged to be supreme, 
the lord of the lower gods and of men. In the sense, 
therefore, of recognizing one God as supreme ruler, al- 
though many inferior ones were also venerated, Poly- 
theism may be said to be monotheistic. 

Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience, 
tells us “Man has never been in doubt that the qualities 


96 


GOD AND REASON 


of God are such as can belong to one,—a polytheism 
that is not in some sense a henotheism [heis, henos, one; 
theos, God, i. e., a belief in one God, and not in only 
one God], is yet to be discovered.” P. 325. 


Nor can Polytheism be considered a stage in the upward 
development, or evolution, of man in religion and morals 
from a zero of no God, and no conscience, as is urged 
by many non-Catholic philosophers who nowadays wish 
to apply their evolutionary theory to religion, to morals, 
and even to God Himself. On the contrary, we have the 
indubitable testimony of competent witnesses, some of 
them non-Catholics, men deeply versed in the study of 
the religions of mankind, and especially of the primitive 
religions, to the fact, that a pure Monotheism was the 
primitive faith of the human race, and hence that Poly- 
theism is a degeneration from a purer form of worship. 


Fr. John T. Driscoll, 8. T. L., God, after discussing 
this point says, 


“We may with perfect safety consider these conclusions as 


well established: 

“a. That the farther back we go in the history of any re 
ligion the purer become the religious concepts, hence the fact 
of primitive purity, for which we have the testimony of 
Renouf, de Rouge, Miiller, Rawlinson, Tiele. 

“b. That everywhere evident traces ‘are found of the 
corruption of primitive belief, hence the fact of degeneracy, 
for which we appeal to the labors of Dr. Robertson Smith, 
Miller, Kellog, Ebrard, Phillips, ete. 

“e, That all nations point in tradition to the time when 
heaven was closer to earth, hence the traces of primitive 
revelation, e. g., Miller, Phillips. 

“d. That the ascertained results of historic criticism show 
the earliest known belief of the Persians, the Hindus, the 
Egyptians, the Chinese, to be of a pure and spiritual mono- 
theism, for which fact we have the researches of d’Harlez, 
Darmesteter, Tiele, Legge, de Rouge, Renouf.” P. 42. 


Tisdall, Comparative Religion, in his concluding chap- 
ter writes: 


“Ethnic religions have been compared to a stream into 
which flow two rivulets, one pure and the other foul. In the 
bed of the river these mingle their waters, though sometimes 
there may be detected a part of the current which has par- 


UNICITY OF GOD 97 


tially escaped pollution. Lactantius and other Christian 
writers of antiquity appeal to the fact that on certain oc- 
casions even polytheists confess the unity of God and show 
some knowledge of Him. ‘When they swear, and when they 
express a hope, and when they render thanks they name— 
not Jove, nor many dieties, but—‘God’; to such an extent 
does truth of itself naturally find expression even from un- 
willing hearts.’ Lactantius points out that in prosperity this 
occurs much less frequently than in adversity... . ‘They never 
remember God except when they are in trouble. After fear 
has left them and danger has receded, then indeed do they 
joyfully run together to the temples of the deities; to them 
they pour out libations, to them they offer sacrifice, them 
do they crown with garlands. But to God, whom they had 
called upon in the stress of necessity, not even in word do 
they offer thanks.’ 

“Underlying Polytheism, and even such _ philosophical 
Pantheism as it is to be found in modern India, there still 
exists in each human heart, if no longer in book-religion and 
in systems of Philosophy, an innate belief in the One, True 
and Living God, who is not a ‘Stream of Tendency,’ not ‘The 
Unknowable,’ nor ‘A Power not ourselves that makes for 
Righteousness, but the Heavenly Father whose name is pre 
served even in the traditions of the modern savage. ... 

“As we have already seen, there is good reason to believe 
that the true knowledge of God ‘shone on the cradle of our 
race. 'The noble vision became veiled, and idolatry with ail 
its attendant abominations showed itself in history as a 
result of a Fall which calls for a restoration, rather than 
as the starting point of a continuous advance.” Pp. 125, 126. 


PRENOTES TO THE PROOF. 


To make our proof clear, a few notions, explained in pre- 


vious parts of philosophy, are recalled. 


be 


The essence or nature of a thing is that which makes 
a thing what it is fundamentally. When the question 
is asked about something, ‘‘What is that?,” it is answered 
accurately and completely by giving the essence or 
nature of the thing. For example, a being is passing 
by of a certain size, form and color; erect, having two 
legs, arms and hands; now talking, now laughing, and 
I am asked what it is. I answer, and correctly, by ne- 
glecting everything else, and denoting that which makes 
him what he is fundamentally, “It is a man.” So if you 
ask “What is God?” I answer by denoting His essence 


98 


GOD AND REASON 


or nature, “He is a necessary being, i. e., a self-existing 
being.” 


A singular thing, is so one that it cannot be multiplied. 
For example, this man cannot be many men. Only one 
man, and of necessity, only one man, can be this man. 
Every singular nature, therefore, as such, is of necessity 
one and only one. 

I may, however, consider the nature wich is in a 
singular being, either as singular or apart from its singu- 
larity. In the first place, I consider the nature which 
makes him to be, for example, this man, in the second 
case, the nature which makes him to be merely a man. 

When we say, then, in our argument that the nature 
of a necessary being cannot be multiplied, we mean thie 
nature looked at apart from singularity, hence the nature 
by which a necessary being is merely a necessary being 
makes him to be also this necessary being. Therefore, 
the very nature which makes God to be God, makes Him 
also to be this God, and as a singular thing cannot be 
multiplied, it follows that the nature of God, however 
it be looked at, cannot be multiplied. 


Whatever exists is necessarily a singular thing. 
If that were not so, then each existing being could be 
many. Hence, for example, an existing man could be 
this man and that man, i. e., not this man, at the same 
time. Which is evidently absurd. 


Whatever can be conceived as non-singular can be 
conceived as non-existing. As a thing cannot exist 
unless it be singular it follows that, if I can 
rightly conceive the nature of any being without 
conceiving it as singular, I can rightly conceive that 
nature as not existing, for I can conceive it without 
something which is necessary for its existence. An 
example will make this conclusion clear. If the pos- 





UNICITY OF GOD oo 


session of a heart and lungs is necessary in order that 
a man may live, I can certainly and rightly conceive 
him. as dead, if it is possible for me to conceive him as 
having lost, i. e., as being without, both heart and lungs. 


PROOF OF THE THESIS. 


If more than one necessary being, i. e., more than one 
God, is possible, the nature of necessary being as such i. e., 
the nature considered apart from its singularity, may be 
conceived as capable of being found in more than one nec- 
essary being. 

But the nature of necessary being as such, i. e., considered 
apart from its singularity, cannot be conceived as being cap- 
able of being found in more than one necessary being. 

Therefore only one necessary being, i. e., only one God, 
is possible. 

Maj. The Major appears to be self-evident. For if 
the nature of necessary being be not monopolized 
by one individual, it may be found in more than 
one. Hence it may be conceived as capable of being 
so found. 

Min. If the nature by which a necessary being is 
constituted not this necessary being but merely a 
necessary being can be conceived as capable of being 
found in more than one necessary being, it can be 
conceived as non-singular, for if it were necessary 
to conceive it as singular, it could be conceived only 
in one necessary being. | 

But the nature of a necessary being, 1.e., a nature 
which cannot be conceived as non-existing, cannot 
be conceived as not singular. If it could, it could 
be conceived without that which is necessary for 
existence, as shown above; and hence it could also 
be conceived as non-existing. But it is impossible 
for the nature of a being whose existence is abso- 
lutely necessary to be conceived as non-existing. 


100 GOD AND REASON 


Scholion. The Unicity of God and the Mystery of the 
Most Blessed Trinity. 


Divine revelation teaches that in God there are three 
Divine Persons, really distinct one from another; and at 
the same time it teaches that there is only one God. The 
same, identical, singular nature, therefore, is common 
to the three Divine Persons. Hence, between our thesis, 
which asserts only the unicity of the divine nature, and 
revelation, there is no opposition. 


DIFFICULTIES 


if A proof which proves only the unicity of the singular 
divine nature does not prove the thesis. 

But the proof of the thesis, which is derived from the. 
nature of a necessary being, proves only the unicity of 
the singular divine nature. 

Therefore the thesis remains unproved. 


D. Min. It would prove only the unicity of the singular 
divine nature, if it were derived from the nature of 
necessary being looked at as singular, i.e., as consti- 
tuting him this necessary being, C.; if it is derived 
merely from the nature of necessary being con- 
sidered apart from singularity, N. Cd. Min. 


th If the multiplication of a perfection in others, does not 
diminish it in those who already possess it, the nature of 

a necessary being, even though it be infinite, need not be 

restricted to one individual. 

But the multiplication of a perfection in others, does 
not diminish it in those who already possess it. 
Therefore many necessary beings are possible. 

D. Maj. If the multiplication of a perfection in others. 
does not diminish it in those already possessing it, 
but if, nevertheless, the fact that it can be multiplied 
is a sign that the perfection is contingent and finite, 


ay 


UNICITY OF GOD 101 


the nature of a necessary being, even though it be 
infinite, need not be restricted to one individual, N., 
if the fact that it can be multiplied were not such 
a sign, the nature of a necessary being might be 
multiplied, C. Cd. Min. 


If the same witnesses who testify to the existence of 
God, and whose testimony is accepted, testify also that 
there are many gods, that testimony is also to be ac- 
cepted. 


But the same witnesses who testify to the existence 
of God testify also to the existence of many gods. 


Therefore, the existence of many gods should be ad- 
mitted. 

D. Maj. If adequately the same witnesses testify, i.e., if 
the testimony is just as universal and just as con- 
stant, with regard to both facts, their testimony is 
to be accepted with regard to both facts, C.; if in- 
adequately the same witnesses testify with regard 
to both facts, 1.e., if the testimony with regard to 
the existence of God, is universal and constant in 
the history of the human race, on account of which 
qualities this testimony is accepted with regard to 
that fact, whereas the testimony with regard to the 
existence of many gods is not universal and not 
constant, their testimony is to be accepted with re- 
gard to both facts, N. Cd. Min. 


If there be but one necessary being, who is God, He 
finally is the cause of the evil in the world. 

But God cannot be the cause of the evil in the world. 
Therefore there must be more than one necessary being. 


D. Maj. He is the cause of all the reality in the things 
that are evil, in the sense that whatever reality is 
produced by any creature is also produced by the 
concurrent action of God, C.; He is the cause not 


102 


GOD AND REASON 


merely of the reality in the thing, but of the evil 
looked at in itself, Subd., He is immediately its 
cause, NV.; mediately, Subd., He is in any sense the 
cause of the evil looked at in itself, in the case of 
moral evil, i.e., sin, N.; in the case of physical evil, 
Subd., He is its cause, making use of it as a means 
to a good end, which may be either a higher physical 
good or something which looks to the moral welfare 
of man, C.; not making use of it as such a means. 
N. Cd. Mm. 


The Problem of Evil. We make no attempt here to 
treat fully the problem of evil which is presented in this 
difficulty. Such treatment will be given later. A brief 
explanation of the formal distinctions given above will 
help to their better understanding. | 


Evil. A thing is said to be evil when it is in some 
way wanting in order. In the evil thing we distinguish 
the reality which is evil, and the evil looked at in itself, 
Evil looked at in itself consists in the privation or 
want of due order. 

Physical evil in itself is the want of conformity with 
the physical laws. 

Moral evil in itself is the want of conformity with the 
laws that bind in conscience. 

As evil looked at in itself is not a reality but a priva- 
tion, it cannot be the immediate effect of an action, since 
every action immediately produces some reality. A pri- 
vation, therefore, is connected with, and consequent on, 
the production of some reality. 

As physical evil is opposed only to some finite good, 
it may, according to the right order, in a complicated 
system, where parts are subordinated to other parts and 
to the whole, be intended as a means to the well being of 
a higher order or of the whole. And hence, what may be 
considered a physical evil, if we confine our attention to 


-UNICITY OF GOD 103 


one small portion of this complicated world-order, will 
be seen to be good if we consider that portion in its re- 
lation to others and to the whole. So, the loss of an arm, 
looked at merely in itself is a physical evil, but to lose 
an arm to save the whole man, is according to right 
order, and therefore, under that aspect, not an evil. So, 
sickness, which sends a man back to God, is not, if viewed 
adequately, an evil. God, therefore, may intend, if He 
wishes, the happening of physical evil as a means to a 
good in a higher order. 

As moral evil is opposed to God Himself, seeing that 
it is the deliberate turning of the creatures man uses, 
and, at times, even of man himself, away from the ulti- 
mate end for which they were made, God can never in- 
tend it. Nevertheless, whilst hating and prohibiting it, 
He may permit it, only however, on the supposition, that, 
such evil being presupposed, He makes it the occasion 
for obtaining some good. Otherwise, it would not be 
directed towards the ultimate end for which all creatures 
were necessarily made,—God Himself. 

Moral evil, it must be noted, is due to man’s deliberate 
misuse of the greatest gift that God has given him, 
namely, the gift of freedom; through which, as master 
of his own actions, he has the power to win God as his 
own. 

Short of taking this gift away from him, God does 
all that, He can to urge man to a right use of it. If man 
fails to use it properly, then man, not God, is to blame. 

If we were to deny to God, the right to give this gift 
to man, or to place him in circumstances in which He 
foresees that man will abuse it, even to the extent of los- 
ing his soul, we should be making God the slave of man’s 
depravity. An example will show this clearly. Let us 
take a man who for two whole years, with the exception 
of one half-hour, deliberately chooses to live at enmity 
with God; and let us suppose that God wishes to summon 


104 


GOD AND REASON 


him to judgment during that time. The sinner thus ad- 
dresses God: “My Lord and my God! with a clear knowl- 
edge of the great gifts You have given me and the love 
You have shown me in forgiving me the innumerable sins 
of my past life, I nevertheless intend thic coming year 
to profane Your Holy Name, to trample Your gifts under 
my feet, and whenever occasion offers, and as far as in 
my power lies, to crucify You. When the year is done 
I will give one half-hour to Your service. The year that 
follows will again be mine. It is in Your power to call me 
to account when You will, but at the risk of being called 
unmerciful, unjust, unholy, You dare not call me from 
life outside of the miserable half-hour I give to Your 
service.” If God were obliged so to act, who would be 
master, God or the sinner? 7 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 105 


THESIS VI. 


The unproduced, necessarily existing, first cause of all 
things produced, God, one and only one, is an intelligent, 
personal being.’ 


PRENOTES TO THE THESIS. 


Still advancing in the development of our scientific concept 
of God, our aim in this thesis is to show that He is an in- 
telligent and personal being. 

That God is a personal being can be proved easily enough, 
once His intelligence has been established. To establish this, 
then, will be our main endeavor. 

Two proofs of it suggest themselves. The first, quite simple 
and needing little or no explanation, is drawn from the exist- 
ence in the world of intelligent beings. The second is drawn 
from the order which everywhere abounds in nature. It is 
known as the argument from design, the argument from final 
causes, the teleological (telos, end) argument. It is a classical 
argument, a strong argument, an appealing argument. Small 
wonder, then, that it has been bitterly assailed by its many 
adversaries, Atheists, Agnostics, Pantheists, Kantian Theists, 
Pragmatists, Modernists. To meet these attacks successfully, 
one must have a firm grasp of it, and this cannot be had without 
a clear and accurate knowledge of its nature and scope. It 
will be necessary, then, before presenting the argument to 
explain fully these two points. 

Fundamental to an understanding of the nature of the argu- 
ment is an understanding of the notion of order. This de- 
mands, then, immediate explanation. 


Order is the adaptation of many, and most frequently of 
diverse, things to some one definite result. 


106 GOD AND REASON 


Order of Beauty (esthetic) is the outcome when the defin- 
ite result of such adaptation is the harmonious combina- 
tion of the many into a whole capable of giving pleasure 
to those perceiving it. 

When the combination is based on quantitative rela- 
tions, beauty of symmetry results; when it is based on 
qualitative relations, the result is beauty of harmony. 

Order of Finality (teleological) is the adaptation of the 
many as means taa definite result to be attained by their 
combined physical action. 

Order of beauty may be said to tend, by the appeal it 
makes through the intellect, ie., by moral causality, to 
the giving of pleasure, as to an end purposed or designed; 
teleological order tends, by the physical action of its 
parts, to the result it achieves, as to an end, purposed © 
or designed. 

Both, then, may be said to tend towards an end, and so 
both may be called teleological. However, as that order 
is more properly said to tend towards an end, as an 
effect purposed or designed, which reaches it through the 
united physical action of its parts, the name teleological 
is usually given to it alone. 

The term teleological order, or order of finality, even 
as broadly applied also to order of beauty, may be under- 
stood in two senses. 

Order of finality materially taken. In this sense, an 
order is considered which implies finality, not as 
implying it, the end reached being considered merely 
as the term, or result, in the physical order, and in 
no sense as the cause, of the ordered action of the 
means used to reach it. 

Order of finality formally taken. In this sense, an 
order is considered not only which shows finality but 
as showing it, the end reached being considered not 
merely as a result, or term, in the physical order, 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 107 


of the ordered action of the means, but also as the 
cause, in the intellectual or the moral order, i.e., the 
final cause, of it. 

The result, therefore, reached in the physical 
order, before its existence there, existed in the in- 
tellectual order as a known result whose attainment 
was desired; the result so desired, and existing as 
yet merely as a thing desired, being the cause of 
the selection and ordering of the means suitable to 
bring about its actual existence. 

In the world abundant evidence is given of both orders, 

that of beauty, and that of finality. From either of them 

separately, or from both combined, arguments proving 
the intelligence of God may be derived. These arguments 
are forms of the teleological argument. 

The teleological argument, therefore, derives from 
presence of order in the world the intelligence of the 
first unproduced cause of all things,—God. It concludes 
from the presence in the world of finality materially 
taken, to the presence there of finality formally taken. 

In other words, from a consideration of the constant 
concurrence of the innumerable forces of nature in pro- 
ducing continually those countless effects of wondrous 
beauty and utility that make this ordered world, the 
intellect is forced to the conclusion that such concurrence 
can be explained only on the hypothesis: 

1. That those effects, prior to the world’s existence, 
were present in thought and efficacious desire to an 
intelligent efficient cause ; 

2. That the means to achieve them through countless 
combinations of natural forces was _ intelligently 
planned ; 

3. That the result of this efficacious desire was the 
actual carrying out of the plan—the ordered universe. 

In the same way considering the marvelous adaptation 


108 


GOD AND REASON 


of part with part in a giant locomotive, we immediately 
conclude that before it existed some intelligent being 
must have conceived the desire to construct a self-pro- 
pelling machine, carefully planned its parts, and then, as 
the result of his desire, executed the plan. 


Various forms of the teleological argument. As we noted 


The 


The 


above, the teleological argument may draw its conclusions 

either from the order of beauty in the world, or’ from the 

order of finaltiy, or from both together. 

argument less strictly teleological, sometimes called 

the argument from order, is that drawn only from the 

order of beauty in the world. This order, as we have 
seen, is teleological in a less strict sense. 

argument strictly teleological, very often called the 

argument from design, is drawn from the order of final- 

ity in the world. This order is strictly teleological. 

It may be made in two different ways: 

1. One form derives its conclusion from the order of 
finality but not exclusively; it argues from both 
orders. However since it concludes mainly from the 
order of finality, it is classed as a strict teleological 
argument. 

2. A second form draws its conclusion solely from 
the order of finality. St. Thomas uses this form. 
This also we shall use, considering the world under 
one aspect only; inasmuch, namely, as it is a com- 
plexus of many active agents whose various opera- 
tions, in marvelous combination, constantly produce, 
in the midst of innumerable changes, effects both 
beautiful and useful. 

W. Knight, who rejects the teleological argument, 

makes mention of its double form in Aspects of Theism. 


He writes, 

“One branch of it [the teleological argument] is the popu- 
lar argument from design or adaptation in nature; the 
fitness of means implying, it is said, an architect or designer. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 109 


“Another branch is the argument from the order in the 


universe: the types or laws of nature indicating, it is said, 
an orderer or law-giver, whose intelligence we thus discern. 
In this case it is not that adjustment of means to ends proves 
the presence of a mind that adjusted them; but that the law 
itself, in its regularity and continuity, implies a mind behind 
it, an intelligence animating an otherwise soul-less universe.” 
P. 60. 


Points to be noted concerning the development of the 
argument. Having defined, and given the divisions 
of, order and the teleological argument, we have still to 
explain some points touching the argument’s development. 


1 


Even though it could be proved that nature is not 
orderly in all its works, our argument would still 
stand. 

Our argument in no way rests on the assump- 
tion that everything in the world is rightly ordered; 
nor on this assumption, that everything in the world 
is rightly ordered, even though we consider the 
world solely inasmuch as it is subject to the laws of 
nature, and hence altogether apart from, and inde- 
pendent of man’s free acts and their consequences. 
But it is based on this assumption, which no one can 
fail to admit, viz., that, even though it were true that 
natural agents now and again acted counter to right 
order (which we do not admit), still this world of 
ours is an ordered world; a cosmos (order), a mun- 
dus (ordered), a tiniverse (versus, towards; unum, 
one), in which everywhere countless creatures of 
bewildering variety and diverse tendencies, in the 
midst of continual changes both accidental and sub. 
stantial, steadfastly, changelessly, and frequently in 
ways most intricate, harmoniously concur in the pro- 
duction of effects of surpassing beauty and useful- 
ness. To emphasize the above point we cite here 
two non-Catholic philosophers, leaving to a corollary 
an account of some particular instances of nature’s 
marvelous workings. 


110 


GOD AND REASON 


Martineau, A Study of Religion, “The plausibility of tele- 
ology depends we are told, on our exclusive attention to 
picked instances, which successfully simulate the char- 
acters of intention; but it is not these alone that ought 
to be cited as witnesses: we have only to enter another 
compartment of nature, and we shall find them not only 
unconfirmed but contradicted. Numerous cases are ad- 
duced of natural arrangements which attain their ends 
so clumsily as to leave but a poor impression of their 
originating intelligence: or, worse, which work such mis- 
chief as can never have been an end to any intelligence 


at all. 

“These cases undoubtedly demand a patient estimate— 
at the same time we must bear in mind the real position 
of the argument and not suppose that positive marks of 
intention and intellectual method can be cancelled or 
neutralized by any appeal to inexplicable or seemingly 
opposite instances. Even if they implied the absence 
from them of intelligent causation, they do not withdraw 
it from the field which it already occupies; but only em- 
barass us with the problem, how it is that the disposing 
mind, conspicuous through so vast a range, has not left 


its vestiges everywhere. 

“The clear is not set aside by the obscure: and if the 
utter helplessness and absurdity of the hypothesis of 
fortuitous concurrence in the face of well understood 
natural order have been established, the threatened 
gufficiency of final causes to account for a residue of ill 
understood and exceptional phenomena will add nothing 
to its competency.” Vol. 1, p. 330. 

Diman, The Theistic Argument. “The universe every- 
where reveals itself to us as a whole, all the parts of 
which are related to each other by precise and unvarying 


“The reign of law is, then, the result which science has 
everywhere reached. It lies at the root of every concep- 
tion we can form of the universe either without us, or 
within us; for while regularity and order are most con- 
spicuous in the grand phenomena of the external world, 
we are not less assured of their pervading presence in 
the most intricate and obscure processes of life. Be- 
ginning with astronomy, the idea has passed to every de- 
partment of science, and to every domain of thought. It 
refuses to be excluded from any sphere where there is 
change and progress and growth. It meets us at every 


step. Pp. 104, 105. 
Our argument is derived from the world-order, 


looked at in its entirety. 
In the development of the teleological argument, we 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 111 


prove the necessity. of admitting intelligence in the 
first cause of all existing things, from a consideration, 
not of particular instances of order in the world, but 
of the world-order looked at in its entirety, i.e., from 
a consideration of the constant, complicated, univer- 
sal concurrence of nature’s countless forces; the re- 
sult of which is, in the midst of endless changes and 
through the ceaseless production and destruction of 
the individual, the preservation of innumerable 
genera and species of unsurpassing beauty and be- 
wildering variety in the mineral, and especially in 
the plant and animal kingdoms. . 

It is to be noted, however, that whilst drawing on the 
universal world-order for our argument, we insist 
that there are in nature many particular instances of 
adaptation of means to end which can only be ex- 
plained by admitting them to be the result of in- 
telligent purposeful action. This is especially true 
in the case of vital functions, and in a still more 
marked way in the case of many instinctive acts of 
animals. 


Among the particular instances of world-order to be 
given in a scholion at the end of this thesis will be 
included some from organic life and the instinctive 
actions of brutes. 


Muckermann, S.J., The Humanizing of the Brute, re- 
marks on this point, “It is obvious that the influence of 
‘purpose’ or a final tendency is met with everywhere in 
ENG RUNIVOPSS) lun as It is clearly demonstrated by the 
laws of organic life in general, and especially by the 
study of the human body, its organs and functions, the 
eye, the heart, the circulation of the blood, the activity 
of brain and nerves. 

“But nowhere is the direction of final tendency demanded 
more emphatically than in the activity of animals which 
originates in their instinctive faculties. Indeed, we meet 
with so many actions appropriate to specific ends that, 
if anywhere in nature, then surely in the domain of in- 
stinct ‘final tendency’ holds the sceptre of sovereignty.” 
Fag 


112 


GOD AND REASON 


Our main argument is not analogical; the argu- 
ment from analogy is not invalid. 


The charge has been made by many adversaries of 
the teleological argument, that it 1s wholly and solely 
an argument from analogy, and an invalid one at 
that. Both of these charges we deny. We deny, in 
the first place, that our argument is based solely on 
the similarity which exists between ordered effects 
artificially produced and ordered effects naturally 
produced. Secondly, we deny that an argument 
based on such analogy is invalid. The warrant for 
these denials will be found in the two valid argu- 
ments which we shall develop later on; the first of 
which will be drawn solely from a consideration of 
the world order itself, the second will be from analogy. 


Diman, The Theistic Argument, “The argument from de- 
sign, is not, as often represented, a mere argument from 
analogy. Thus it is said that in this argument we infer, 
from the likeness which certain natural objects bear to 
artificial objects, that there must be a likeness in their 
causes. We know that a watch can only be the work 
of an intelligent maker, and hence in the wonderful ad- 
justments in the hand or the eye we can conclude that 
they in like manner must have been framed by an in- 
telligent being. 

“But whatever analogy there may be between the opera- 
tions of nature and the works of man, as part of the de- 
sign argument, it is rather a means of illustration than 
a condition of inference. 

“When we infer that the eye or the watch are the work 
of an intelligent being, there is an inference in either 
case and an inference of precisely the same nature. It 
is as direct and independent in one case as in the other. 
“Hence the argument of design rests directly on the 
character of the works of nature.” P. 136. 


As our argument concludes directly from order, it 
is of necessity based on an order which could not 
have been produced non-intelligently. 

Having demonstrated the existence and unicity of 
God, as the unproduced, necessarily existing, first 
cause of all things, we purpose in this thesis, as we 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 113 


have already declared, to prove directly from a con- 
sideration of the ordered action of nature’s combined 
forces, that that cause must be an intelligent being. 
We admit, moreover, that the same conclusion may 
be also derived directly from particular instances in 
nature, of adaptation of means to end. 

To derive this conclusion directly, however, it is clear 
that the order on which the argument is based must 
be such as to exclude its having been produced non- 
intelligently. For if, as far as it is concerned, it 
could have been produced non-intelligently, even 
though for a fact it was intelligently produced, still 
the intelligence of its cause could not be derived di- 
rectly and solely from it. 


Now, experience shows us that some ordered effects, 
of a few parts simply arranged and not involving con- 
stant adaptation in the midst of change, may be pro- 
duced non-intelligently. An infant, for example, may 
arrange four or five letters of the alphabet so that 
they spell its own name; or some bits of straw, casu- 
ally, 1.e., non-intelligently, dropped may take the shape 
of a star or a regular pentagon. Evidently, then, an 
argument cannot be based on order of this kind, for 
the possibility of its having been non-intelligently 
produced precludes a direct conclusion from it of 
intelligence even in the first cause of all things. 
What, then, is the nature of that order which ex- 
cludes the possibility of non-intelligent production and 
on which our argument is necessarily based? An- 
swering in the abstract, we may say that any order 
which exhibits a marked constancy of adaptation of 
part to part in the production of a definite, compli- 
cated result excludes of itself the possibility of non- 
intelligent production, and this is more emphatically 
true when, asin the concrete case of the world order of 


114 


GOD AND REASON 


finality, from which our argument is drawn, the con- 
stancy of adaptation of part to part, is almost beyond 
our comprehension. For here the parts are almost 
countless; the adaptation of part to part in the in- 
dividual, of individual to individual in the different 
species, of species to species, and of kingdom to 
kingdom, are most complicated; and the effects of 
the complicated action of these countless individuals 
of different natures are produced not once, nor twice, 
but continuously and for centuries. 


Fr. J. F. Driscoll, God, “It may be objected that chance 
can explain the coincidence of phenomena. This objec- 
tion is not new; it is as old as philosophic speculation. 
That it should be advanced today, seems strange in view 
of the fact that it has been refuted so often and s0 
thoroughly. 


“Chance is a word which cloaks our ignorance. It hag 
no objective value. It is not a cause. It is a name given 
to a group of phenomena, independent of one another 
and without any known connection. ..... Now that 
such a grouping can occur, cannot be denied. The ad- 
mission does not touch our trend of reasoning. Our 
basis is the constant repetition of this group with the 
same result. A single combination might be due to 
chance. The frequent combination of the same elements 
and their manifold content is a phenomenon which de- 
mands a cause.” Pp. 157, 158. 
Martineau. 4 Study of Religion, “He who selects takes 
for realization one out of several possibilities. Observing 
him in a single instance, you cannot tell his act from a 
mere fortuity; he may have chosen, or he may have 
chanced, the things he took. But if through a score of 
a hundred similar opportunities, he repeats the same 
appropriation, you know that it is no random hit he 
makes; there is here a new phenomenon, over and above 
the individual events, namely a certain order among 
them, consisting in the regular reproduction of the same; 
and for this phenomenon you need a cause and have it, in 
the controlling preference of the agent. Selection, there- 
fore, has its external, legible feature, namely, among 
several possibles, steadily one.” Vol. I, pp. 258, 259. 
Diman, The Theistic Argument, “It is not surprising that 
some of the most earnest of recent opponents of theism 
have recognized this [the teleological argument] as the 
most formidable weapon drawn from the armory of na- 
tural theology. It is admitted that the perpetual and un- 
interrupted uniformity of method is a cogent if not a 





GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 115 


convincing proof of a presiding intelligence, since the 
progress of science has rendered the hypothesis of fortu- 
ity irrational. ‘And let us think of this supreme Causal- 
ity as we may’, says one of the ablest of these, ‘the fact 
remains that from it there emanates a directive inference 
of uninterrupted consistency, on a scale of stupendous 
magnitude and exact precision, worthy of our highest 
possible conceptions of Deity.’” p. 115.. 

“{The] confusion of opinion with regard to its [the de- 
sign argument’s] meaning and scope is undoubtedly the 
main cause of the discredit which has been attached 
in our times to an argument which has been advanced and 
defended for two thousand years. In the minds of many it 
has been connected with such unintelligible and pre- 
posterous conclusions that it has been set aside as des- 
titute of any logical basis. 

“It is thus of the utmost importance to understand clearly, 
at the outset, what this basis is. The argument of design, 
then, is simply this: that there is a certain interpreta- 
tion which the facts of nature themselves call for and 
necessitate, the interpretation or explanation which at- 
taches to manifest arrangement and adaptation. This 
explanation adheres to the facts of nature and cannot be 
separated from: them. It is stamped upon these facts. In 
this sense, and in this sense only, it is claimed that design 
or finality is in these things. It is not an explanation of 
nature derived from theory, but one forced upon the mind 
by nature herself. By the constitution of our minds and by 
the laws of thought, we are forced to put this construction 
upon the facts presented. Just as we connect uniform 
occurence with law, so we connect manifold coincidence and 
adaptation with design. 

“It is the agreement and concurrence in the system 
of separate facts, which constitutes the whole force of 
the argument. That Bacon did not deny that nature, 
in this sense, is penetrated and illumined by the pre- 
sence of design, is proved clearly enough by his own 
words: ‘For while the mind of man looketh upon sec- 
ond causes scattered, it may sometimes rest in them and 
go no further, but, when it beholdeth the chain of 
them confederate and linked to-gether, it must needs 
fly to Providence and Deity.’” Pp. 187, 188, 139. 


In the explanation given, of various points concerning the 
development of our argument from design, mention has been 
made more than once of final causality, and fortuitous or 
chance events. What is a final cause? What is chance? A 
clear understanding of these terms is necessary for a clear 
understanding of our argument. Our explanation of them will 
be brief and restricted to our present needs. 


116 GOD AND REASON 


The end of an action considered as a cause; final cause; 
final causality. 

When we speak of the end of an action we may mean either 
the result, i.e., the terminus, of the action as it exists as an 
accomplished fact in the physical order, or the same result, not 
however as already accomplished, but as that for the accom- 
plishment of which an efficient cause exercises its energies. In 
this latter sense the word end signifies the final cause of the 
action of the efficient cause. Hence— 


A final cause, or end, is that on account of which, or for the 
accomplishment of which, an efficient cause acts. It is 
that which the efficient cause desires and, by its actions, 
intends to effect. Hence, as positively influencing the 
action of the efficient cause, it exercises a positive in- 
fluence on the production of the effect, and so is a true 
cause of it. It is the goal desired by the efficient cause, 
and the actions of this cause are the means taken to 
reach it. 

It is first in the order of intention, i.e., of efficacious 
purpose to attain it, in which order, and in which order 
alone, it is a cause; a cause, namely, of the actions by 
which it is finally accomplished. 

It is last in the order of achievement, in which order it 
is in no sense a cause, but merely the term of the actions 
actually performed in order to attain it. The final cause, 
therefore, influences the existence of the effect not by 
physical action, but only in as much as it is an object 
desired by the efficient cause, who is moved thereby to 
action. 

That which is the final cause may be e-risting or non- 
existing, but the final cause can never be existing under 
the aspect under which it is the final cause. If that 
which is the final cause be non-existing, then its existence 
under some aspect is desired; if it be already existing, 
then its possession may be desired; if it be already 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 117 


possessed, then the enjoyment of it in some way or 
other, or the giving of it to another, may be the motive 
leading the efficient cause to act. 

From the foregoing, it is clear that, strictly speaking, 
only intelligent beings can be said to act on account of an 
end. When unintelligent beings are said so to act, they do 
so only in as much as the end, for the attainment of which 
they strive, is determined by an intelligent being, which 
fits them to attain it, and thus directs them towards it. 

Our contention, therefore, in the teleological argument 
is, that the natural agents, which in the world tend towards 
the production of countless effects of wonderful beauty 
and utility, do so under the direction ofan intelligent be- 
ing, who ordered them for that purpose and directs them 


continually towards its achievement. 

Driscoll, God, “The principle of finality can now be drawn from 
the facts enumerated. When we find manifold activities of dif- 
ferent kinds combining to produce a future effect, so that the 
effect results not from any one in particular, but from the mu- 
tual and harmonious activity of all working as a unit, the mind 
is constrained to admit that this coincidence of action can 
only be explained by admitting that the effect in some manner 
influenced the arrangement of the activities. The necessity 
and existence of this very influence transforms the effect into 
a cause.” P. 156. 

How it can, be known that an efficient cause acts for an end. 
There are two ways, at least, in which this can be known. 
1. When the efficient cause explicitly states that he so 

acted. 


2. When the effect produced is of such a nature that 
no sufficient reason for its existence can be given un- 
less it be admitted that it was intended by an in- 
telligent being. Hence, for example, that man would 
be considered foolish who would declare that the 
costly, complicated marine engines that drive our 
ocean liners were not produced intentionally and 
after much careful planning, but by chance. In our 
argument it will appear, first, that nature produces 


118 


GOD AND REASON 


effects infinitely surpassing in perfection the driving 
of a vessel, and by processes infinitely surpassing in 
complication the workings of any machine devised 
by man, and, secondly, that these effects so produced 
can be explained only as the result of the planning 
and consequent action of a being of wonderful in- 


telligence and power. 


Shearman, The Natural Theology of Evolution, “If it 
is inconceivable that a watch or a clock could 
come into existence without the exercise of intelligence 
and foresight, it is much more inconceivable (if such 
an increase of inconceivability is possible) that the 
more wonderful and complicated plant or animal should 
come into existence without intelligence or design.” 
Picetis 

Diman, The Theistic Argument, “The order and harmony 
everywhere apparent in the universe are conceded facts. 
Those who refuse to refer them to intelligence are bound 
therefore to account for them in some other way. To say 
that they originated with chance, is an explanation so 
manifestly absurd, that it need not be considered.” P. 120. 


We heartily agree with the writer just cited in branding 
as preposterous any attempt at explaining the order in 
the world as due to a chance combination of merely na- 
tural forces. Preposterous though it be, it is, nevertheless, 
practically the explanation commonly offered by Evolu- 
tionists. They are almost unanimous in asserting that, 
“there is no evidence in nature of a designing mind” 
and, as a consequence, no matter how they theorize, their 
theories give but one solution; the ordering of nature’s 
forces is due to chance. It will be necessary, then, to 
say a few words about chance. This we shall do after 
citing a few authors in confirmation of this estimate of 
Evolution as generally defended. | 


J. Gerard, S.J., Hvolutionary Philosophy, “So far as positive 
doctrine is concerned this only is common to the various 
groups amongst which Evolutionists, properly so called, are 
distributed—that the universe has been evolved by some pro- 
cess or other, and in obedience to some law. 

“On the negative side, however, they are more explicitly in 
unison, the essential backbone of every evolutionary system 
being the denial of an intelligence presiding over and direct- 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 119 


ing the processes of nature whatever they have been. Evolu- 
tion, as commonly explained, means nothing, if it does not 
mean that everything has been worked out by blind, auto- 
matic forces, and that we find in all nature no evidence of a 
designing mind. This is clearly the cardinal point of the 
doctrine, which being granted, all can harmoniously agree 
to differ. But for the idea, that to explain the existence of 
nature, ag we observe it, is required a First Cause possessed 
of understanding and free-will, there is no tolerance, and 
nothing so surely arouses the anger of the more eager par- 
tisans of the New Philosophy, as to hint that the world bears 
traces of design.” P. 73. 


J. N. Shearman, (an Evolutionist) The Natural Theology of 
Evolution, “We come then to the theory of Evolution which has 
had the greatest effect on the course of thought in modern 
times, namely, that which is associated with the names of 
Darwin and Wallace—the theory of Natural Selection. .... 
“We have in this theory three points of great importance 
chance variation, survival of the fittest, and heredity . ‘ 
Nobody could or would believe that any chance assemblage 
might add chimes to a clock or watch already existing? No- 
body could and nobody would. Why then do some imagine 
that chance variations may account for the advance of an 
animal organism from a lower to a higher stage in the scale 
of being? . 


“It would be as easy to believe, that the Sphinx is merely 
a rock, which has come to be of its present form as the 
chance result of long ages, during which it was worn away 
by the continual friction of the desert sands that were blown 
against it, as to think that the organization of one of the 
higher animals is the result of fragments of design, each 
the ‘work of chance and all added together by Natural Selec- 
tion.” Pp. 42, 43, 56, 57. 

“When thoughts and theories are strictly catechised, they are 
found to contain nothing which can be supposed to account 
for order, but chance on the one hand and design on the 
other, and when the question is plainly put to us ‘Is it 
chance or design?’ our answer can never be really doubtful.” 
P, 264. 


Gray, Darwiniana, “The issue between the sceptic and theist is 
only the old one, long ages argued out, namely, whether or- 
ganic nature is the result of design or of chance. Variation 
and natural selection open no third alternative; they concern 
only the question, how the results, whether fortuitous or de- 
signed, may have been brought about.” P. 153. 





Chance, its nature. 


Chance is sometimes considered to be the cause of an effect 
neither foreseen by, nor intended either by nature or 


120 


GOD AND REASON 


by the free choice of, the causes by chance producing it. 
In reality, however, chance is not a cause at all, but 
the name given an effect neither foreseen by, nor intended 
either by nature or by the free choice of, the causes by 
chance producing it. Hence a chance effect would be 
the finding of a pearl necklace on the road by the farmer’s 
wife on her way to market, or the killing of a man by 
a rock hurled into the air by a distant blast. On the 
other hand, a man who deliberately poisons himself does 
not die by chance, nor does a tree by chance put forth 
leaves in the springtime. 

It is clear, then, that chance is nothing more than the un- 
intentional and unforeseen concurrence of the effects of 
two or more causes, acting simultaneously or at different 
times, but all of which effects individually were inten- 
tionally produced by some one or other, or perhaps by 
all of their proper causes. It is only the concurrence and 
the effect resulting from it which are unintentional and 
unforeseen. 

It is quite evident, therefore, that a chance effect is not 
without its proportionate cause. 

It is also quite evident that what is a chance effect for 
the cause who neither intends nor foresees it, may in no 
way be a chance effect with regard to some one else, by 
whom it is intended or foreseen. For example, two young 
people meet at a mutual friend’s house; for them the 
meeting is a chance one, as they neither foresaw nor in- 
tended it; not so, however, for their parents who inten- 
tionally brought it about. 

Since God, as will be proved later, foresees and intends, 
either positively or permissively, everything that will be, 
nothing can be said to happen by chance with regard to 
Him. 

Absolute chance, therefore, is impossible; relative chance, 
i.e., relative to finite causes, is of frequent occurrence. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 121 


Properties of chance. 


Chance happenings are, relatively, of infrequent and 
regular occurrence. For example, twenty bits of paper 
consecutively numbered allowed to flutter down through 
the air from a lofty tower on a gusty day will alight some- 
where. If the operation be repeated, how frequently will 
they fall in exactly the same places? How frequently 
will they fall in the order of their numbering? 


Again, the greater the number of causes acting, and the 
greater the number of the conditions to be fulfilled, in 
producing a definite concurrence, the more infrequent and 
irregular will be a chance happening of it; and for two 
reasons. In the first place, an increase in the number of 
causes or elements concurring increases the possibility of 
many other combinations, and, secondly, an increase in 
the number of conditions to be fulfilled with regard to a 
definite concurrence, makes this concurrence more diffi- 
cult, and, hence, decreases the possibility of its frequency. 
For instance, suppose that the number of pieces of paper, 
of the foregoing example, be increased to five thousand ; 
suppose that the gusty winds, in place of blowing from 
one point of the compass and with constant velocity, 
blow now from this now from that point and with change- 
able velocities; suppose, that in place of having to fall 
again merely in the same place they fell at first, it was 
further required that they should fall with the same side 
up, each parallel with the other, with numbers pointing 
in the same direction and reading consecutively from 
one to five thousand; it is quite evident that under these 
conditions to have them fall continuously that way by 
chance five thousand times is absolutely inconceivable. 

Nor is it hard to see that definite chance effects are 
necessarily relatively infrequent and «irregular. For 
since the concurrence of the causes and conditions which 
results in their production is not at all necessary, be- 


122 


GOD AND REASON 


cause not intended, and since, as we just saw, in a case © 
where the causes and conditions that are to concur are 
many, many other combinations are equally possible, a 
constant and regular definite concurrence would be with- 
out proportionate cause. 

Hence, whenever an effect is produced constantly and 
regularly by many concurring causes acting simultane- 
ously or at different times, we conclude, and rightly so, 
that it cannot be due to chance. 

It is quite easy to see, then, how irrational it is to at- 
tribute the wonderful order of the world to chance, for 
here we have innumerable forces, under conditions most 
complex, concurring in the production of effects most 
complicated, with unvarying regularity, year after year, 


and century after century,—everywhere . 


Von Hammerstein, Foundations of Faith, “Farraday says: 
‘When I contemplate the innumerable united forces working 
in nature; when I reflect how quietly and silently they 
maintain their mutual. equilibrium, so that the most 
antagonistic elements, in themselves strong enough to 
destroy completely the whole economy of nature, subsist 
peaceably side by side, and are made subservient to the 
needs of animal creation; when I consider all this I am more 
than ever convinced of the Almighty Ruler’s wisdom, good- 
ness and greatness, which our language is powerless to ex- 
press!’ 

“Inspired by the same views, Herschel says: ‘The aim of 
physical geography is to exhibit the compiled and accumu- 
lated mass of details as forming one harmonious whole united 
by mutual relations and influences, and subject to one great 
plan. ’ 

“Now where there is a plan, there must have been some 
one who conceived it . . . If, therefore, we would regard as 
possible the procession of the universe from an unconscious 
being we must renounce the idea of purpose in the universe, 
together with the idea of a rational nexus of events. All 
that is, all that happens, would then be the work of blind 
chance; an aimless, meaningless chaos. ... 

‘He who should deny the existence of an all wise creator 
in the face of so many millions of correspondent instincts 
and other harmonious ordinances, who should consequently 
neglect to render to this, his Creator, the respect and grat- 
itude due Him, must lack either understanding or conscience. 
I would more readily admit that one of Beethoven‘s sym- 
phonies had been composed by no one, that no architect ever 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 123 


designed the Cathedral of Cologne, that an ingenious and com- 
plicated machine had no inventor, than that the harmony 
of creation is not a sufficient proof of the existence of a 
planning and calculating Creator.” Vol. 1, pp. 117, 140, 185. 
Shearman, Natural Theology of Evolution, “To those who 
suppose that chance variations [Mr. Shearman is re- 
futing Darwinism] may account for everything if by 
any means those which are most suitable can be selected 
and preserved, the case seems to present itself in this way. 
We can suppose some one alteration to occur by chance, then 
why not another, why not any other? One particle may by 
chance alight on the proper spot, why not also a second and 
a third? It is only a matter of chances, and if a sufficient 
number of trials be granted, anything that is needed will 
certainly arise. 


“The mistake here lies in thinking that the arrival of a 
second particle and a third at the right place are events of 
the same kind as the arrival of the first. For the reason 
that there seems to be nothing impossible in the arrival of 
the first particle at the right spot is that it is taken to be 
a solitary event, unconnected with any other. The particle 
must be somewhere, why not there as well as anywhere 
else? But the reason that the arrival of the second is of any 
importance is that it is not an unconnected event but is 
linked on to what has gone before and forms a basis for what 
is to follow. 


“In an orderly arrangement every event is co-ordinated 
with the past and the future, and this co-ordination is not 
fitful, it is not a thing that comes and goes; it is steadily 
maintained and must be steadily maintained, during the build- 
ing up of the whole structure. Now this co-ordination of the 
past with the future is an act of thought; it manifests pur- 
pose and exhibits a plan. To ascribe it to chance is to sup- 
pose that co-ordination arises without any cause to produce 
TO aL ss 


“Tf a chisel were thrown at a block of marble it may 
happen to knock off such a chip as a sculptor would take by 


his first stroke . . . But it would not be reasonable to set 
a blindfolded man to throw chisels at a block of marble 
in the hope of producing a fine statue ... For the regular 


effect which is required is not produced by isolated blows 
. but by a series of efforts made into one by a constant 
regard for the purpose of the whole. 


“The first stroke that the sculptor makes is made in sub- 
ordination to the whole design. It is the continued con- 
sciousness of this design that gives regularity and order to 
his work. If you take away the consciousness of a design, 
as you do, when you trust to chance, you take away the cause 
of the order, and taking away the cause of the order you 
cannot expect the order to remain. We do not find events 
in Nature happening without sufficient cause . 


124 GOD AND REASON 


“We had four things before us, order, confusion, mind 
and chance, and our decision was that order always implies 
mind, and that chance can only bring about confusion.” Pp. 
57) 58, OOo 1 


Scope of the teleological argument. 


An argument cannot be -rightly understood or properly 
defended against attack, if its aim, or intent, or scope, be not 
clearly grasped. This clear grasp is all the more necessary 
when, as in the present case, the argument is an important one, 
when it may be presented in different ways with varying 
effect, and when many who find fault with it and reject it, do so 
because, either through ignorance or malice, they misrepre- 
sent it. 

The importance of the argument may be gathered from the 
following: 


Driscoll, God, “The oldest and most popular argument for the exist- 
ence of God is drawn from the order and harmony of the universe. In 
the remnants of ancient literature which exhibit the mind seeking 
a solution for the mysteries of life, this argument appears in 
simple and crude forms. Language, true index to thought and 
feeling, goes far beyond the known records of time and presents 
in its vocabulary words which bear the indelible marks of order 
and design. Thus to the Greeks the world was a cosmos, to 
the Latins a mundus, to our forefathers a wniverse, i. e., one 
united and harmonious whole. . 

“The Christian Fathers and Apologists most frequently insist 
upon this consideration. They cite the sublime Psalm of the 
Hebrew Psalmist, ‘The heavens show forth the glory of God and 
the firmament declares the work of His hands.’ Ps. 18. They call 
the mind of the lowest and humblest to the marvelous harmony 
of the heavenly bodies in their course, to the regular succession 
of the seasons. They find considerations which constrain the 
ignorant and the learned to admit an intelligence and providence 
all powerful and beneficient which shapes the course of all things 
and appointeth to each its place and its time. 

“In our own time this argument has been most bitterly assailed. 
The rise and influence of the physical sciences, especially of Biology 
and of Physiology, have for a time seemed to deprive it of force... 
The attempt, however, has utterly failed.’”’ Pp. 147, 148. 


As the argument may be presented in different forms and 
with different results, it will be necessary to determine separ- 
ately its scope under each form: 


I. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 125 


The teleological argument combined with the cos- 


mological argument. 


The teleological argument may be combined with the cos- 


mological argument in various ways. 


a. 


Combined with the bare cosmological argument. By this 


_ combination is proved the existence of an intelligent, first, 


unproduced cause of this universe; and nothing more. 
Combined with the cosmological argument, the latter’s 
conclusion being developed to the point of proving the 
unicity of the first, unproduced cause. In this case the 
combined arguments prove the existence of an unpro- 
duced, first cause who is intelligent and who is necessarily 
one and only one; and nothing more. 

This is practically the way we present the argument in 
our thesis. Hence the combined arguments, as we use 
them, do not prove, nor is it intended that they should 
prove, either that the intelligence of the first cause is 
infinite or that it is a creative intelligence. 
Furthermore, it is to be noted that in this combination 
the conclusion that the intelligence guiding this world is 
necessarily only one, is not derived by us from a con- 
sideration of the remarkable unity in the world-order, 
but from a consideration of the nature of an unproduced 
being. We admit, however, that the unity of plan and 
execution in the world order points strongly to one gov- 
erning intelligence, still it does not prove it conclusively, 
nor does it, nor can it prove that only one unproduced 
governing intelligence is possible. 

Combined with the cosmological argument, the latter's 
conclusion being developed to the powmt of proving that 
the first unproduced cause 1s infinitely perfect and the 
creator of the universe. The conclusion of this combin- 
ation is that an unproduced cause of all things produced 
exists who is necessarily one and only one, infinitely 
intelligent and the creator of all things. 


126 


os 


GOD AND REASON 


The teleological argument uncombined. 

The teleological argument, considered apart from medi- 
ate and immediate conclusions of the cosmological argu- 
ment, demonstrates the existence of an intelligent being, 
superior to the world, the cause of its ordered existence, 
who disposes and controls all the activities at work in 
nature; on whom, therefore, man depends for his exist- 
ence and to whom he owes reverence and service. In 
other words, it proves the existence of God as He is 
known, not in the scientific, but in the popular concept 
we have of Him. Consequently, considered apart from 
all conclusions derived through the cosmological argu- 
ment, the teleological argument does not prove, nor is it 
used to prove, either the existence of God as the un- 
produced cause of all things, or that He is necessarily 
one, or that His intelligence is infinite, or that He is the 
creator of the world. Ina scholion to our thesis we shall 
give a brief development of this form of the argument, 
adding thereto that of St. Thomas, who uses the argu- 
ment in this way. 


In the second part of our thesis we declare that the necessarily 
existing first cause of all things produced is a person. What 
is a person? 


A person is an intelligent being, substantially complete and 


self-possessed. Or, more explicitly, a person is a singu- 
lar, complete substance, which is intellectual, and self- 
possessed, i.e., sui juris, or not united to another being 
by whom it is possessed. 

The name, person, is derived from the Latin, persona. 
This word primarily signified the mask which actors 
wore. Later it was used to signify the part or character 
they sustained; still later, the one sustaining such a 
part, and, finally, it came to denote any intelligent, sub- 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 127 


stantially complete, self-possessed being, from the fact 
that such a being also plays his part in the drama of life. 
A person, then, is the ultimate principle to which are 
ascribed all the actions, properties, passions of a sub- 
stantially complete, intellectual nature forming a whole 
by itself, i.e, which is self-possessed. Hence it is the 
person, John, who walks, talks, thinks, suffers, desires. 
In Christ our Lord, the God-man, there is but one Person, 
the Divine Person; for though the human nature of Christ 
is a singular, intellectual and complete substance, it is 
not a human person, because it is not self-possessed. It 
is possessed and owned by the Divine Person, the Second 
Person of the Blessed Trinity, in whom are united hypo- 
statically two natures, the divine and human. All the 
actions of the God-man, therefore, whether they be 
performed through the divine or human nature, are ac- 
tions of God the Son, the Second Person of the Blessed 
Trinity, and so are of infinite excellence and value. 


A singular, complete and self-possessed substance, which 
is not intellectual, is not called a person, but merely a 
thing, in the full sense of the word, i.e., not part of a 
of a thing, like, e.g., the color of a thing. 


Less generically it is called, e.g., an animal, a horse, a 
plant, etc. Technically such a substance is also called 
a suppositum, or an hypostasis, i.e., the subject to which 
all the actions which proceed from it are attributed. 
These names are derived respectively from the Latin, 
sub-positum, sub-jectum, and the Greek hypostasis, which 
signify that which is placed under, 1.e., the subject. 

The special name, person, is given to a complete, singu- 
lar, self-possessed substance, which is intellectual, be- 
cause it is self-possessed in a more perfect way than a 
mere suppositum, It has individual control, ie., self- 
possession, of some of its actions, i.e., its free actions, 


128 


GOD AND REASON 


while a mere suppositum has individual control of none. 
It is falsely asserted by not a few non-Catholic philos- 
phers that a person 1s necessarily a finite, a limited being. 
As a consequence, some of them, holding God to be in- 
finite, deny that he is a person; others, insisting on His 
personality, deny His infinity. Their error springs from 
a false notion of the way all perfections are possessed by 
an infinite being. For them, an infinite being is one in 
whom is found all reality in such wise that it is im- 
possible that any reality should exist outside of him. 
Consequently, they reason, a person, who is of necessity 
a being distinct from and excluding other persons and 


supposita, cannot be infinite. 


Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinz, “The attribute of infinity 
contradicts and neutralizes all the other attributes of 
God, and makes it impossible to ascribe to the Deity either 
personality or consciousness or power or intelligence or wis- 
dom or goodness or purpose or object in creating the world; 
an infinite deity does not effect a single one of the functions 
which the religious consciousness demands of its God... . 
An infinite God can have neither personality nor consciousness, 
for they both depend on limitations. 

“Personality rests on the distinction of one person from 
another, consciousness on the distinction of self and not self. 
An all embracing person, therefore, is an utterly un- 
meaning phrase, and if it meant anything, it would mean 
something utterly subversive of all religion. For the infinite 
personality would equally embrace and impartially absorb 
the personalities of finite individuals, and so Jesus and Bar- 
abbas would be revealed as co-existent, and therefore as co- 
equal, incarnations of an infinite God.” P. 306. 


Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, “Pantheism, as we under- 
stand it, has no intention of depriving God of anything or of 
denying him anything but human limitation. It will not 
permit us to define God by the concept of personality, simply 
because the notion is too narrow for the infinite fulness and 
depth of his being. .... We might call God a super-personal] 
being, not intending thereby to define His essence, but to 
indicate that God’s nature is above the human mind, not 
below it.” P. 254. 


Paulsen is a Pantheist, and insists that personality is a 
notion ‘‘too narrow for the infinite fulness” of God. To 
show what confusion with regard to fundamental con- 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 129 


cepts reigns in these false systems of philosophy we shall 
call another Pantheist to witness against Paulsen. 


Knight, Aspects of Theism, The original meaning of 
‘persona’ was the mask through which the actor performed 
his part; but if ‘each man in his time plays many parts’ 
‘personating’ each, surely the Infinite Being may manifest 
himself in. an infinite number of ways, and assume an infinite 
number of guises; although his likeness is not to be found 
invarny: one obs. them, 24.) It neither follows that a nature 
which partakes of personality is therefore a limited nature; 
nor that, if unlimited in space, time and degree, it cannot 
be personal. ... . That personality cannot co-exist with 
infinity is an assumption without speculative warrant or ex- 
perimental proof.’ Pp. 158, 159, 167. 


ADVERSARIES. 

Among those who deny the possibility of demonstrating 
the existence of an intelligent, personal God, and either im- 
plicitly or explicitly reject the teleological argument, may be 
numbered : 

1, All professed Atheists, dogmatic, sceptic and agnostic, 
of whom very many are Materialists. 

2. All Pantheists, of whom many, whilst admitting that 
the being they call God is intelligent, still deny that 
he is a person, Pantheists, as before noted, are really 
Atheists. 

3. The general run of Evolutionists. 

4, Kant and a countless number of modern philosophers 
more or less infected with Kantianism. In this class 
are found the Modernists. 

5. In general, all who insist that unaided reason cannot 
demonstrate God’s existence. 

What modern non-Catholic philosophy quite generally 
thinks of the design argument has already been made evident. 
In a passage of his Gifford Lectures for ror4, Theism and 
Humanism, Balfour, who concedes some pragmatic value to 


the argument, will tell us again, 

“The argument [for Theism] then, which I propose to lay 
before you, though its material is provided by our common-sense 
beliefs, is not an argument from common-sense .. . Is it then, 


130 GOD AND REASON 


you may be tempted to ask, some form of the yet more familiar 
argument from design? . . . And if so, has not the vanity of all 
such endeavors been demonstrated in advance; from the side of 
Sceptical philosophy by Hume; from the side of Idealist Philosophy 
by Kant and his successors; from the side of Empirical Philosophy 
by the 19th century Agnostics; from the side of science by the 
theory of natural selection? Do not the very catch words of the 
argument—‘contrivance,’ ‘design,’ ‘adaptation,’ exercised by the ‘Arch- 
itect of the Universe’ fill us with a certain weariness? Do they 
not represent the very dregs of stale apologetics; the outworn 
residue of half forgotten controversies?” P. 28. 


PROOF OF THE THESIS. 


Part I. The unproduced, first cause of all things produced, 
i.e, God, is an intelligent being. 


First Proof, Derived from the existence in the world of 
intelligent beings. 


If intelligent beings exist in the world, the unproduced, 
first cause of all things produced is an intelligent being. 
But intelligent beings exist in the world. 

Therefore the unproduced, first cause of all things pro- 

duced is an intelligent being. 

Maj. If the first cause of all things produced were not 
an intelligent being, no produced being could be intelli- 
gent. If it could, then, since every perfection that is 
must originate from God, the first cause of all things 
that exist, an effect could be more perfect than its 
efficient cause, and, consequently, the principle of 
causality would be violated. 


Min. The Minor is immediately evident. 


Second Proof. The teleological argument. 


If in this visible world innumerable natural agents are at 
work producing an order most widespread, most com- 
plicated and most constant, and if such a combination 
of natural agents producing such an effect must neces- 
sarily be attributed to some intelligent cause or causes, 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 131 


the first, unproduced cause of all things produced must 
be intelligent. 

Bute] sanythis visible world innumerable natural agents 
are at work producing an order most widespread, most 
complicated, most constant, and, 2, what is more, such a 
combination of natural agents producing such an effect 
must necessarily be attributed to some intelligent cause 
or causes. 


Therefore the first, unproduced cause of all things pro- 

duced is intelligent. 

Maj. To admit the existence of any intelligent being 
and at the same time to deny intelligence to the first, 
unproduced cause of all produced being, from whom, 
consequently, all perfections flow, 1s to reject the prin- 
ciple of causality, to hold that an effect may exist 
without a proportionate cause. Hence the Major 
must be admitted. 


Min. First Part.—In this visible world innumerable 

natural agents are at work producing an order most 
widespread, most complicated, most constant. 
The natural sciences without exception, and one’s own 
contemplation of nature give indubitable testimony to 
the truth of this assertion. For they witness to the 
presence in the world of an— 


Order. In the world there are beings innumerable; 
great and small; simple and composed of many ele- 
ments and many parts; of varying degrees of per- 
fection, non-living and living, plants, animals, man. 
All of these beings are so marvelously arranged, 
both with regard to their parts and amongst them- 
selves, that, mutually supplying to one another all 
those things which are necessary for the proper per- 
formance of each one’s special work, the lower con- 
tinually serves the higher, and the higher those still 


GOD AND REASON 


higher; and so are perpetuated the numberless 
species and genera in the various kingdoms that give 
us our mundus, our cosmos, our universe. 

Most widespread. In the various kingdoms which 
constitute our world are innumerable individuals 
of innumerable species and innumerable genera; 
all are subject to Nature’s laws; order reigns 
supreme. 

Most complicated. The world-order is produced— 

1. By many elements in innumerable and complicated 
combinations ; 
2. By countless individual, efficient agents of num- 
berless species and genera; 
3. Under conditions innumerable, ever varying and 
most complicated; the individual substances being 
subject to constant changes both accidental and sub- 
stantial ; 

4. The result of all of which is an order of the great- 

est stability founded on the maximum of instability. 
For, whilst kingdoms, genera, species and the apt 
combination of elements endure, the elements them- 
selves are in a constant flux resulting from the ac- 
tion of mechanical, physical and chemical forces 
operating either in their own spheres or as vitally 
elevated. Everywhere is found local: motion, and, 
what is of deeper import, everywhere the destruc- 
tion of inferior beings that superior beings may exist, 
and, in turn, the return everywhere of superior be- 
ings, in part at least, to the earth from which that 
part was taken, lest, the inorganic kingdom being 
depleted, life vanish from the world and death reign 
supreme. 

Furthermore, 1f we consider the organic world only, 
and restrict our inquiry to creatures endowed with 
the higher forms of plant or animal life, we shall 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 133 


find in each one of them, in some, however, more 
than in others, an adaptation of part to part, and 
function to function, most complicated. How many 
and varied the organs, and how marvellously united ; 
how many and varied the functions, and how per- 
fectly co-ordinated and subordinated; in order that 
a living being of one of the higher species nourish 
itself, grow and perfect itself; give birth to others 
like unto itself; defend itself against hostile forces 
of nature; expel whatever could be harmful to it; re- 
pair injuries; and through its mysterious sensitive 
faculties put itself in touch with the visible world 
round about it! 


Most Constant. Not merely for days, nor weeks, 
nor months, nor years, but for centuries, with unfail- 
ing regularity, the countless changes and combina- 
tions which give us our world-order have been 
produced by Nature’s forces. 


Diman, The Theistic Argument “What strikes us at the 
first glance is the universal prevalence of order. I say 
at first glance, for though the nature and endless mani- 
festations of the order that runs through the universe 
are only partially perceived after prolonged and elabor- 
ate investigation, the fact of the existence of this order 
is the first thing that strikes the observing eye. 

“We are not more impressed with the great fact of 
change than with the fact that change everywhere 
proceeds in accordance with fixed and invariable rule 

. It has been the mission of science to extend fur- 
ther and further on every hand the reign of law, and 
to show that what at first sight seems most excep- 
tional, most unaccountable, most incapable of being 
reduced to regular rule, is after all but another and 
more striking illustration of the principle, a_ prin- 
ciple which equally finds its illustration in the falling 
of a pebble to the ground, and the flight of a flaming 
sphere through the furthest removes of space.” Pp. 
100, 101. 

“The universe everywhere reveals itself to us 
as a whole, all the parts of which are related to each 
other by precise and unvarying laws. The system of 
which our earth is a member is a vast and orderly 
system, the various parts of which are so adjusted, 


134 


GOD AND REASON 


as regards mass and magnitude and distance, and rate 
and plane of motion, that the whole is rendered stable 
and secure . . . While each orb is affecting the orbit 
of every other, while each is exerting a constant in- 
fluence which, if left uncounteracted, would destroy 
itself and all the rest, all are balanced in their motions 
with such wondrous accuracy as to convert the ele- 
ment of danger into a source of strength. 

“And so in the, structure of matter we are every- 
where confronted with the same system of definite 
proportions, no chemical union being possible except 
where the different elements bear to each other a 
definite numerical ratio. The least alteration of this 
proportion would convert the most wholesome sub 
stances into the most deadly poisons, and, instead of 
furnishing nutriment to animals and plants, spread 
everywhere destruction and death. 

“The reign of law is the result which science has 
everywhere reached. It lies at the root of every con- 
ception we can form of the universe, either without 
us or within us; for while regularity and order are 
most conspicuous in the grand phenomena of the ex- 
ternal world, we are not less assured of their pre- 
sence in the most intricate and obscure processes of 
life. 

“Beginning with astronomy the idea has passed to 
every department. of science, and to every domain of 
thought. It refuses to be excluded from any sphere 
where there is change and progress and growth, It 
meets us at every step.” Pp. 104, 105. 


Min. Second Part. The combination of natural agents 
producing an order most widespread, etc., must 
necessarily be attributed to some intelligent cause or 
causes. 


First Proof. From the very nature of the order itself. 
The only reasons that can be advanced as sufficient to 
explain the world-order are either: | 

a. An intelligent cause or causes who intended it, 
and selected and so arranged all the forces of na- 
ture, and the many and complicated conditions 
under which they operate, that universally and with 
the greatest constancy they effect it,—or 

b. Natural causes, which of themselves, and alto- 
gether independently of any selection or direction 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 135 


from without, tend constantly to produce it,—or 

c. Mere chance, i.e., no intelligent cause produces 
it, nor is there any tendency in natural causes con- 
stantly directing them to its production. 

But of these reasons: 

a. The reason given under (a) alone is valid. For 
b. As natural causes are contingent beings, they do 
not contain in themselves a sufficient reason for 
existence, hence in them and independently of any 
selection or direction from without, can be found 
no sufficient reason why they rather than others 
exist; why they exist in the proportions now given 
in the world, and not in other proportions; why the 
qualities and forces which are theirs are in intensity 
just what they now are, and neither greater nor 
less; why they have the relative positions they have, 
and not others. 

But the order in the world depends on all these 
factors. Hence natural causes in themselves, and 
independently of direction and selection from with- 
out, cannot explain it. 

c. Nor can chance explain the world order. 

From the very nature of chance, as we gather from 
our prenotes, a definite effect brought about by the 
chance coming together of many causes is produced 
rarely and irregularly; still more rarely and trregu- 
larly if the number of causes concurring by chance 
in its production, and the number of conditions to 
be satisfied, be increased; and with the greatest 
rarity and irregularity when the number of causes 
producing it and the conditions under which it is 
produced are increased indefinitely. 

Now, in the world order, where the causes are in- 
numerable and the conditions under which they act 
most complicated, not only with the greatest fre- 


136 


GOD AND REASON 


quency but always and everywhere and with the 
greatest regularity the causes supply to one an- 
other whatever is necessary for the performance of 
each one’s proper work, and consequently for the 
preservation of the universal order; individuals are 
being constantly produced like unto their producers, 
and kingdoms, genera and species are constantly 
preserved. Chance, therefore, is absolutely ruled 
out. 


Diman, The Theistic Argument, “To suppose that a unl- 
verse, such as science reveals to us, so real, so intricate, 
so harmonious, so stable, could have been called into 
being by the operation of blind chance, is an hypothesis 
that no man in his senses, at the presen: day would 
think for a moment of maintaining. .... 

“To account, then, for this order and harmony 
everywhere so apparent in the external world, we 
are shut up to one of two hypotheses: the hypothesis 
of mind, working through the forces of nature and co- 
ordinating them into a mutual adjustment, or the hy- 
pothesis of matter endowed with inherent powers and 
potencies [i. e., independently of an intelligent cause] 
and working in an endless succession of combination 
and dissolution. There is no other explanation pos- 
sible, and in the present state of speculative opinion 
no other explanation is proposed. The choice lies 
between intelligence and blind force; between reason 
enthroned above physical causation and the unconscious 
working of purely natural laws.” P. 121. 


Second Proof. From the analogy existing between 


ordered effects naturally produced and artificially pro- 
duced. 

Ordered effects of a very complicated nature artificially 
produced are of necessity attributed to intelligence. 
Therefore effects of a similar kind naturally produced 
must be attributed to a like cause. 


The Antecedent is universally admitted. 


Cons. The Consequent or Conclusion is also to be ad- 


mitted. For although the elements which combine 
to form a natural, ordered effect have a natural 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 137 


tendency, i.e., a tendency from within, to produce 
it, whilst the elements which combine to form an 
artificial, ordered effect have no such intrinsic ten- 
dency, still as in both cases the elements are es- 
sentially contingent beings, and so not self-deter- 
mined as regards existence, neither are they self- 
determined as regards the combination which pro- 
duces the ordered effect. Hence if in complicated 
works artificially produced we necessarily call on 
intelligence to explain such combination, so in com- 


plicated works of nature we must do the same. 


Hettinger, Natural Religion, “The assertion of some athe- 
ists that the forces and laws of nature are necessarily in 
action, is simply another subterfuge. Strauss argues, ‘We 
have no right to conclude that because man cannot pro- 
duce a work requiring the adaptation of means to an end 
without consciously aiming at the end, therefore such 
works in nature must be similarly produced, that is, by an 
intelligent creator. For nature herself proves that her 
adapted work does not imply conscious intelligence in 
the worker.’ But, on the contrary, this necessarily 
fixed action of the forces of nature, and conformity to 
their purpose, are an additional argument for the ex- 
istence of a cause which has determined this fixedness 
and conformity.” P. 86. 

Shallo, Scholastic Philosophy, “Nature is nothing but 
the collection of contingent agencies at work in the 
universe; hence it is true to say that nature executes 
the order of the universe, but not that it originated 
or designed it. .... Such a collection will never give 
us the ordered world in which we live, without ad- 
justment and co-ordination and subordination of those 
various activities for the attainment of manifold par- 
ticular and universal ends; and for this, Mind is needed.” 
Pio: 


Part II. of the Thesis. The unproduced first cause of all 
things produced is a person. 
First Proof. 

A singular, complete, intellectual and self-possessed sub- 
stance is a person. 
But the unproduced first cause of all things produced is 
a singular, complete, intellectual and self-possessed sub- 
stance. 


GOD AND REASON 


Therefore the unproduced first cause of all things pro- 
duced is a person. 


Maj. The Major gives the definition of a person. This 
definition is formed partially under the guidance of 
divine revelation which teaches us that a singular, 
complete and intellectual substance may not be a person, 
and that, because it may be not self-possessed, This 
happens in our Lord, the God-man, whose human 
nature is possessed by the Divine Person, the Second 
Person of the Most Blessed Trinity. In Christ our 
Lord, therefore, two complete, distinct natures, the 
human and the Divine, are united in one Person, the 
Divine Person. 


Min. The unproduced first cause of all things pro- 
duced is a singular, complete, intellectual, self- 
possessed substance. 


The unproduced first cause is a — 

Complete substance—Accidents and incomplete sub- 
stances, by their very nature, are not self-sufficient 
but dependent on other things, to unite with which 
they have a natural tendency. The unproduced cause 
of all things produced, on the contrary, is a necessarily 
existing being, who is, therefore, absolutely indepen- 
dent of other beings, and excludes, as absolutely im- 
possible, any union with them which would imply a 
deficiency in himself. 


Singular—Only singular beings exist, and the un- 
produced first cause exists and with absolute necessity. 
Intellectual—As is proved by the two proofs of the 
first part of this thesis. 

Self-possessed—The unproduced first cause exists 
of necessity and by his very essence, and is the only 
being who so exists. He exists, therefore, as an ab- 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 139 


solutely independent being, hence as a self-possessed 
being. 
Second Proof. 
The unproduced, first cause is an absolutely necessary 
being, and consequently, as will be proved later, an in- 
finitely perfect being. This, however, he would not be, 
if he were not a singular, complete, intellectual sub- 
stance, self-possessed. 
What is more, as the first cause of all existing beings, 
and hence of all existing persons, he must also be a 
person, otherwise an effect could be of greater perfection 
than its cause. 


Scholion I. The existence of God, as popularly conceived, 
proved by the teleological argument apart from all other 
arguments. 

If the world-order cannot be explained without admitting the 

existence of an intelligent being, superior to the world, on 

whom the world depends, its ruler, and on whom man de- 
pends for his existence and all he has, and to whom, con- 
sequently, he owes reverence and service, the existence of 

God, as conceived in the popular concept we have of Him, 

is proved by the teleological argument, apart from all other 

arguments. 

But the Antecedent of the above proposition is true. 

Therefore the Consequent is also true. 

Maj. The truth of the Major is immediately evident to 
one who knows what the teleological argument is, and 
how God is represented in the popular concept we have 
of Him. 

Min. The world-order cannot be explained without ad- 
mitting the existence of an intelligent being, superior 
to the world, etc. . 

1. That there is order in the world we have already 
proved. 


140 GOD AND REASON 


2. That this order cannot be explained without ad- 
mitting the existence of an intelligent being has also 
been proved. 


3. That this intelligent being is superior to the 
world, a being on whom the world depends, its 
ruler, and on whom man depends for his existence 
and all he has, and to whom, consequently he owes 
reverence and service, remains to be proved; and 
is proved as follows: 


a. This intelligent being is neither the world it- 
self, nor the soul of the world, as Pantheists 
would have us believe, for the world, composed 
as it is of beings of many different species and 
many individuals—supposita and persons—has 
not that unity which is found necessarily in a 
living, intelligent being. 


b. Therefore the being who is responsible for the 
ordered universe is distinct from it, and as its 
ruler is superior to it; and as the existence of 
all things, man included, depends on this order, 
all things depend on the author of the order 
for all they have. But the being who 1s superior 
to man and who gives man what he‘has is his 
Lord and Master, and to Him man owes 
reverence and service. 


St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1, q. 2, a. 3, develops the argument as 
follows, “The fifth way [of proving God’s existence] is taken from 
the governance of the world; for we see that things which lack in- 
telligence, such as natural bodies, act for some purpose, which fact is 
evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same 
way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not 
fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their purpose. What- 
ever lacks intelligence cannot fulfill some purpose, unless it be 
directed by some being endowed with intelligence and knowledge; 
as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some 
intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are ordained 
towards a definite purpose; and this being we call God.” (Trans- 
latéd by Fathers of the English Dominican Province.) 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 141 


Scholion II.. The teleological argument as viewed by its 
enemies. 


How necessary it is to have a clear grasp of the nature and 
scope of the argument will be evident from a rapid glance 
at the difficulties brought against it by its adversaries. Knight, 
who rejects the argument, has made, in Aspects of Theism, 
quite a complete collection of them. We shall let him be 
spokesman for the many who agree with him, 


1? 


“Reverting to the form... of the argument... which 
is ordinarily known as the argument from design . 

the argument is based upon analogy and it might be termed 
analogical as strictly as technological. 


“The objections to this mode of proof are manifold. The 
effects it examines and from which it infers a cause are 
finite; whereas the cause it assumes is infinite. . 


“By this argument, at its best, we only reach an artificer, 
not a creator—one who arranged the phenomena of the 
world not the originator of its substance—the architect of 
the cosmos not the maker of the universe. . ’ 

“There is no parallel whatever between the process of manu- 
facture and the product of creation, between the act of a 
carpenter working with his tools, and the evolution of life 
in nature. 

“To infer the existence of a personal divine agent, from 
the observation of the mechanism of the universe, is in- 
valid. Where is the link connecting the traces of mind 
discernible in nature, those vestigia animi, with an agent 
who produced them? . 

‘‘Why should we rest in our inductive inference from the 
phenomena of design, in a single designer, when the de- 
signs are so varied and complex? May not the complexity 
and variety of the latter suggest a polytheistic group of 
ruling, yet conflicting powers? Might not the two broadly 
marked classes of phenomena—the one good and the other 
evil, and both presenting evidence of design—warrant the 
dualistic inference of two hostile deities? 

“Or if in all that we observe, a subtle and pervading ‘unity’ 
is found, and as a consequence existing arrangements point 
to one designer, why may not he himself have been, at a 
remoter period, designed? And so, ad infinitum ... 
“Design is a plan to overcome hindrance, to effect a con: 
templated end by conquering a difficulty and by adjusting 
phenomena each to each. But it is only a being of limited 
resources that requires so to act or to work . . . With 
the infinite the idea of design is incongruous . 

“The phenomena of the universe which distantly resemble 
the operations of man, do not in the least suggest an agent 


142 


GOD AND REASON 


exterior to themselves; and we are not intellectually con- 
strained to ascribe the arrangement of means to ends in 
Nature to anything supra-mundane. 


10. “We are not conscious of the process of creation, nor do 


Hn 


12. 


13. 


ie 


1 


15. 
16. 
i Wes 


we perceive it. We have never witnessed the construction 
of a world. We only perceive the everlasting flux and re 
flux of phenomena, the ceaseless pulsations of nature’s life— 
evolution, transformation, birth, death and birth again. 
But Nature herself is dumb as to her whence or whither. 
“Even if, as already hinted, we could detect a real analogy 
between the handiwork of man and the processes and pro- 
ducts of Nature, we should not be warranted in saying that 
the constructive intelligence which explains the one class 
of phenomena is the only possible explanation of the 
other. . . . It can never assure us that those traces of in- 
telligence to which it invites our study, proceeded from a 
constructive mind detached from the universe; or that if 
they did, another mind did not fashion that mind and so 
On GG) tHfinitaM) in 

“If the inference from design is valid at all, it must be 
valid everywhere. All the phenomena of the world must 
yield it equally. No part of the universe can be better made 
than any other part . . . Therefore if the few [ ?] phen- 
omena which the teleologists single out from the many are 
a valid index to the character of the source whence they 
have proceeded, everything that exists must find its coun- 
terpart in the divine nature. 

“If we are at liberty to infer an archetype above from the 
traces of mind beneath, on the same principle must not the 
phenomena of moral evil and malevolence be carried up- 
wards by analogy? A procedure which would destroy the 
notion of deity which the teleologists advocate. ... Con- 
sider the elaborate contrivances for inflicting pain, and the 
apparatus, so exquisitely adjusted, to produce a wholesale 
carnage of the animal tribes . . . The whole world teems 
with the proofs of such intended carnage .. . If, there 
fore, the inference of benevolence be valid, the inference 
of malevolence is equally valid: and, as equal and opposite, 
the one notion destroys the other. . . 


.“The notion of design breaks down from the very width 


of the space it covers. Seemingly valid in the limited area 
of finite observation and human agency, it disappears when 
the whole universe is seen to be one vast network of inter- 
connected law and order..... 

“The teleological argument must be pronounced fallacious. 
‘Tt is illusory as well as incomplete; 

“And were we to admit its relevancy, it could afford no 
basis for worship, or the intellectual and moral recognition. 
of the Object whose existence it infers.’ Pp. 61 to 77, passim. 


These are the main objections to our argument. A 


grasp of the principles aiready laid down should make 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 143 


their solution fairly easy. They will be given at the 
end of the thesis in form, and also solved in form. 


Scholion III. The teleological argument and Evolution. 
Many of the enemies of the teleological argument 
claim that it has been deprived of all its force and 
rendered practically useless by the theory of Evolution, 
and especially by Darwinism. On the other hand, how- 
ever, we find some, though not many, Evolutionists who 
insist that Evolution has not only not weakened the ar- 
gument but rather strengthened it. 
Before giving our answer, it may be well to hear what 
both sides have to say on the matter. 


Royce, The Religious Aspect 0) Philosophy, “There is no 
doubt about this, that the doctrine of evolution has 
rendered the popular empirical proof of a_ special de- 
signing power much harder than we used to suppose .. . As 
to the intelligence of the higher powers, what the theory of 
evolution has done for us in this respect is simply, to make us 
feel that we know not and cannot even guess, how much what 
we empirically call base mechanism can do to simulate the 
effects of what, in an equally empirical and blind way, men 
call intelligence.” Pp. 280, 281. 


James, Varieties of Religious Hxperience, “As for the argument: 
from design, see how Darwinian ideas have revolutionized it.” 
P, 407. 


Weber, History of Philosophy, “What characterizes modern 
materialism, is not its mechanical explanation of the world nor 
its absolute negation of final causes,—in this respect, as well as 
in others, materialistic principles have not changed since the 
time of Democritus,—but solely the fact that, thanks to 
Darwin, it found, as its adherents claim, a ready answer to 
the constantly reiterated and never refuted objection of the 
Teleologists.” P. 571. 


In an altogether contrary sense, write the following 
Evolutionists. : 


Martineau, 4 Study of Religion, “I have not been deterred 
from vindicating the teleological interpretation of nature 
by the opprobrious treatment, or, at best, condescending excuse, 
which seems to be deemed ‘the right thing’ for the ‘argument 
from design.’ ‘Advanced thought’ also, like dress and manners, 
is not without its fashions and its fops. And many a scientific 


144 


GOD AND REASON 


sciolist who would bear himself comme il faut towards such 
questionable deceivers as final causes now thinks it necessary 
to have his fling at Paley and the Bridgewater ‘Treatises. He 
has it on the best authority that Darwin has exposed their 
imposture; and he must show that he is not going to fall into 
their tracks. It is probable that, of those who speak in this 
tone, nine out of ten have never read the books with which 
they deal so flippantly; and it is certain that the tenth is in- 
competent to grasp the essentials of an argument, letting its 
separable accidents fall away. 

“And this evolution, whatever its extent, is not a cause 
or even a force, but a method, which might be the path either 
of a voluntary cause or of a blind force, and has nothing to 
say to the controversy between them. If there were design 
before, so is there now; if not, then there has none been 
added. But on the other hand, if marks of thoughts were 
early found before, they have now become marks of larger 
and sublimer thought.” Vol. 1, Pp. XII, XIII. 


Diman, The Theistic Argument, “It has not been my purpose to 
press Evolution into the service of Natural Theology but 
simply to establish the negative proposition that it does not 
conflict with any of the grounds which have been advanced 
for believing in a first and in final causes.” P. 197. 


Hall, The Being and Attributes of God, “Many theistic writers 
have conceded, unwarrantably, we think, that the Darwinian 
Theory has nullified Paley’s argument for design. . It ought to 
be clear that so far from overturning the teleological argument, 
the objections which have been brought against it in modern 
days enable theistic believers to exhibit its validity more con- 
vincingly than ever.” Pp. 169, 175. 


Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx, “Evolution is meaningless if 
it is not teleological, and we cannot conceive of purpose except 
in the intelligence of a personal being. And we are forbidden by 
the principle of not multiplying entities needlessly to invent 
gratuitous fictions like an impersonal intelligence or uncon- 
scious purpose.” Pp. 308, 304. 


Truth to say, Evolution as such, since it is concerned 
in no way with the source of the world order, but only, as 
its very name implies, with the method of that order’s 
production, whatever be its source, in no way affects the 
design argument, the sole object of which is to determine 
whence that order comes. Evolution or no evolution, 
the order is there. How did it get there? The design 
argument answers this question. Evolution as such has 
no answer to give; it is outside its province to give any. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 145 


When we consider, however, not Evolution as such 
but the evolutionary theories commonly proposed, the 
case is altogether different. These theories not only 
claim that the world order, either wholly or in part, has 
been evolved by some process or other, but insist also 
that the source or origin or cause, of this evolving order 
was not necessarily an intelligent being. In this latter 
point they run counter to the design argument, and on 
this point only the design argument takes issue with 
them. 

Our conclusion, then, is that any theory of Evolution, 
which in its explanation of the world-order denies the 
necessity of attributing it to intelligence, is flatly opposed 
to the design argument, and this not because it advocates 
an evolutionary explanation of the world’s development, 
but because it denies the existence of its intelligent cause. 
All general Evolutionary systems as usually explained 
and defended do this. And on this ground, and on this 
only, the design argument rejects them as false. They 
are impossible in many other ways, metaphysically and 
physically, as is shown elsewhere in philosophy. At 
present we are not concerned with those questions. 


Scholion IV. Some examples in confirmation of the asser- 
tion on which our teleological argument is based, namely, 
that the constitution and preservation of the world-order 
is the result of the universal, complicated and constant 
co-operaton of the numberless parts and forces of nature. 


For a full confirmation of this assertion, one should go to 
the natural sciences. We have space here only for a few ex- 
amples. These will be stated as briefly as possible without any 
attempt at fulness of treatment, and popularly rather than 
scientifically, 


The atmosphere and plant and animal life. 
The quantity, quality or kind, proportion, and general 


146 


GOD AND REASON 


properties of the substances of which our atmosphere is 
almost wholly composed are marvelously adapted to the 
needs of plant and animal life, in fact, so marvelously 
adapted, that a marked and continued change in any one 
of these factors would make organic life either abso- 
lutely impossible or extremely difficult. 

On their side plants and animals are just as marvelously 
fitted with organs capable of utilizing all the benefits 
offered them by the atmosphere. Is all this the outcome 
of chance? 


Quantity of the atmosphere adapted to the needs of 


plant and animal life. 


“If the quantity of air surrounding the earth were to be 
greatly increased, . . . its density . . . and its momentum 
when in motion would all be increased in like proportion. 
It is, therefore, obvious that it would not require any very 
great increase in the mere quantity of the gases which form 
the atmosphere, to convert what would now be a gentle breeze 
into a destructive hurricane, without any actual increase in 
the velocity of the wind. 


“Moreover a mere augmentation of the quantity of the 
atmosphere without any change in the proportion of its diff- 
erent constituents would so greatly increase its power as a 
supporter of combustion that fires once started would be 
almost inextinguishable.” 

Quality and proportion of substances in our atmos- 


phere adapted to the needs of plant and animal life. 


Nitrogen forms almost four-fifths, by volume, of the 
atmosphere, in which it is found in the free state. Its 
most important function is the dilution of the oxygen of 
the atmosphere. Nitrogen is one of the constituents of 
chlorophyll, the substance which gives to foliage its green 
color, and which, in the presence of sunlight, is active in 
the production of plant food. In this process the carbon- 
dioxide of the air is decomposed, the oxygen being re- 
turned to the air and the carbon retained as one of the 
food constituents. This food is stored in the leaves of 
plants during the day as starch. At night it is converted 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 147 


into sugar, which, in a state of solution, is carried to the 
different parts of the plant as food. If there were no 
chlorophyll, there would be no life on earth. 

If the proportion of nitrogen in the air were notably 
greater, and the amount of oxygen were notably less, 
respiration would be extremely difficult, or altogether im- 
possible, owing to lack of sufficient oxygen. 


“Our lives would become lethargic and stolid, nothing 
but dull heavy movements compelled by hunger or physical 
necessity. Our fires would die out, or, if by chopping wood 
into very thin splinters and drying it thoroughly, we could 
get an occasional fire to cook some delicacy, the labor re- 
quired would be very great. Hard coal would then be as diffi- 
cult to ignite as are diamonds or graphite under the condi- 
tions which now exist. 

“Under such circumstances man would be confined to the 
tropics for it would be impossible for the lungs to perform 
their functions with such energy as would furnish enough 
oxygen to generate sufficient heat to protect the body from 
even a moderate degree of cold. 

“If the proportion of nitrogen were greatly decreased, 
the process of oxidation which under present conditions, 
either directly or indirectly makes life on earth possible, would 
be so intensified that life would be destroyed. 

“The slightest spark would start forest and prairie fires 
which would spread over the surface of the land, burning 
up grass and herbs and leaving nothing but desolation in 
their path . . . We couid no longer use iron for stoves and 
furnaces, for the simple reason that the iron itself would 
burn with . . . fierceness. 


“As for animals . . . if they could continue to live and 
perpetuate their species under such circumstances : 
their lives would be one fitful fever . . . and their existence 


would be intense but brief.’’ 


Oxygen, uncombined, is about one-fifth of the atmos- 
phere by volume. It is the most widely distributed and 
most abundant element on earth, forming not only one- 
fifth of the atmosphere by volume, but also eight-ninths 
of water by weight, and almost one-half by weight of 
the solid crust of the earth. 

If there were no oxygen in the air animal life would be 
impossible. If the proportion of oxygen in the air were 
notably greater or less, the results would be the converse 


148 


GOD AND REASON 


of those described above when speaking of a change in 
the proportion of nitrogen in the atmosphere. 


Carbon dioxide (CO,) is another substance found in 
the air, in much less quantity, however, than either nitro- 
gen or oxygen. Of one thousand parts of air, carbon 
dioxide is only four-tenths of one part. Relatively small 
though this amount be, if it were totally removed from 
the air, plant life would be impossible, and, as a conse- 
quence, animal life also, for carbon is an essential con- 
stituent of all living bodies, and all that they have is 
taken from the air through the leaves of the plant, as 
noted above. If the proportion of carbon dioxide in the 
air were greatly increased and at the same time that of 
oxygen diminished, as carbon dioxide is a non-supporter 
of combustion, the respiration of animals would be 
rendered extremely difficult and even impossible. Plants 
make use of the carbon dioxide in the air, animals make 
use of the oxygen, each returning to the air what the other 
needs, the plants giving back oxygen and animals carbon 
dioxide. To this, no doubt, in some measure it is due 
that, though both these substances are in continual flux. 
their quantity in the atmosphere is always practically 
the same. 


Water vapor. Another constituent of our atmosphere 
is water vapor; a gas lighter than any of the three above 
mentioned. The amount of it in the air varies from one- 
sixty-sixth to one-two-hundredth of the whole volume. 
Other conditions remaining the same, the higher the 
temperature, the greater the amount of moisture the air 
will hold in solution without precipitation. If there were 
no moisture in the atmosphere there would be no plant 
or animal life, for there would be no rain, no springs, no 
rivers. Without rain plant growth is impossible; without 
water animals cannot live. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 149 


The water vapor in the air prevents the too rapid evap- 
oration of water from plants and animals. 

“By its mere mechanical action, falling on mountain tops 
and collecting into brooks and rivers..... it wears 
down hills and fills up lakes and valleys, converting 
water-covered surfaces first into swamps and bogs and 
then into fertile meadows.” In this process of soil mak- 
sng, the disintegration of rocks by the rain is aided 
very much by the presence in it of carbon dioxide which 
is extremely soluble in water. 

Not only by erosion does water level mountains, and 
disintegrate rocks, but owing to a remarkable property 
it has, under certain conditions it rends them asunder. 
Water contracts as it cools till it reaches four degrees C., 
then it begins to expand. This expansion is gradual till 
the freezing point is reached, at which point there is a 
sudden expansion of the water equal to one-tenth of its 
volume. As moisture soaks into the mountain soils and 
pores of the rocks, it is plain how in places where low 
temperatures are reached it causes them to crumble. 

It will not be out of place to note another far-reaching 
effect due to this most unique property of water. If 
water on cooling did not expand as it does, the ice which 
would form when it froze would sink. As water is an 
extremely bad conductor of heat, this ice would accumu- 
late from winter to winter. The result in time would be 
the transformation of the waters of the earth into solid 
masses of ice, and a change in climate detrimental, if not 
absolutely fatal, to all forms of life. 

“Another very important effect produced by the presence 
of moisture in the air is due to its power of preventing 
the [too rapid] radiation of heat from the earth.” Moist 
air allows the heat radiated from the sun to pass through 
it readily and heat the earth. The heat, however, which 
in turn is radiated from the earth passes through moist 


150 


GOD AND REASON 


air with great difficulty. In this way the earth and the 
air are kept at a temperature beneficial to plant and 
animal life. 


. 


General properties of the air beneficial to life. 
Owing to these properties air is a medium capable of 
propagating sound, it does not impede the passage of 
heat from the sun to the earth, it does not impede the 
passage of light, it is adapted to the generation of winds. 
Owing to the general law of the diffusion of gases, the 
gases of the air do not arrange themselves according to 
their densities, the heaviest lowest, etc. If they did so, 
carbon dioxide, being the heaviest, would cover the sur- 
face of the earth to a depth sufficient to bring about the 
destruction of life. 

Though the presence of innumerable particles of dust in 
the air cannot strictly be called a property of the air, 
still their presence helps very much the formation of the 
rain drops, and also gives us our diffused light. 


Some concluding remarks. 


“We are now able to understand and appreciate in some 
slight way “those characteristics and adaptations of the at- 
mosphere which make this earth a suitable habitation for 
plants and animals as we know them. The conditions nec- 
essary to this end involve [as we have seen] not only 
the chemical and physical qualities of the air, but they ex- 
tend even to its mere quantity and mass. 

“At the time when the earth assumed a separate exist- 
ence the quantity and proportions of the various materials 
which now form it and its atmosphere were absolutely fixed 
and they must have been adjusted either by intelligent de- 
sign, or, as the materialists claim, by ‘blind chance.’ 

“Let us see now how close and, at the same time, how 
complicated this adjustment was. The calculation is easily 
made, and as a result it will be found that the atmosphere is 
considerably less than one-millionth part of the material 
which, at the separation of the sun and earth, constituted 
this planet. From this, therefore, it is easily seen that the 
adjustment by which our atmosphere attained its present 
physical characteristics and its special relations to the rest 
of the planet, must have been made to less than the one- 
millionth part of the entire amount of matter involved. 





GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 151 


“In other words, a deviation to the extent of one-millionth 
part or even less, would have left us either with no atmos- 
phere at all or with one of double its amount according as 
too much or too little matter of a special kind had been 
assigned to it. 


“This relates wholly to the physical or mechanical rela- 
tions of the atmosphere or to the atmosphere as a whole, but 
the chemical adjustment had to be far closer than this. Oxy- 
gen forms but one-fifth of the air, and therefore if the amount 
of oxidizable matter (hydrogen, carbon, calcium, magnesium, 
iron, zinc, etc.) in this globe had been the one five-millionth 
part more than it is, there would have been no oxygen at 
all, in the atmosphere, and animal life as we know it, would 
have been impossible. 

“But it was necessary to adjust these materials, even more 
closely, than to the five-millionth part; if there had been one 
ten-millionth part more of these oxidizable matters, including 
a greater proportion of hydrogen, the amount of oxygen in 
the air would have been reduced by one-half and none of the 
higher animals could have adjusted themselves to these con- 
ditions.” 

“On the other hand, if the quantity of these oxidizable 
materials had been reduced by one ten-millionth part, the 
atmosphere would have been so rich in oxygen that organic 
matter would have been in constant danger of destruction 
by fire, if it could ever have come into existence at all, which 
is very doubtful. . 

“Out of the... [80 or more] elements known to the 
chemist, the quantities of at least twenty-five had to be care- 
fully adjusted in order to leave an atmosphere such as we 
now have, and in this adjustment due regard had to be paid 
to the special character and combining weight of each indiv- 
idual element. This involved a complex combination of con- 
ditions, . . . and to ask us to believe that these adaptations 
with all their minute details, were the result of mere chance, 
is to demand an [inconceivable] amount of credulity. : 

“We are therefore compelled to dismiss the hypothesis 
of monistic mechanical evolution determined by blind chance 
as utterly inadequate to explain the great riddle which this 
universe with all its varied manifestations of adaptations 
presents. 

“On the other hand, that evolution [Phin, the writer 
quoted, believes in evolution] which is the expression of the 
will and power of a supreme, self-conscious personal Ruler, 
furnishes a simple and adequate explanation of all the won- 
derful adjustments which we have described and no other 
hypothesis is competent to do this.” 


The quotations in the above section are taken from Phin, 
The Evolution of the Atmosphere as a Proof of Design 
in Creation. 


Pah 


GOD AND REASON 


The Human heart; the circulation of the blood; the 
blood. 


Everywhere in the world is found abundant evidence 
of intelligence, in the selection and complicated co-ordina- 
tion and subordination of its parts, innumerable and 
varied, each performing its own proper work and all con- 
stantly furthering the common end for which they were 
linked together. Nowhere, however, is this evidence so 
striking as in the higher forms of animal life. Here the 
intricacy and ingenuity of adaptation is bewildering, not 
only when we view the living organism as a whole, but 
even when some one part alone is under consideration. 
A few words about the human heart, the circulation of 
the blood, and the blood itself will make this clear. 


The human heart is a muscular pump which in adults 
is about 5 inches in length, 314 inches in its greatest 
width and 2% inches in its extreme thickness. Its 
weight is between 1/150 and 1/160 that of the body. 
It is enclosed in a sac called the pericardium in such 
wise as to leave it relatively free motion, otherwise it 
could not perform its work. 


It is hollow, its interior being divided by a longitudinal 
partition into two cavities, which have no direct com- 
munication with each other. Each of these cavities is in 
turn subdivided transversely into two compartments; the 
upper is called the auricle and the lower the ventricle. 
Both auricles communicate directly and freely with their 
corresponding ventricles through openings called the 
auriculo-ventricular openings. 

The auricles are the smaller, less muscular portions of 
the heart, since their function is merely to receive the 
blood and transmit it to the ventricles. The walls of the 
left ventricle are four times the thickness of the right, 
since upon it falls the work of propelling the blood for 





GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 153 


the entire systemic circulation, while the right ventricle 
has to send the blood only through the pulmonary vessels. 
The direction of the course of the blood through the 
heart is maintained by four valves, two of which guard 
the orifices between auricles and ventricles, the other 
two guarding the openings into the aorta and the pul- 
monary artery. The tri-cuspid valve, consisting of three 
flaps of fibrous tissue, guards the right auriculo-ventricu- 
lar opening, and the bi-cuspid, or mitral valve, consisting 
of two flaps, guards the left. We might add here that in 
the normal heart which beats about seventy-two times a 
minute, each one of these valves opens and closes about 
one hundred and three thousand times a day. During 
this same time the heart does two hundred and sixteen 
thousand foot-pounds of work. 

Near the base of attachment, the flaps of the valves are 
tough and able to withstand the pressure of the blood, 
while at the edges, they are thin and delicate and yield 
to it. When the blood has passed into the ventricle and 
the ventricle begins to contract they prevent by their 
perfect apposition any return of it into the emptied auri- 
cle. Similar arrangements guard the proper closure of 
the aortic and pulmonary valves. 


The circulation of the blood. Starting from any one 
chamber of the heart the blood will in time return to 
it; but to do this it must pass through at least two sets 
of capillaries; one of these is connected with the aorta 
and the other with the pulmonary artery, and in its 
circuit the blood returns to the heart twice. Leaving the 
left side it returns to the right, and leaving the right it 
returns to the left: and there is no road for it from one 
side of the heart to the other except through a capillary 
net-work. Moreover it always leaves from a ventricle 
through an artery, and returns to an auricle through a 


GOD AND REASON 


vein. There is then really one circulation; but it is not 
uncommon to speak of two: the systemic, through the 
body, and the pulmonary, through the lungs. 

The dark, venous blood returned from the circuit through 
the body, where it has become charged with waste pro- 
ducts and other impurities is poured into the right auri- 
cle. This contracts, the tri-cuspid valve opens, and the 
blood is discharged into the right ventricle. Here it re- 
mains a small fraction of a second, when this ventricle 
contracts, the tri-cuspid valve closes, the valve at the 
mouth of the pulmonary artery opens, and the blood is 
driven through this artery into the lungs where it is 
spread out through the countless capillaries distributed 
through the lung tissues. Here it is freed from its car- 
bon dioxide, oxygenated and returned through the pul- 
monary vein into the left auricle. 

The contraction of the left auricle discharges this oxy- 
genated blood through the mitral opening into the left 
ventricle, whose powerful contraction sends it into the 
aorta to perform its systemic circuit. The timely open- 
ing and closing of the valves controlling the course of the 
blood in this operation, are brought about in a way simi- 
lar to those of the right heart described above. 

During the systemic circulation blood is supplied 
through the aorta to the arteries, which carry it to all 
parts of the body by their continuation, first, through 
the arterioles and, then, through the capillaries distributed 
throughout all the tissues. Here the blood through the 
thin capillary walls comes into contact with the inter- 
mediary fluid known as the lymph, which fills all the 
tissue spaces through which by osmosis an interchange 
takes place. The blood exchanges its oxygen and nu- 
tritive elements for the waste matter of the body and 
effects that transference of chemical substances from 
the organs in which they are produced to those others 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 155 


in any way depending on their activity. This includes 
the transmission not only of the elaborated products of 
digestion but likewise the internal secretions. It is to be 
noted, that the various tissues, e.g., bone tissue, liver 
tissue, etc., act selectively, that is, each takes from the 
blood those substances necessary for its proper nourish- 
ment. Selective also is the action of the different glands 
in taking from the blood those materials, which either 
unchanged or chemically changed, are poured out on a 
free surface, whether that of the general exterior or of 
an internal cavity. These materials so poured out are 
separated either for removal trom the body or for further 
use. In the latter case the secretion may be either some- 
thing taken from the blood which is delivered by the 
secretory organ unchanged, or something taken from the 
blood which is chemically changed by the secretory organ. 
From the capillaries, after exchange of products with the 
tissues through the lymph has taken place, the blood is 
collected by venules into the veins, which finally unite 
into the vena cava which carries the blood back to the 
right auricle. This process goes on continuously during 
life. The heart has its special system of blood supply in the 
coronary arteries; the blood entering tie coronary ar- 
teries from the aorta and passing into the capillaries 
which surround the fibres, and returning in a deoxidized 
state through the coronary sinus into the right auricle. 
The walls of the arteries are thicker and stronger than 
those of the veins; both consist of three coats and are 
quite elastic. Except the pulmonary artery and the aorta, 
which possess the semi-lunar valves at their cardiac ori- 
fices, the arteries possess no valves; many veins, on the 
contrary, have them. These valves, sometimes single, 
oftener in pairs, and sometimes three at one level, permit 
blood to flow only towards the heart. They are most 
frequently found where two veins communicate. 


156 


GOD AND REASON 


The walls of the capillaries consist of only one coat and 
are extremely thin, and so are well adapted to allow of 
filtration or diffusion taking place through them. The 
capillaries are innumerable; their average diameter is 
about one fifteen-hundreth of an inch; in many parts of 
the body they lie so close that a pin point cannot be in- 
serted between any adjacent two. 


The blood. The blood is made up of a liquid plasma 
and solid cells or corpuscles. It contains at least four 
separate and important ingredients: the plasma or blood 
serum, red cells, white cells, and blood plates. 

Plasma. [*ifty-six per cent of the blood is plasma; of 
this ninety per cent is water. In the plasma are found 
the foods for the various tissues, and the waste products. 
Red cells. These are the most abundant of the formed 
elements of the blood. There are thought to be in man 
at least five million blood-cells to every cubic millimetre 
of blood. These cells are mostly manufactured in the 
marrow of the long bones. Their main function is to 
carry oxygen from the lungs to the tissues, and carbon 
dioxide from the tissues to the lungs. 

White cells. These are much less numerous than the 
red cells, varying in number from five thousand to 
twenty thousand to the cubic millimetre. They may be 
aptly termed the human body’s “army of the interior” in 
the fight with disease-causing agents. They are useful 
both physically, by eating, as it were, the bodies of in- 
vading bacteria (phagocytosis); or chemically, in the 
elaboration of certain counter-poisons (antitoxins) ; or 
in the manufacture of specific immunizing bodies for 
the blood-serum. 

Blood plates. Our knowledge of these is very meagre. 
Cf. Encyclopedia Americana, 1918, from which our re- 
marks on the blood, etc., were taken almost verbatim. 


3. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 157 


A bird and its flight. Here again are most convincing 
evidences of design. We quote from Martineau, A 
Study of Religion, and also from Ronayne, S.J., God 


Known and Knowable. 


With the bird “it is impossible to be indifferent to weight, 
as with an animal that never quits the ground. It is im- 
possible to balance the weight with the medium, as with an 
animal that lives in the sea. A portion of the locomotive 
strength must be spared from its work of progression to 
lift and sustain the body in a fluid lighter than itself; and 
to minimize what is subtracted for this purpose must be 
the fundamental problem in constructing this new order of 
being . 1 a aE 

“The bird, accordingly, is a complete study of economy in 
weight and intensity in muscular power. By relegating to 
the gizzard the triturating process of the food, the head is 
lightened of its teeth and greatly reduced in size. The vis- 
cera and ribs are thrown far back, and packed in a small 
compass under the dorsal vertebrae, several of which are 
anchylosed [united in one bone], to give a firm base of sup- 
port for the wings; but, these central solidities secured, all 
beyond is arranged with a view to lightness. 

“The cylindrical bones are hollow, and filled not with 
marrow but with air, which also has access to the interior 
of the broad bones, honeycombed as they are with cells; 
similar cells run through the membranes of the abdomen; soa 
that the small lungs have the power, through their connec- 
tions, of permeating the whole body with air. 

“As the arms are pre-engaged for flight, the mouth is 
the only prehensile organ, with some help from the feet; 
and, to perfect it for this function, it is not only furnished 
with a beak varied according to the dietary of the species, 
but is set upon a single condyle to turn every way; and at 
the end of from ten to (in the swan) twenty-three cervical 
vertebrae, instead of the seven allotted to the mammals; so 
that there is never any part of its body which a bird cannot 
reach with its beak. ... 

“With all this provision however for lightening the body, 
there is still need of a most powerful apparatus to counter- 
balance its gravitation, and give it its free passport through 
the air. Weight enough must be left to supply the counter 
force to the relative motion of the atmosphere and the 
wing; for the line of flight is but the result of these two; 
and the real problem is to have neither of them excessive 
in comparison with the other, while both are allowed ite 
play. 

“Often in a moderate wind, you may see a hawk aie 
hanging aloft with its axis not far from the verticle, and half- 
folded wings apparently at rest: in this case the sails are 
set and the helm is turned at so nice an angle as to play off 


GOD AND REASON 


the line of the wind against that of gravitation, and so 
sustain the body at its height; and though it cannot be held 
from drifting on the breeze, .... yet the residuary impulse 
of the wind is counteracted by the inconspicuous exertion 
of the bird . 

“When the atmosphere is still, the only difference is, 
that the business of creating the wind is thrown upon the 
bird: by the beat of his wings he compresses the air into 
motion and rises and advances by its r@action, the direction 
which he takes being determined by the angle of the stroke. 
The elements of structure needed to meet these conditions 
are not difficult to define, but are very delicate in fact.” 
Martineau, Vol. 1, p. 278 ff. 

“The length and breadth of the surface covered by the 
open wings pressing on the air cause that the upward pres- 
sure far surpasses that of gravitation, while the thinness of . 
the wings takes very little from the air pressure. Again, 
that the wing may gain a rebound by striking the air, it is 
made large enough to compress a rolume of air, proportioned 
to the size of the bird—and that it may be light and at the 
same time strong enough, it is furnished with feathers. ~ 

“Another contrivance for the execution of purpose, we 
find in the form and arrangement of the feathers. The elas- 
ticity of the air under the downward stroke of the wing 
enables the bird to rise, but this effect, if the aerial property 
alone were taken into consideration, would be neutralized by 
the upward stroke, and thus flight would become impossible. 
To meet this difficulty the wing is so shaped that its under sur- 
face is concave while its upper surface is convex,—so that, when 
the wing strikes the air, it gathers it in or focuses it and is 
acted on by the full force of atmospheric resistance; on the 
other hand, when it strikes the air with the upper or convex 
surface, it meets with little resistance, since the convexity of 
the surface offers scarcely any resistance to the air. Add to 
this, that in giving the up-stroke the bird more or less flexes 
or contracts the wing and extends it for the contrary motion; 
and thus the flexion of the wings in the former case opens 
the feathers, in the latter, the extension, on the contrary ren- 
ders them airtight, underlapping each other as they do. 

“All this, however, will enable the bird to ascend, but 
will not enable it to fly. How is this to be accomplished? 
Again, by the combination of the wings’ mechanism with nat- 
ural forces. The power of forward motion is given to birds, 
first, by the direction in which the wing-feathers are set, and, 
next, by the structure given to each feather in itself. The 
wing-feathers are all set backwards, that is, in the direction 
opposite to that in which the bird moves; whilst each feather 
is at the same time so constructed as to be strong and rigid 
toward its base and extremely flexible and elastic toward its 
end. On the other hand, the front of the wing along the 
greater part of its length, is a stiff, hard edge, wholly un- 
elastic and unyielding to the air. The anterior and posterior 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 159 


webs of each feather are adjusted on the same principle. 

“The consequence of this dispogition of the parts as a 
whole and of this construction of each of the parts is, that 
the air which is struck and compressed in the hollow of the 
wing, being unable to escape through the wing, owing to the 
closing upwards of the feathers against each other, and also 
being unable to escape forwards, owing to the rigidity of the 
bones and the quills in that direction, finds its easiest escape 
backwards. In passing backwards, it lifts by its force the 
elastic ends of the feathers, and thus, while effecting this 
escape, in obedience to the law of action and reaction, it 
communicates in its passage, along the whole line of both 
wings, a corresponding push forward to the body of the bird. 

“By this elaborate mechanical contrivance the same vol- 
ume of air is made to perform the double duty of yielding 
pressure enough to sustain the bird’s weight against the force 
of gravity, and also communicating to it a forward impulse.” 
Ronayne, DP. 158. 

“Nor does the instinctive feeling ever fail, which directs 
to the skilled use of this delicate instrument [i.e.,the wing]. 
Would the bird poise itself at a given point, like the humming 
bird looking for insects in the flower below? He so inclines his 
body as to let the plane of his wings be horizontal and their 
stroke rectangular, and thus prevents progressive motion by 
any backward beat. Would he turn to the left? He de- 
presses that side as compared with the other and inclines 
the head and tail upwards, and the flow of air on the sails 
thus altered does the work for him, and he wheels like a 
skater circling without a stroke, by more or less rotation on 
its axis; determining the curve to be sharp as the swallow’s 
or deliberate as the heron’s. 

“The habit of the wing he accommodates to its strength 
and to his own needs; if it is short, multiplying its beats, 
till they quiver out of sight, enabling him to put forth fits 
of velocity, as with divers pursuing shoals of traveling fish; 
if it is long, demanding from it less vivid strokes, but trust- 
ing it for distant ventures of hundreds, even thousands, of 
miles. Martineau, Vol. 1, p. 281. 


Instinct, 

In the instinctive actions of animals we find innumerable 
examples of adaptation and use of means to achieve a 
definite result, so ingenious and at times so complicated, 
that we are forced to look for an intelligent cause of 
them. That the brute beast is not such a cause can be 
proved, hence the intelligent cause must be the one from 
whom it received its nature, in which the instinct is im- 
planted. We cite a few examples. 


160 


GOD AND REASON 


The Sphex. Gerard, S.J., Science and Scientists, 


“Wasps of the genus called Sphex lay up with their eggs 
a store of animal food for the benefit of their young when 
hatched. It is desirable . . . that the victim chosen for this 
unhappy function, should be rendered helpless, but at the 
same time not killed, so that the provisions may keep fresh. 
This is effected by stinging him in one or more nerve centres, 
thus paralyzing him for motion, but not immediately affecting 
his life. One species of Sphex, for instance, preys upon 
crickets, in which three nerve centres have to be thus dealt 
with, to reach one of which the neck has to be stretched 
back while the others are minute spots in other parts of 
the body. For a man to do this would require the nicest 
knowledge of anatomy. Yet the Sphex performs the opera- 
tion with unhesitating accuracy, and a young mother doing 
so for the first time cannot be guided by experience, while 
she certainly has not an elder instructor at her elbow. . 


“Another species of the same genus uses caterpillars in- 
stead of crickets, and to paralyze them from six to nine 
stings are needed, one between each of the segments of the 
body, the brain being also partially crushed by a bite with 
the mandibles. . 


“An instinct fundamentally the same is occasionally found 
in animals altogether different. Thus there have been found 
in a polecat’s nest as many as forty frogs and toads, all alive 
and able to sprawl helplessly, but each bitten accurately 
through the brain, so as to incapacitate them for locomotion.” 
Pp. 102, 107. 


Sitaris Humeralis (Muralis). Muckermann, S. J., 
The Humameing of the Brute, 


“In its larval stage this interesting blister-beetle of the 
family of Meloidae cannot live except on the egg of a bee, 
whereas the indispensable food of the second stage is honey, 
which would have been virulent poison to the beetle in his 
earliest existence. 

“The following organs are at the disposal of our beetle 
to secure possession of the egg: six strong legs, well adapted 
for climbing and clinging to other objects, fully developed 
mandibles and feelers, and finally good eyes. But after the 
transformation of the first larval stage into the second, the 
worm-like grub is blind and has almost lost its legs and 
feelers, but is endowed with a large mouth admirably adapted 
for sipping the honey which is necessary for its subsistence 
in this second stage of development. 

“The spot where Sitaris first beholds the light of day is 
near the entrance of the bees’ habitation. The larva is hatched 
towards the end of September or early in October, and re- 
mains quietly in the same spot throughout the winter without 
any food until the bee leaves its home in the early spring. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 161 


Then the moment for action has arrived, and it is highly in- 
teresting to perceive how our beetle procures its suitable 
nourishment in the most appropriate manner.” P., 18. 


Shearman, The Natural Theology of Evolution, will 
tell us the rest of the story of Suitaris, 


“The male bee is hatched first and comes out of the nest 
nearly a month before the female, so that it is probable that 
the greater number of larvae [of Sitaris] become attached 
to the male, but they take an opportunity of transferring 
themselves to the female and remain with her until she lays 
an egg. 

“This egg is laid in a cell containing a supply of honey, 
upon which it floats, and the cell ig then closed by the bees. 
But at the moment when the egg is laid, the Sitaris gets on 
it and remains there, using the egg as a raft and feeding on 
its contents. As it can neither float on the honey nor feed on 
it it would pe ish if it left the egg. After living in this way 
for about a week it undergoes a moult and then assumes 
another form [described above by Muckermann]|, admirably 
adapted for floating on the honey and able to use it as food. 
It now spends about forty days in consuming the honey, after 
which it changes its form again and passing into the pupal 
stage appears as a perfect insect in the following month.” 
P. 254. 


Rynchites Pubescens. Von Hammerstein, 8. J., 


Foundations of Faith, Vol. 1, 


“The saw-fly is an example of foresight, or would be, 
were there no Creator to look into the future for it . : 
Our little saw-fly has sufficient wisdom to provide itself on 
its entrance into the world with the implement which it will 
one day need for the performance of its instinctive actions. 
This is a dainty saw. Nor is this all. Rynchites pubescens 
is capable of making distinctions, and only when it is a female 
does it provide itseli with a serviceable saw; if it is to 
develop into a male it knows that it will have no future need 
of the instrument, and therefore contents itself with a tiny 
one, which, while practically useless is sufficiently recogniz- | 
able to enable it to be identified as the proper consort of its 
future mate. The female . . . does not roll funnels like its 
cousin (Rynchites betulae, the funnel-roller), but bores and 
saws for its eggs little holes in oak-twigs, and for this it 
needs its saw. Its mode of operation is described for us by 
Fr. Wassmann: ‘We have long spoken of the saw-fly with- 
out having accurately established its claim to the title. From 
the great number of operations witnessed by us we shall 
select one . . . which is particularly noticeable for the pre- 
cision of its separate paris . 


162 


GOD AND REASON 


““A beautiful dark-green female . . . had just mated, 
and soon began to wander undecidedly up and down on the 
oak-twigs . . . Finally the proper spot was found, and be- 
neath a knot which in better days had borne a leaf, the 
saw-fly began its tagk. 


““At first the little animal sat quite still, gnawing the 
outer bark with a scarcely perceptible motion of the jaws, 
but before long began its serious life-work. Sinking its head 
and raising its neck, it began to bore a hole in the bark, 
continually enlarging this . . . and accompanying by a regu- 
lar movement of the whole body the action of the proboscis, 
upon which it seemed to have concentrated all its feeble 
energy. 


“That the entrance to the hole might be afterwards 
closed, the little carpenter merely pushed to one side the 
loosened bark, but the interior of the cavity was cleanly 
sawed out in the shape of an ellipsoid. When able to insert 
its proboscis up to its eyes, the Rynchites considered the 
cradle finished, and turning let fall into it a tiny drop of 
yellowish adhesive matter. Once more facing around, it 
smoothed down the inner walls of the cavity with this gum, 
which afterwards hardens and turns brown. This gerves to 
preserve the tender skin of the future larva from friction 
against the rough surface of the wood. Again the beetle 
turned, probably to ascertain whether the cavity was all ready 
to receive the egg; a few splinters were removed from the 
aperture, and the most important business of the ingect’s life 
began. 


“*The female inserted her ovipositor as deeply into the 
hole as possible . . . after three minutes of perfect quiet the 
young life had begun, a single amber-yellow, shining, ellip- 
tical egg, one millimetre in length, lay in the dark receptacle 

.For the last time the mother inserts her proboscis into 
the cavity . . . to place the egg in proper position; she 
then begins with a satisfied movement of the antennae to 
close the aperture. The entrance is stopped up with the 
greatest care, and the loosened bark pressed tightly on the 
wound so that the spot where the treasure lies concealed may 
present no suspicious appearance—the bark merely looks as 
though it has been scratched and loosened with a finger- 
nail. 

““Of its own reasoning . . . the young saw-fly would 
never arrive at this exercise of ingenuity. The female of this 
bluish-gray beetle does not know that it is to lay an egg in 
which the hope of its race is slumbering; and could it fore- 
see the tiny larva in the egg, the rules of human prudence 
would certainly not suggest hard wood as nourishment for 
this feeble little worm. ‘The adult beetle, notwithstanding its 
strong jaws, lives only on the tender young foliage of the 
oak, and would the anxious mother feed her incomparably 
more tender offspring on chips? 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 163 


““‘And further, who instructed the little carpenter in the 
use of her six-toothed saw? How does the beetle know that 
the points on its snout are a saw? Does it remember the 
proboscis of its mother who concealed a tiny egg in an oak- 
twig last year never to see it again? Whence does the new- 
born artist know that it must hold the corners of its upper 
jaw obliquely in order not to hurt itself when sawing? . 
Who advised the beetle at the very outset of its labor not 
to tear off the bark, but merely to loosen it, so that it could 
be used later to close the opening? Who told it, that on 
penetrating deeper into the twig, it must devour the hard 
chips made by its saw? Its ordinary food is of quite a diff- 
erent sort, and what similarity is there between shavings and 
the fresh or dried leaves of the young oak? .. .A pro- 
phetic appetite for hard oak-wood takes possession of the 
female at breeding time; for on careful observation scarcely 
a couple of grains fell on the glass held beneath; an appetite 
which could only appear reasonable and proper to the mind 
of Him who gave the little beetle its digestive apparatus and 
its peculiar organic development. 

“ “Who previously informs the beetle of the size, form and 
tender nature of the future egg? By whose counsel does it 
so cleanly saw the interior of the cavity, and plaster it so 
smoothly? As we saw above, the young larva occupies the 
whole of the ellipsoidal cavity; if this latter were of angular 
form, smaller in size, or roughly lined, the tender creature 
would soon lay down its young life. 

““And who gave the artist that secretive gland which pro- 
duced the substance proper for the smoothing and polishing 
of the cradle? Did the anxious mother, of her own great pru- 
dence, cause a chemical glue-factory to grow inside her? . . 
Whence, finally, has the fly learned the necessity of closing 
the cavity? Where has it made the acquaintance of the ich- 
neumon-fly, which would try to lay its egg in that of its 
neighbor? Where did it discover that the action of air would 
have a dessicating effect on its egg? Humanly speaking, it 
could only have gathered this information from its own ex- 
perience, and were this the fact, we should not have the 
pleasure of occupying ourselves with a beautiful blue-green 
Rynchites; a dried-up, yellowish, leathery particle would be 
all left us by that famous animal reason. 

““Only in the unity of an inborn organico-physical law 
of development which, denying the influence of individual 
reflection and free choice, awakens the organic feelings of 
the animal in a wonderfully consistent succession, only in 
the specific individuality of the sensuous nature of the tiny 
creature which received its order at the beginning of time 
from the hand of the Divine Artist,—-only in this, do we find 
a satisfactory explanation of the instinctive perceptions of 
the saw-fly.’ Py 

“Nor has the saw-fly any cause for pride in being able 
at its birth to foresee. . . . Numerous other animals are en- 


164 


GOD AND REASON 


dowed with the same prophetic gland . .. The larva of 
the male stag-beetle, for instance, knows that it will after- 
wards have antlers, and therefore leaves room for them at 
the end of its hole.” Pp. 177 ff. 


Some miscellaneous examples taken from various 
authors. 


The stomach. 


“The organ most universal in the animal kingdom, namely 
the stomach, secretes a gastric juice which dissolves and 
digests flesh. Why, then, it is asked, does not this juice 
digest the stomach itself, this being of its nature perfectly 
digestible, so that after its owner’s death it can serve as 
food for other flesh-eating creatures? But while its possessor 
is alive this difficulty is anticipated by the provision of a 
special varnish, the epithelium, which lines the internal walls 
of the stomach, rendering these unassailable by the action 
of the gastric juice, just as if coated with porcelain. This 
protection, it is argued, must already have been supplied to 
the first stomach in which digestion was ever performed, or 
the process could never have gone any further. What clearer 
proof of design is it possible to imagine? “Nature and her 
Author, The Month, August, 1910. 


The young bee is hardly able to move its wings when 
it leaves the hive in search of flowers, and begins to labor 
not to supply its own immediate wants, but for a common 
and future good; for from its first journey, it sometimes 
makes a collection of bees-wax. Bees have been seen to 
return to the hive loaded with two large balls of this 
substance the same day they were born. 


The spider has not so much as seen the insects which 
will serve for its food when it hastens to lay a snare for 
them by weaving a curious web. The spinning machin- 
ery which is set up in its body is not more accurately 
adjusted to the secretion of which its web is formed, than 
is its instinct directed to the construction of the web, 
and to the selection of suitable places for the capture of 
its prey. Each step it takes is adapted to a determinate 
result. The thread of the spider is secreted by an appara- 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 165 


tus of small vessels twined and wound around many times 
on each other, terminating in four or six nipples pierced 
by a multitude of little holes or rather microscopic tubes. 
These tubes are so many spinnerets where the viscous 
liquid is emitted in long threads and with which the in- 
sect weaves its meshes. 

“It has been calculated,” says Milne-Edwards in his 
Zoology, “that ten thousand of these delicate threads 
penne are not equal in thickness to one of our hairs.” 
Nevertheless one of these threads can bear a weight one 
hundred times that of the insect itself. 


Birds’ nests. In examining the nests of birds we shall 
soon learn that their form and structure are always the 
same for the same species, but very different from one 
species to another, and particularly adapted to the needs 


of the little family. 


“The eggs,’ as Milne-Edwards tells us, “must be 
placed on a soft bed, warm and comfortable for the naked 
weakling just come out of its prison shell. The bird which 
has never before built nor seen a nest constructed, makes 
his own for the first time, and turns out a perfect model of 
a nest suited to his kind. In order to make it solid, he 
secretes a kind of viscous saliva, with which he mixes dust 
or clay, and thus makes a perfect paste or putty. In order 
to furnish the interior he gathers brush, hair, or the tufts 
of cottonous flowers, and ofttimes it is at the cost of their 
own proper substance, that the parents make a resting place 
for their progeny. Thus the eider, a large duck found in 
Iceland and Lapland, plucks out the silky down from its 
own breast in order to spread under its little ones a soft bed 
of eider-down. 

“When a bird sits precisely three weeks on its eggs, how 
does it know that exactly that period of time is required 
to metamorphose the eggs into young? It could not have 
seen whether or how long its own mother brooded. Neither 
has it studied zoology. How then does it know that its 
species must brood, while the megapodius in New Holland 
deposits its eggs in mouldering vegetation? It is evident that 
the singular correlation of habit and purpose was planned 
by some one. It was not planned by the bird, still less by 
an unconscious something in nature, for an unconscious thing 
can not plan. It follows that the Creator conceived this 
design, and so disposed the organism of the animal that it is 


166 


GOD AND REASON 


in some way driven at the proper time to brood during the 
prescribed period.” 


DIFFICULTIES 


The argument from design draws its conclusion from an 
analogy existing between orderly effects naturally and 
artificially produced. 
Such an argument, however is invalid. Therefore, etc. 
So Knight and many other moderns, 
Tr. Maj. N. Min. 
The reasons for transmitting the Major and deny- 
ing the Minor will be found in the prenotes to the 
thesis, and in the valid proofs of the first part of 
the thesis drawn directly from the world order itself, 
and indirectly from analogy. | 


In order that the teleological argument may transfer to 
God the conclusion that it draws, viz., that the cause of 
the world-order in an intelligent being, it must make use 
of the cosmological argument. | 

But such argumentation is invalid; it involves the invalid 
ontological argument. 

Therefore the teleological argument invalidly concludes 
that there exists an intelligent God. 

So argue Kant, Knight and a host of Kantians. 

R. 1. D. Maj. In order that the teleological argu- 
ment may transfer to God, as He is conceived 
scientifically, the conclusion, etc., it must make 
use of the cosmological argument, C.; in order 
that the teleological argument may transfer to 
God, as He is popularly conceived, the con- 
clusion, etc., it must make use of the cosmo- 

_ logical argument, NV. Tr. Min. D. Con. 
2. Tr. Maj. N. Min. and tts proof. 
The reasons for the first solution will be found in 
the prenotes, and also in the proof given in Cor- 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 167 


ollary I. The denial of the Minor and its proof 
in the second solution is warranted by Theses II 
and III. 


The teleolgical argument is valueless unless it proves that 

the intelligence which produced this ordered world 1s 

one, and only one, infinitely wise, and the world’s creator. 

But the teleological argument cannot prove these points. 

Therefore it is to be rejected. 

Knight and many other moderns make this assertion. 

D. Maj. It is valueless in proving the existence of 

an intelligent God, as conceived in the popular con- 
cept, unless it proves, etc., N.; it is valueless in 
proving the existence of God, as conceived in the 
scientific concept, unless it proves, etc., Subd., it is 
valueless unless it proves all these points indepen- 
dently of the cosmological argument, and its de- 
veloped conclusion, N.; unless it is able to prove 
them dependently on that argument and its de- 
veloped conclusion, C. Cd. Min. OD. Con. 
In the prenotes to the thesis, and in the teleological 
proof given in Corollary I will be found the reasons 
for the answer to this difficulty. 


If a chance combination of moving atoms could produce 
this ordered universe the teleological argument is invalid. 
But a chance combination of atoms could produce this 
ordered universe. 
Therefore the teleological argument is invalid, 
So reason all materialistic Monists. Their latter-day 
leader is Haeckel. Many Evolutionists belong to this 
school. 
N. Min. The following reasons for denying the Minor 
will suffice: 
a. The many atheists who urge this difficulty 
deny the existence of a first cause of the world, 


168 


GOD AND REASON 


distinct from the world itself, its producer, and 
a necessarily existent, immutable, infinite, in- 
telligent being. 

The position they take is metaphysically im- 
possible. 

b. They assert, moreover, that from brute matter 
have been evolved all living things; plants, 
animals and even man. This assertion is ab- 
solutely false. 

c. When asked whence came the order that is 
found everywhere in nature, their answer 1s 
that it all happened by chance. Our thesis 


proves the falsity of this answer. 


“To suppose that a universe such as science re 
veals to us, so real, so intricate, so harmonious, so 
stable, could have been called into being by the opera- 
tion of blind chance, is an hypothesis that no man 
in his senses, at the present day, would think for a 
moment of maintaining. Diman, The Theistic Argument, 
p. 121. 


A word about Haeckel will not be out of place. 
Dwight, Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomist, writes 
of him, 

“There is little trouble in finding the prototypes 
of Haeckel and others of his class—violent, restless 
and unscrupulous. I should be glad to pass this man 
by without more words, but for the very reason that 
he is looked upon as a leader and a prophet, not by 
the ignorant alone, but by many who should know 
better. For their enlightenment it is necessary to 
show what his word is worth. This was done as long 
ago as 1874 by the late Prof. Wilhelm His, the great 
embryologist and one of the most respected leaders 
of science.” 


After showing how Haeckel had been proved by 
His to be absolutely unscrupulous in his dishonest 
handling and falsifying of plates in an effort to 


bolster up his theory of evolution, Dwight continues, 

“His then points out other false dealings by 
Haeckel in the matter of illustrations, some of which 
he declares to have been invented, and remarks very 


\e 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 169 


justly that his play with facts is far more dangerous 
than his play with words, in as much as it requires 
an expert to denounce it—‘Let then others honor Haeckel 
as an efficient and reckless party leader; according to 
my judgment he has forfeited through his method of 
fighting, even the right to be counted as an equal in 
the company of serious investigators.’ There is only 
to add that Haeckel in spite of plenty of subsequent 
exposures, hag not reformed his ways. . . If anyone 
would know what the late Alexander Agassiz, whom 
we all honor as a scholar and gentleman, thought of 
Haeckel, let him consult Agassiz’ report on the ex- 
pedition of the Albatross in the Bulletin of the Museum 
of Comparative Zoology at Harvard College, Vol 23, 1892, 
pp. 32 to 40. His tone is not that of one arguing with 
an equal, but of one exposing a Knave.” Pp. 21 ff. Cf. 
also Gerard, S.J., Prof. Haeckel and his Philosophy, 
Month, October, 1910. 


If some one or other of the current evolutionary theories 
can satisfactorily explain the world-order without appeal- 
ing to an intelligent being as its cause, the teleological 
argument is invalid. 

But some one or other of those theories can so explain 
the world-order. 

Therefore the teleological argument is invalid. 

N. Min. Evolution or no evolution, some sufficient 
reason must be found for the existence of order in 
the world. Our argument proves that it is neces- 
sarily the effect of intelligent action. Cf. also pre- 


notes to the thesis. 


“It has not been my purpose to press evolution 
into the service of natural theology, but simply to 
establish the negative proposition that it does not 
conflict with any of the grounds which have been ad- 
vanced for believing in a first cause and in final 
causes . d 

“Evolution is simply -.a scientific interpretation 
of the facts of nature. It is to be proved or disproved 
by an appeal to facts, and in this respect rests on 
precisely the same basis as the argument from. design. 
As a scientific interpretation of nature it deals with 
physical or second causes. . . . Confined to its legiti- 
mate field, it does not touch one of the problems with 
which natural theology deals.” Diman, 1. c. pp. 197, 
389, 181, 196. 


170 GOD AND REASON 


On the question of Evolution the following books 
will be found very helpful. They are brief, to the 
point, and sufficiently thorough: 


Evolutionary Philosophy, Gerard, S.J. 

Attitude of Catholics Towards Darwinism and 
Evolution, Muckermann, §.]J. 

Thoughts of a Catholic Anatomisi, Thomas 
Dwight, M.D., LL.D., Professor of Anatomy 
at Harvard. 


6. If we admit design or finality in nature, we are torced 
to conceive an infinitely powerful being as making use of 
means to produce a desired result. 


An infinite being, however, cannot be conceived to. act 
in this way. 


Therefore design or finality in nature cannot be admitted. 
So argue Mill, Knight, Schiller and many others. 
N. Min. 


“It is difficult to treat with seriousness an argument 
which when analyzed will be found to be destitute of 
force. What it amounts to is simply this: that working 
towards results in regular and orderly methods is proof 
of limitation in a being who, if infinite, would achieve 
results by a direct and immediate exercise of power. 
In other words, if every chicken were called into being 
by a creative fiat we might infer that the power was 
infinite to which such a phenomenon was due; but 
if this power chose to endow the egg with a potency 
by which in accordance with invariable law the chicken 
was to be produced, we are bound to infer from such 
resort to an indirect method of production that it 
was shut up to the employment of natural agencies, 
and hence was finite. 


“Aside from the strange omission to note that all 
the natural agencies called into requisition to produce 
a definite result are the very proof of the intelligence 
on which the [teleological] argument insists, this ob- 
jection fails to recognize the simple principle, that in 
producing definite results infinite power must always 
work under limitations, limitations not in the power 
but in the method adopted and in the end proposed.” 
Diman, 1. ¢c., p. 119. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 171 


If the present world-order was intended by God, the most 
minute particulars must have been intended by Him, for 
example, “that that particular swallow should snap up 
that particular gnat at this particular instant.” 

That, however, appears to be incredible. 

Therefore the present world-order was not designed by 

God. 

Darwin and others present this difficulty. 

R.z. Our first answer to this difficulty is, that it is wide 
of the mark. The aim of our thesis and of the 
teleological argument, is not to prove from the 
order existing in the world the existence of an 
infinitely intelligent designer but merely the exist- 
ence of an mtelligent designer, and this conclusion 
stands even though, as was stated in our prenotes, 
disorder existed here and there in the world, and 
hence even though every minute happening were 
not intended. 

Answering the difficulty in form, then: 

D. Maj. If the present world-order was intended 
by God, the most minute particulars must have 
been intended, and the scope of our thesis and of 
the teleological argument obliges us to defend 
this conclusion, N.; it does not so oblige us, C, 
Cd. Min. 

2. In our second answer we shall suppose that the 
intelligence ruling the world has been proved to 
be infinite indirectly, through the cosmological ar- 
gument, as explained in the prenotes. 

This presupposed, our solution in form 1s: 

D. Maj. The most minute particulars must have 
been intended by God, so that each particular 
event was designed by a particular act of the 
divine mind, N.; so that each particular event 
was designed by one act of the divine mind which 


172 GOD AND REASON 


planned the universal order, and each and every 
part of it great and small, Subd., in such wise 
that each particular effect produced served as a 
means in the attainment of the ultimate end de- 
sired by God in creating this universe, C.; in such 
wise that that end was not so furthered, N- 

Cd. Min. 


“What shall be the answer to this? At first sight 
it might seem reasonable to doubt whether it is nec- 
essary to admit design everywhere in nature, if you 
admit it anywhere. There is indeed no immediate ap- 
pearance of intrinsic contradiction in the idea of a 
universe in which only the more important operations 
should be guided by design. 

“Considering however, that the first Designer of 
the world is self-existent, and infinitely perfect, He 
must know from eternity, not only in general, but in 
detail, all conditionally future results of any plan 
whatever. Moreover, His infinite wisdom necessarily 
prevents any event from happening, the occurrence of 
which would in no way serve His plan. From this 
it follows that every effect in the universe has been 
designed by God, in as much as He has foreseen it, and 
has from eternity decreed not to prevent it happening 
but to make its occurrence serve the end of all creation. 

“Granting that Darwin’s assertion that we cannot 
be consistent with ourselves, unless we admit that all 
the effects in nature have been foreseen and preordained, 
we deny altogether that there is any thing repugnant 
to reason in this admission. Reason forbids us indeed 
to admit that each particular event has been designed 
by a particular act of the Divine Mind distinct from ths 
act by which the whole Universe was planned. Such an 
assumption would clash with God’s simplicity and in- 
finite perfection. But there is nothing intrinsically re- 
pugnant in the statement that God by one act of his 
infinite intellect foresaw all events, and by one act of 
his infinite will subordinated each of them to a par- 
ticular good purpose. On the contrary, this cannot be 
denied without denying what is logically connected with 
God’s infinite perfection, as will appear in our treatise 
on divine knowledge and providence.” Boedder, Natural 
Theology, pp. 185, 186. 


8. If the world-order were the effect of intelligent action, 
the world would not contain many things whose exist- 
ence is purposeless. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 173 


But there are many such things in the world; for ex- 
ample, the countless seeds that never grow; and in living 
beings, rudimentary organs and organs fully developed 
but functionless. 

Therefore the world-order is not the effect of intelligent 


action, 


Se Darwin, Lange, Knight and others argue. 


de. 


I. 


LN) 


N. Maj. The order we see in the world 
can be explained only as the effect of intelli- 
gent action. Hence there exists an intelligent 
being, its cause. This we have proved, and 
this only we wished to prove here. Granted, 
then, that there are many useless things in 
the world, their presence in no way does away 
with the order which warranted our conclu- 
sion, We deny the Major, then, in the sense 
that it does not disprove the conclusion we 
wish to defend in this thesis. 

N. Min. In this solution, going beyond the 
limits of this thesis and defending the infinite 
intelligence of God, the author of the world- 
order, we transmit the Major and deny the 
Minor proposition. 

It is true that there are many useless things 
in nature if by useless our adversaries mean 
that they do not reach the end which our ad- 
versaries have determined they should reach, 
and not that which God has determined. They 
claim that nature is like a bad marksman who 
shoots a million bullets and hits the bull’s- 
eye only once. This is true, if the bull’s-eye 
be the one set up by our adversaries, and not 
that set up by God. But who, we may ask, 
has constituted these men the counsellors of 


God? 


174 


GOD AND REASON 


Not in one way only, but in many ways the 
works of nature are directed by God to the 
end for which He fashioned them. Some 
praise God by their usefulness, others by 
showing forth His beauty, others in manifest- 
ing His mercy, His justice, His omnipotence. 
As to the examples cited we note: 

Seeds that never grow are not on that ac- 


count useless. 


“Have you ever eaten bread? Of what was it made? 
So far as I know ‘wasted’ seeds. On what do birds 
live? To the best of my knowledge on ‘wasted’ 
seeds. And what becomes of the seeds which are 
not used as food by anyone? If I mistake not 
they usually decay and form humus.” Von Ham- 
merstein, |. ¢., p. 188. 


Rudimentary organs may serve either for 
adornment, or to show the unity of type ac- 
cording to which the author of nature fash- 
ioned his many creatures, or for uses un- 
known to us. This last answer may also be 
given with regard to those fully developed 
organs which appear to us to be useless. What 
is more, our adversaries themselves are now 
beginning to see the weakness of their argu- 
ment from this source. Nature is slow to 


yield its secrets to man. 


“In estimating a charge,” says Martineau, |. ¢., 
“against any contrivance, of failure to answer its 
end, we must start with a clear conception of that 
end, else we may measure the means by a false or 
variable standard.” P. 3389. 

“Complaint is made of several useless and un- 
meaning arrangements [in nature’s plan] ..... 
Facts of this kind may fairly enough be called un- 
meaning, if no more is intended by the phrase than 
that we do not know their raison d’étre; and use- 
less, if, in order to try them, a purpose is assumed 
which they fail to serve.” P. 330. 

“Neither our ignorance of any organ, nor its sub- 
ordinate duty warrants our condemnation of it as 
good for nothing.” P. 335. 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 175 


“A different answer must be given to the objection 
founded on what are called ‘rudimentary organs.” 
So long as we shut ourselves up with the individual 
and his wants, and estimate his build by reference 
to this alone, it may perplex us to meet with parts 
he cannot use. But nature, far from being utili- 
tarian only, is ideal too.” P. 335. 

“All these rudimental organs,’ writes Paget, 
Lectures on Surgicait Pathology, ‘must, as they 
grow, be as excretions, serving a definite purpose 
in the economy by removing their appropriate 
materials from the blood, thus leaving it fitter for 
the nutrition of other parts, or adjusting the 
balance which might otherwise be disturbed by the 
formation of some other part. Thug they minister 
to the self-interest of the individual.” P. 31. 
“Now when we are offended by the superabundant 
genesis of things as so much waste, we forget that 
nature has no occasion for parsimony, and that 
it is only in our finite economy that a close 
reckoning of resources acquires an appropriate 
place. With Plato, the crowning glory of the 
creative Power was its ‘ungrudgingness’, and if, 
in tenanting the elements with life, a liberal mar- 
gin was left for its possibility beyond its actual 
range at any moment, it expressed the large 
thought and ample readiness of the Maker, with- 
out harm to any creature that He had made..... 
Nor should we entirely disregard a further end 
which is incidentally raised by this method, viz., 
the investiture of the world with a glorious exuber- 
ance, furnishing it as a majestic palace with end- 
less galleries of art and beauty, instead of as a 
cheap boarding-school, with bare benches and 
scant meals. How much the splendor and signifi- 
cance of nature depends upon its fulness,—upon 
the irrepressible rush of life into every open inlet 
and over every surface newly spread!”’ Martineau, 
1 Serf easy. a 

“Now if we are to judge from the appearance of 
nature whether God does hit the bull’s-eye [in 
each case with precision],..... we must first be 
certain what is the bull’s-eye at which He is aim- 
ing when He lays down and maintains laws of 
evolution for matter and life. .... 

“The advocates of the design argument have never 
imagined that the divine intention in framing this 
world was to disregard the inherent tendencies 
to corruption, and to secure to each form of or- 
ganic life the completion of its natural develop- 
ment and the fulness of comfort and enjoyment. 
This has not even been supposed of man, the high- 


176 


GOD AND REASON 


est among livin; organisms. If indeed man’s life as 
a whole to the iuclusion of the life to come were 
meant, we should have to speak differently. But 
as far as that portion of his life is concerned which 
is led here below, it was acknowledged many thou- 
sand years ago by one whose theism is beyond 
suspicion that, ‘Man born of woman, living for a 
short time, is filled with many miseries.’ (Job, 
142,013) 


“We conclude, then, by saying that the target at 
which the Designer of nature is aiming, is not the 
prosperity of corporeal life, and the bull’s-eye in 
the target is not the perfect adaptation of each 
individual life to its surroundings. The true target 
is God’s glory and the final happiness of those ra- 
tional creatures who obey the voice of their con- 
science, and the bull’s-eye in the target is precisely 
that degree of God’s glory and man’s final happi- 
ness which the Creator in the light of His infinite 
knowledge has fixed absolutely.” Boedder, Natural 
Theology, pp. 180, 181. 


If the world-order were intended by God, all the sick- 
ness, pain and sorrow that afflict creatures must have 
been intended by Him. 


It is impossible, however, to conceive God as intending 
such miseries. 
Therefore the world-order was not intended by God. 
So Darwin and others ob‘vct. 

Noting again that this difficulty tends to dis- 
prove, not that the world-order is the effect of in- 
telligent action, but of infinitely intelligent action, 
we answer in form: 


D. Maj. If the world-order were intended by God, 
God must have intended also those evils which flow, 
and in as much as they flow, from man’s morally 
bad acts, N, (these He permits, making them serve 
some good purpose) ; God must have intended other 
physical evils, Subd., as ends in themselves, N.; as 
means to some end which may be the physical good 
of His creatures, or man’s moral good, or the pay- 


10. 


18h: 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 177 


ment of the penalty incurred for faults committed, 
C. Cd. Min. 


It is to be noted that this difficulty makes no mention 
of moral evil. God’s attitude towards moral evil 
is touched on briefly in the solution of Diff. 4, 
Thesis V. 


If natural agents by their very nature, and, hence, 
through an intrinsic impulse, tend constantly to produce 
the ordered effects we see in the world, it is not neces- 
sary to have recourse to an extrinsic designer to explain 
them. 


Now, natural agents have such an intrinsic impulse. 
Therefore it is not necessary to have recourse to intelli- 
gence to explain them. 

Caird and others give this difficulty. 

D. Maj. If they have such an impulse, and if they 

have received it from God, the Author of nature, 
it is not necessary to, etc., N.; if they have such an 
impulse wholly and solely from themselves, it 1s 
not necessary, etc., C. Cd. Min. 
The reason for the distinctions will be found in the 
teleological proofs drawn from the nature of the 
world-order and also from the analogy existing be- 
tween ordered effects naturally and artificially pro- 
duced. 


If animals, when they act instinctively, in some sub- 
conscious way see the end for which they act and will it, 
an argument for the existence of an intelligent cause of 
the world cannot be derived from such actions. 

But animals, when they act instinctively, so act. 
Therefore from the instinctive actions of animals no 
such argument can be drawn. 

So Von Hartmann and others object. 


178 


12; 


GOD AND REASON 


Paley N. Maj. Even if it were true that animals 
showed signs of intelligence in their instinc- 
tive actions, their intelligence could not be ex- 
plained without admitting intelligence in the 
first cause of all things, God. 

2, N. Min. Brute beasts have neither under- 
standing nor free will. 


If the order in the world were intended by God, God 
would have had to make use of finite means to attain 
finite ends: for example, He would have had to make the 
eye for vision. 

But God cannot so act. If He did so, He would be 
moved to action by a finite thing. 

Therefore the world-order was not intended by God. 

So Spinoza reasons. 

D. Maj. God would have had to make use of finite 
means to finite ends, in such wise, however, that His 
own infinite goodness is the ultimate motive and end 
of His action, to which end all finite beings with 
their proximate ends are ordered by Him, C.; in the 
sense that anything finite could be the mitt mo- 


tive for God’s action, N. Cd. Min. 
St. Thomas, Contra Gentiles, Bk. 1, cc. 74, 75, 
writes, 


“Good understood is the object of the will. But what 
is understood by God in the first place is the divine 
essence. Therefore the divine essence is the first object 
of the divine will..... 

“Now that essence is not augmentable and multipliable 
in itself, but can be multiplied only in its likeness, 
which is shared by many. God, therefore, wills the mul- 
titude of things, in as much as He wills and loves His 
own perfection...... 

“The will follows the understanding. But God with 
His understanding understands Himself in the first 
place, and in Himself understands all other things. 
Therefore in like manner He wills Himself in the first 
place, and in willing Himself wills all other things.” 
(Translated by Father Joseph Rickaby, S.J.) 


13. 


14. 


Mey 


GOD, INTELLIGENT AND PERSONAL 179 


If we are obliged to conceive the intellect as a faculty 
whose acts are changeable and composite, we cannot 
rightly predicate knowledge of God. 

Now, we are obliged so to conceive the intellect. 
Therefore we cannot predicate intelligence of God. 
Hume proposes this difficulty. 


D. Maj. If we are obliged so to conceive all intellects, 

we cannot rightly predicate intelligence of God, 
who is absolutely changeless and absolutely simple, 
C.; 1f we are obliged so to conceive finite intellects, 
such as our own, we cannot rightly predicate in- 
telligence of God, N. Cd. Min. 
This difficulty arises from the false notion that the 
concepts we derive from finite things are to be 
applied to God just as they are and without any 
change. 


The teleological argument rests on the principle that all 
order must be intelligently produced. 

This principle, however, is false. 

Therefore the teleological argument is inconclusive. 
So Hume reasons. 


D. Maj. It rests on the principle that all complicated 
order such as we have in the world, taken as a whole, 
and in some parts of the world, must be intelligently 
produced, C.; absolutely every kind of order. Tr. 
Cd. Min. 


If order frequently results from the cooperation of many 
causes, from the order in the world the unicity of its 
designer cannot be proved. 

Now order frequently arises from such cooperation. 
Therefore from the order in the world the unicity of 
its designer cannot be proved. 

Hume so argues. 


180 GOD AND REASON 


D. Maj. From the world-order an argument cannot 
be drawn to prove most probably the unicity of the 
world-designer, NV.; to prove with absolute certainty 
His unicity, Subd., by means of the teleological 
argument alone, C. (we deny, however, that we 
intend so to prove it); by means of the teleological 
argument, combined with the proof of God’s unicity, 
which in turn, is derived from the notion of neces- 
sity being supplied by the cosmological argument, N. 
D. Con. 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 181 


THESIS VII. 


The existence of God, as a being superior to the world, 
on whom the world and all its creatures, including man, 
depend, a being to be supplicated, propitiated, worshipped, 
is proved from the fact that mankind at all times has ad- 
mitted the existence of such a being. 


PRENOTES TO THE THHSIS. 


Just as our proof of the existence of God, as the intelligent 
maker and ruler of this physical universe, was derived from a 
fact in the physical order, viz., the universal and constant 
ordered action of nature’s forces, so too another proof of the 
existence of God, as the ruler of this physical world, and in a 
special way as the ruler of mankind, is derived from another 
fact, as wonderful in its way as the marvelous world-order ; 
a fact in the moral order, viz., the universal and constant testi- 
mony of the human race to the existence of a being (or beings) 
superior to the world, on whom the world and all its creatures, 
including man, depend; a being to be supplicated, propitiated, 
worshipped. This fact, we contend, cannot be explained, un- 
less we admit that the being, whose existence is so universally 
and constantly proclaimed, really and actually does exist. 

To substantiate our claim it will be necessary: 

‘1. To make clear the nature of the consent which is said 
to exist; 

2. To establish the fact of such consent; 

3. To show how this fact can be explained only by ad- 
mitting the actual existence of the being whose existence is so 
universally affirmed. 


The common consent of mankind in affirming the existence 
of God may be expressed thus: There exists a being 


182 GOD AND REASON 


(or beings) superior to the world, on whom the world 
and all its creatures, including man, depend; a being to 
be supplicated, propitiated, worshipped. 


The nature of this consent. .That some being of such nature 
exists, is the persuasion common to all peoples. When 
we come, however, to the question of the attributes of 
that being, and whether he be one or share his nature 
with others, we find no longer agreement among our 
witnesses. With regard to these points, errors of vari- 
ous kinds have crept in, nene of which, however, are 
either universal or constant. Now these errors which 
are neither universal nor constat.‘ in no way lessen the 
value of the witnesses for the purpove of our argument; 
for though their testimonies may differ with regard to 
other points, they are unanimous, and constantly so, 
with regard to one, viz., the existence of a being such as 
described above. And this is all we require for our argu- 
ment. We shall not expect to find, therefore, nor shall 
we find, nor is it necessary for us to find, a clear and 
true concept of God amongst all our witnesses; but we 
shall find universal and constant agreement at least with 
regard to some perfection proper to God. We shall find 
them all asserting that some being exists, superior to the 
world, on whom the world and all its creatures, includ- 
ing man, depend; a being to be supplicated, propitiated, 
worshipped. That being is God. 


The universality and constancy of this consent. It will be 
sufficient for our argument if we find this consent to be 
constant, and morally speaking universal, that is, constant 
and universal to the extent, that at all times and in 
practically speaking all places, all men, with relatively 
few exceptions, either by word or by deed, have pro- 
fessed a belief in the existence of a supreme being such 
as we have described in our thesis. 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 183 


If, then, in each age of the world, some individuals, or 
one or two relatively small groups of men, should be 
proved to have existed without this conviction, our argu- 
ment would be in no way weakened. For an exception, 
even on the part of one or two such groups, in the present 
case, would no more prove the testimony of the rest of 
mankind to be false, than would the hate which one or 
two parents might possibly have for their offspring, prove 
false that universal law of love of parents for their 
children, deep rooted as it is in their very nature; rather 
would such exception prove those parents to be unna- 
tural, inhuman,—monsters. 

What is more, those peoples or tribes which our adver- 
saries falsely claim to have existed without any knowledge 
of a supreme being, will be found living in the lowest 
stages of barbarism. And so, in place of trying to disprove 
through them the testimony of the rest of mankind, our 
adversaries should rather admit them to be wanting in 


those traits which mark the normal man. 


“In seeking for peoples that know no God, who live without 
faith or worship, where do our philosophers go? Do they 
select for their inquiry peoples that have stood on the highest 
pinnacles of civilization. ..... No, not they. But they go 
to some cannibal South Sea island, scarce touched by the foot, 
or known to the science, of the white man, or to some de- 
graded and wretched African tribe, and then with these speci- 
mens dug from the heart of the most dismal barbarism they 
come forward and cry: ‘Behold, peoples who acknowledge no 
God!’” Fairbairn, City of God, p, 87. 

How unfounded, however, are the statements of those 


who assert that they have discovered peoples devoid of 
all knowledge of a supreme being will appear immediately. 


That such consent is actually given, nay more, that no race 
nor nation nor tribe can be surely said to have existed 
in ignorance of a supreme being, cannot be doubted. 
It is a fact that no nation nor even tribe, no matter how 
savage and wanting in culture, has as yet been found 
that can be surely said to be ignorant of the existence 


184 


GOD AND REASON 


of a supreme being. In support of this assertion we have 
the clearest kind of testimony in historical records of all 
sorts, and in the conclusions drawn by careful students 
of the religions of the relatively primitive races, from 
data painstakingly gathered by explorers and mission- 
aries, 

It is true that some of these peoples in a greater or less 

degree held sacred, or treated as gods,—spirits, men, 

animals, the forces of nature and idols of wood and 
stone, yet at the same time they admitted the existence 
of, and worshipped, or at least considered to be worthy 

of worship, some divinity strictly supra-mundane, i.e., 

one whose nature was acknowledged always to, have been 

distinct from, and superior to, that of any creature. 

If the testimony of our witnesses went no further, we 

should have solidly established the existence of the fact 

on which our argument is based. But the testimony 
of our witnesses does go further, and makes it clear that: 

1. Not only no people has been heard of nor found with- 
out a religion, but no one has been found nor heard 
of, in which religious worship could be said to be in 
a nascent or immature state, or of recent growth: 
history nowhere tells us of the introduction of re- 
ligion anywhere. 

2. No polytheistic people has been found without some 
evidence or other of a belief in one God who was 
supreme among the others. Hence we may say that 
no people has been found professing pure Polytheism. 

3. There is not only no evidence of evolution in re- 
ligious worship, whether it be from a primitive zero 
of Atheism, through Naturalism, Fetichism, Totem- 
ism, Animism, and Polytheism to Monotheism, or 
any other of the varities of evolution proposed by our 
adversaries, but on the contrary, there is much evi- 
dence that goes to prove that the primitive religion of 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 185 


mankind was strictly monotheistic and hence that 
those peoples who were given to the practice of lower 
forms of worship, such as Totemism, Animism, Poly- 
theism, etc., were religious degenerates. 


Fr. P. J. Gannon, S.J., Comparative Religion, Irish 
Theol. Quarterly, Oct., 1916, writes, 


“It must be admitted that the followers of the New Science 
[of Comparative Religion], from Max Miiller onwards, have 
shown a fine enthusiasm and admirable industry. ... Further 
it may be freely conceded that they have made great additions 
to the sum total of our knowledge of human thought, and 
have rendered signal service to the cause of religion, in so 
much as they have corrected the views of earlier explorers 
who sometimes spoke of races with no vestige of religion. 
They are as one to-day upon the universality, temporally and 
locally, of the religious instincts, and this is a clear gain 
for apologetics. They have also incidentally sent definitively 
to the scrap-heap encyclopedist explanations of religious phe- 
nomena which reduced all to priest-craft acting under the 
stimulus of greed and playing upon the ignorance of the 
crowd. 

“Winally, they have revealed the existence of purer and higher 
beliefs underlying the most abject forms of religious aberra- 
tion. They have given us more and more support for the 
hypothesis [i.e., an hypothesis, from the natural view-point], 
formerly weakly enough based on authenticated facts, that 
monotheism is prior to polytheism, and that, so far from man 
rising naturally and consistently to nobler thoughts about 
religion, he has frequently let go his hold upon the much 
closer approximations to truth which he possessed in the 
infancy of his race. The widespread prevalence of religious 
degeneracy cannot now be denied by scientists with a name 
to lose. Of course, they save their theory of evolution by 
making still ampler provision for partial retrogression; but 
then it requires a lot of saving in view of the number of the 
exceptions.” 

Christlieb, Modern Doubt and Christian Belhef, gives 
like testimony : 

“It is a matter of fact that, even in polytheistic religions, the 
presentiment of the one personal God has not entirely faded 
away. Only to take one instance, we should scarcely find a 
negro in Africa who denies the one God, the Creator of heaven 
and earth. The history of religions is making it more and 
more evident at the present day, that in the most ancient 
traditions of all nations, there are to be found scattered traces 
and features, distorted but still recognizable, of a primitive 
revelation of the one personal God.” P. 182. 


186 GOD AND REASON 


Some few testimonials to the universal religious belief 
of mankind. For brevity’s sake we shall cite mainly 
the conclusions reached by those who have consulted 
original documents and works concerned with our 
present subject-matter. Our first concern will be the 
religious beliefs of the civilized races, after that we shall 
see how savage and barbarous peoples acknowledged the 
existence of, and honored, a supreme being. In a corol- 
lary we shall give further and more detailed testimony 
concerning the religious belief of savage, relatively prim- 
itive peoples. This testimony will be drawn from two 
authors who have studied the question deeply. They are: 
Andrew Lang, The Making of Religion; and Rev. Philo 
Mills, S.T.L., Prelistoric Religion. Fr. Mills has 
treated his subject-matter from every angle. His work 
is thorough and exhaustive. 


Religious belief of civilized peoples. Fr. John Driscoll, 
S.T.L., God, in a brief, but sufficiently thorough sum- 
mary, says, 


“Religion is a phenomenon universal not only in place 
but in time also. The records of all nations from the 
dawn of history show that the human race has at all 
times sought for God. Abundant proofs are furnished 
by the new department of science, The History of Re- 
ligions. The materials so far collected are imperfect. 
Yet they all converge to the important truth that the 
farther back we go in the history of religious thought, 
the more certain it appears that the earliest belief of 
mankind was monotheistic...... 

“In India. The sacred books of the Hindus are made up 
of various writings covering the space of a thousand 
years. The most ancient is the collection called the 
Vedase i007. iG Its [the Rig-Veda’s] age has been variously 
estimated from 1500 to 2000 B.C. A careful examination 
of these records shows traces of a primitive monotheism. 
PK eee, The farther back we go in the history of the 
Indian peoples the purer becomes the form of religious 
belief. Idolatry is shown to be a degeneration. .... 

“In Irania. The oldest and most trustworthy records of 
the Iranian worship are contained in the Gathas. The 
sacred chants are attributed to Zoroaster. .... They 
form the kernel about which the sacred literature of 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 187 


the Persians clustered in an aftergrowth. Now the 
Gathas inculcate a belief in Ahura-Mazda, the self-exist- 
ing, omniscient being. He is the all-powerful lord who 
made heaven and earth and all that is therein, and 
governs everything with wisdom....... 

“We can, therefore, with perfect safety accept the con- 
clusions of d’Harlez, of Darmesteter, of Tiele, that the 
primitive form of Iranian belief was monotheistic. 


“In Greece and Rome. The same truth comes out from a 
critical study of the religions of Greece and Rome. 
When we ascend to the very dawn of Grecian history we 
are met with the fact that the idea of God, as the su- 
preme being, was firmly implanted in the minds of this 
branch of the Aryan race. The worship of the powers 
of nature came afterwards, and gave rise to the family 
of gods which in Greece and Rome surrounds the person 
ORUZEUSIT evar Ps 


“In Egypt and China. Under the strong light thrown by 
contemporary scholarship upon the ancient religions of 
Egypt and China, the same truth is brought into clear 
view. Polytheism is shown to be an aftergrowth and 
corruption. 

“In the most ancient monuments of Egypt the simplest 
and most precise conception of one God is expressed. 
He is one and alone no others are with Him. ... He 
has made everything and He alone has not been made. 

. .. More than 5000 years ago in the valley of the 
Nile the hymn of praise arose to the true God. ADA DN actcle 
the worship of the Egyptians was polytheistic from the 
beginning was taught by Tiele in Outlines of History 
of Religion; in a later work (Egyptian Religion) he 
expresses the contrary opinion. .... These primitive 
truths now shine forth from the rank growth of myth- 
ology and superstition in which they had been well-nigh 
buried. 

“In China the power of nature, the spirits of ancestors 
are invoked and worshipped. But behind all these is 
found the conviction in the existence of some higher 
power, who is the creator and preserver of the world. 
This monotheistic belief is a tradition handed down from 
the earliest period of their history..... Mr. Legge and 
Mer. d’Harlez unhesitatingly declare that 5000 years 
ago the Chinesa were monctheists. 

“The Semitic Races. When we turn to the Semitic races 
we have in the Holy Bible a record of Jewish belief 
which is beyond question. ... They stand forth a clear 
example of a nation monotheistic throughout the course 
Ofsits, history.’ Pps, 29) if. 

Plutarch tells us of his age, ‘Travel the world over and 
you may find cities without kings, without palaces, 
without treasures, without money, without theatre, with- 
out circus; but a city without temples, without gods, 


188 


GOD AND REASON 


without prayers, without oaths, without sacrifices to 
obtain blessings and avert evils, no man has ever be- 
held nor ever will behold.” Adv. Coloten, 31. 


Religious beliefs of uncivilized peoples. We quote again 


from Fr. Driscoll. 


“In Africa, South America, Australia. The natives of 
Africa have sunk to the lowest grade of humanity. 
Covered over, as their belief is, with the crudest forms 
of superstition and fetichism .... we yet find reminis- 
cences of a supreme God. In their conceptions the 
ethical element predominates. As Dr. Robinson Smith 
truly observes, ‘Even in its crudest forms, Religioa was 
a moral force.’ The Bushmen, Fuegians, Australians 
have moral and omniscient gods, i.e., makers of things, 
fathers in heaven, friends, guardians of morality, seeing 
what is good or bad in the hearts of men. The aborigines 
of Australia are probably the lowest extant in the scale 
of civilization. Yet their religious conceptions are so 
lofty. . .. An all-Knowing being observes and rewards 
the conduct of men; he is named with reverence, if 
named at all; his abode is in the heavens, he is maker 
and lord of all things; hisi lessons soften the heart.... 
This supreme being is not the product of ancestor wor- 
ship; for it is held where the latter is not found. In 
Guinea the natives worship ‘The Ancient One’, ‘The 
Ancient One in the Skyland’, ‘Our Maker’, ‘Our Father’, 
‘Our Greati Parner. (oe wus The belief in one supreme 
being who made and upholds all things is universal. 

“In North America. The Pawnees worship...... the 
Spirit-Father..... or our Father in all places. The 
Zunis speak of God as..... the All-Father. The In- 
dians of Missouri worship..... The Old Man Immortal, 
The Great Spirit, The Great Mystery .... The Algonquin 
speaks of ‘Kitche Maneto,’ who created the world 
by an act of his will. The Aztecs of Mexico pray to 
EY Fen Our Father.” Pp. 39 ff. 


This consent has grown stronger as mankind advances in 


The 


knowledge. That the constant and universal belief 
of mankind in the existence of a supreme being has 
grown stronger with man’s growth in knowledge is a 
patent fact. The civilized nations of the earth witness 
to it, as do also the most eminent philosophers and men 
deeply versed in all other branches of knowledge. 


common consent of mankind as a source of certain 
knowledge. We stated above that from the fact that 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 189 


mankind universally and constantly has acknowledged 

the existence of a supreme being we derive another argu- 

ment for that being’s existence. 

In general that common consent of mankind, which by 

some is called “the voice of nature’, and which is a 

source of certain knowledge, is had: 

1. When the consent is morally speaking universal, 
and of enduring constancy, that is, when substantially 
the same judgment is affirmed by practically speak- 
ing all the peoples of the earth, not for years, but 
for centuries, and with a persistency that has in- 
creased with mankind’s increasing knowledge. 

2. When the judgments in question are concerned with 
matters of fundamental and vital import to man, and 
hence, a sure knowledge of which is necessary if he 
is to live a stable physical, intellectual, social, moral, 
religious life. 

3. When many, who give their consent to these judg- 
ments, do so unwillingly. This last condition is not 
absolutely necessary ; when, however, it 1s given, the 
strength of the testimony is increased. 

When these conditions are fulfilled such consent is a 
source of certain knowledge, for it is necessarily motived 
by objective evidence or, what is the same, it proceeds 
from the intellect acting purely of itself, 1.e., under the 
influence of no disturbing cause. Hence, either its 
judgments are true, or universal Scepticism must be ad- 
mitted. Our reasons for these assertions are the follow- 
ing: 

a. The consent in question is one of world-wide univer- 
sality and enduring constancy, and no reason is 
sufficient to explain it which is not of equal con- 
stancy and equal universality. On the other hand, 
the peoples who are in intellectual agreement differ 
so widely one from another that no reason, which 


190 


GOD AND REASON 


could possibly lead them into error in the matter 
proper to the judgments under consideration, i.e., 
matter fundamental to the life of man, could con- 
ceivably be of such constancy or such universality. 
That reason, therefore, which alone leads the in- 
tellect surely to truth, that is, objective evidence, is 
the sole reason sufficient to explain this constant and 
universal agreement of mankind. 

That only objective evidence can explain the constant 
agreement of mankind in matters of vital import is 
shown also in the present instance, viz., in the ques- 
tion of the existence of God, negatively, viz., by re- 
jecting the puerile reasons advanced by our adver- 
saries to explain this consent. These reasons, and 
their refutation will be found in the confirmation of 
our proof. 


Moreover, if objective evidence were not the con- 
stant and universal reason, these judgments should 
grow not stronger but weaker as mankind advances 
in knowledge. For touching as they do on questions 
fundamental to the whole varied life of man, and as 
a consequence it being of the highest importance 
that their worth should be carefully ascertained, they 
would not be accepted by the learned without diligent 
and searching examination. If, however, these judg- 
ments were not motived by objective evidence, i.e., 
if they were not true, such a scrutiny should have 
discovered, to some extent at least, their falsity, and 
so, in place of growing stronger as the world grew 
in knowledge, they should have grown weaker, and 
in course of time they should have been rejected. 


Finally, as a witness, who testifies to the truth of 
that which he wishes were not true, is apt to be an 
unprejudiced witness, where there are many stch in 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 191 


agreement with the rest of mankind, the combined 
testimony is made stronger. 


Judgments affirmed by the common consent of mankind. 
The judgments described above are sometimes called 
judgments of the common sense of nature (sensus com- 
munis naturae), the voice of nature (vox naturae), and 
are defined as those judgments which mankind univer- 
sally and constantly affirms; which are concerned with 
matters fundamental in the physical, intellectual, social, 
moral, religious life of man; and which as man’s knowl- 
edge increases, grow ever stronger. Father Hontheim 
in his Theodicea (Natural Theology), after enumerating 


many such judgments, concludes, 


“These are weighty principles which no nation ever denied; 
of which no nation lived in ignorance. These are truths so 
necessary for man’s welfare that the providence which rules 
the world has never permitted them to be utterly lost sight of 
by the nations. These are truths so evident, and as it were 
innate and ingrained in our nature, that we cannot help know- 
ing them, we can never lose the memory of them. And if, 
here and there, one may chance to be found who denies them, 
he is looked on as one devoid of human nature, who hag be- 
come like unto the brute beasts in whom no intellect is found.” 
Pie229: 


Justification of these judgments. Attention is called to 
the justification of the judgments of mankind given by 
us above. We based their truth on the fact that they 
are judgments of the intellect motived by objective evi- 
dence, and hence of the intellect acting purely of itself, 
i.e., in no way influenced by any disturbing cause; so 
that an admission of falsity in them would be an ad- 
mission of absolute Scepticism. Another justification of 
these judgments is sometimes given, which, however, can- 
not be used in the present instance, in which our object 
is to prove the existence of God, since its use would in- 
volve a petitio principu. This justification is based on the 
fact that falsity in these judgments would imply an es- 
sential defect in human nature. Such defect, however, is 


192 GOD AND REASON 


impossible only on the supposition that the author of our 
nature is an infinitely perfect God. As this justification, 
therefore, finally appeals to God, it is quite evident that 
it cannot be used where there is question of proving 
God’s existence. 


ADVERSARIES. 


Either indirectly or directly opposed to this thesis are 

all those philosophers mentioned in previous theses who 

deny the existence of God, or, admitting His existence, 
deny that man can prove it. 

In a closer way opposed to this thesis are all those philo- 

sophers who have forced the evolutionary theory into 

religion. Among these may be mentioned: 

The Positivists, with their three periods of religious 
evolution: The Theological, The Metaphysical, and 
The Positivistic. In this last period man realizes he 
can have no supernatural knowledge. He becomes 
his own god. 

Von Hartmann, who begins with Naturalism and ex- 
pects a final evolution into a composite of Monism 
and Judaic Monotheism. This will be a Panmonothe- 
ism. 

Lubbock, who starts with Atheism, and expects a final 
evolution into Pantheism. 

H. Spencer, Tylor, Tiele and others, who claim that 
man’s primitive religion was Animism, 

Frazer, King, Marett and others, who insist that prior 
to the animistic period, another existed in which man 
practiced Magic. This age they called preanimistic 


PROOF OF THE THESIS. 


The common consent of mankind in affirming any judg- 
ment concerned with matter fundamental to the life of 
man, which consent grows stronger as mankind advances 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 193 


in knowledge, and which counts among its witnesses 

many who would deny if they could the judgment they 

affirm, must necessarily be true. 

But the common consent of mankind in affirming the 

existence of God is such a consent. 

Therefore from the fact that mankind so agrees in 

affirming the existence of God, we rightly conclude that 

God exists, 

Maj. The Major is to be admitted for the reasons 
given in the prenotes. Such a consent is necessarily 
motived by objective evidence. 

Min. a. That mankind agrees in affirming the exist- 
ence of a supreme being is evident from the 
testimony given in the prenotes. 

b. That the judgment of mankind is strengthened 
with man’s advance in knowledge is a fact to 
which history witnesses. 

c. That the fact that God exists is fundamental 
to man’s life is self-evident. 

d. That many who admit the existence of God, 
the rewarder of good and punisher of evil, 
would wish that He did not exist, that so they 
might live as they please, without fear of 
punishment, needs no proof. 


THE PROOF CONFIRMED. 


Many of our adversaries, finding it impossible to deny the 
fact that mankind does agree in proclaiming the existence of 
a supreme being, offer many false explanations of it. We sub- 
join, in brief form, these explanations and their refutation, as 
a confirmation of our proof. 


Religion owes its rise and propagation to the fraudulent 
and venal actions of priests and rulers, who desired to 
increase their power and wealth. 


194 


GOD AND REASON 


R. This assertion has never been proved. What is 
more, it cannot be proved as we have no historical 
record of the introduction of religion anywhere. 
Again, if religion were rooted in fraud, it would 
have disappeared long ago. Many other reasons for 
rejecting this false and ridiculous explanation might 
be given. They are not necessary. 


Ignorance of natural causes led man to treat as persons 
natural forces and objects; to imagine that superior be- 
ings dwelt within them; and fear of their power and 
desire to placate them gave rise to prayers and sacrifices. 
R. This explanation is founded on the absolutely false 
and metaphysically impossible theory that man, 
soul and body included, is evolved from the brute 
beast. Moreover, it goes counter to facts. It 
supposes evolution in religion, and a man-made 
god. We have seen, however, that the lower 
forms of religion are due to degeneration, and 
also that all races acknowledge the existence of 
a strictly supramundane being, i, a being in 
no sense man-made, or the product of evolution. 
Finally, if religions were founded on ignorance of 
natural causes, with the disappearance of that ig- 
norance it also should have disappeared. 


The beginning of religion is due to the conjuring up of 
ghosts and spirits by the imagination of primitive man. 
These spirits, more especially if they were supposed to be 
the spirits of heroes and ancestors, were gradually trans- 
formed into gods. Hence, Polytheism, which gradually 
developed into Monotheism. 

R. This explanation, besides falsely presupposing 
the evolution of man from the brute beast, does not 
agree with the facts. It is true that some peoples 
worshipped ghosts and spirits, but it is also true 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 195 


that simultaneously they worshipped gods strictly 
supramundane. Again, Animism was never uni- 
versally practiced. What is more, if religion was 
built on ghost or finite-spirit worship, there would 
be no religion in the world to-day. 


4. Through sentimental promptings and a desire for the 
pleasing companionship of a friend, consoler and helper, 
man created for himself super-human beings. So began 
religion amongst men. 

R. Our adversaries offer no proof of this assertion. 
It cannot be proved. Religion is not a matter of 
sentiment. If it were, it would have long since dis- 
appeared, for reason leaves no place for mere senti- 
ment in the serious affairs of life. Again a senti- 
ment-made god is not the supreme being that man- 
kind worships. Mankind’s God is the ruler of the 
world, the rewarder of good and the punisher of 
evil. 


Scholion I. A very brief description of some of the erron- 
eous, relatively primitive, religious beliefs. 


Naturalism (Naturism) is the belief that the forces 
of nature are the activities of different spirits hav- 
ing more or less the nature of gods. It is a form 
of Polytheism. 


Animism attributed all phenomena not due to obvious 
natural causes to finite spirits of all kinds. 


Fetichism considers material objects as the abode of 
spirits, or as animated by them. The possession of 
the object was supposed to procure the services of 
the spirit lodged within it. These spirits were 
worshipped. 


196 GOD AND REASON 


Totemism is the belief that animals or the souls of 
animals were closely related to men, so as to be as 
it were brothers of the same tribe. These animals 
are called totems. Different tribes have different 
totems. Each tribe holds its own totem sacred; 
honors it, and is supposed never to kill or eat it. 


Scholion II. Some examples of the religious beliefs of 
uncultured, relatively primitive peoples. 


“No existing type of humanity”, says Mills, Prehistoric Re- 
ligion, ‘can be regarded as the bearer of undiluted primitive 
faith except as an approximation, as something similar to 
what was once upon earth. Hence all the existing savage 
beliefs are more or less tainted, but exhibit greater or less 
approximations to absolute truth in proportion to their an- 
tiquity or to the purity with which the primitive revelation 
has been handed down. .. . [some races] seem to mirror 
the conditions of life of an age which has long since perished 
— to represent, in fact, a type which is relatively primitive 
— an approach at least to primitive man. It is with such a 
type that our present study is occupied.” P. 17 of Preface, 
and p. 1. 


We shall cite first some examples from Lang, The Mak- 
ing of Religion: 

“Of all races now extant, the Australians are probably 
lowest in culture...... Their religious conceptions are so 
lofty that it would be natural to explain them as the result 
either of European influence, or as a relic of a higher ciyili- 
zation of the past. The former notion is discredited from the 
fact that their best religious ideas are imparted in connection 
with their ancient and secret mysteries, while for the second 
idea, that they are degenerate from a loftier civilization, there 
is absolutely no evidence. .... 

“In the Bora or Australian mysteries, at which the knowledge 
of ‘The Maker’ and of his commandments is imparted, the 
front teeth of the initiated are still knocked out..... The 
cult among the Australians is the keeping of certain laws 
expressed in moral teaching, supposed to be in conformity 
with the institutes of their god... . 

‘From all this evidence it does not appear how non-polythe- 
istic, non-monarchical, non-Manes-worshipping savages evolved 
the idea of a relatively supreme, moral, and benevolent cre- 
ator, unborn, undying, watching men’s lives. ‘He can go 
everywhere and do every thing.” Pp. 175, 176, 177, 184. 
“The case of the Andaman Islanders may be especially 
recommended. .... For long these natives were the joy of 
emancipated inquirers as the ‘godless Andamanese’...... 


i i 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 197 


Yet when scientifically studied in situ by an educated English- 
man, Mr. Man, who knows their language, has lived with them 
eleven years ..... they turn out to be embarrassingly rich 
in the higher elements of faith....... 
“The people are probably negritos, and probably ‘the original 
inhabitants, whose occupation dates from pre-historic times’ 
ew ya bate Their religion is probably not due to missionaries, as 
they always shot all foreigners, and have no traditions of the 
presence of aliens on the island before our recent arrival. 
Their god, Puluga, is ‘like fire,’ but invisible. He was never 
born and is immortal. By him were all things created, except 
the powers of evil. He knows even the thoughts of the 
heart. He is angered by sin (Yubda) or wrong-doing, that 
is, falsehood, theft, grave assaults. adultery, bad carving of 
meat, and (as a crime of witch-craft) by burning wax..... 
He is judge of souls; and the dread of future punishment ‘to 
some extent’ is said to affect their course of action in the 
present life...... There is the usual story of the deluge 
caused by the moral wrath of Puluga. The whole theology 
was scrupulously collected from natives unacquainted with 
other races.” Pp. 194, 195. 
“The Banks Islanders ‘believe in two orders of intelli- 
gent beings different from living men’. 1. ‘Ghosts of the dead’. 
2. ‘Beings, who were not, and never had been, human’. This, 
as we have shown, and will continue to show, is the usual 
savage doctrine. On the one hand are separable souls of men, 
surviving the death of the body. On the other are beings, 
creators, who were before men were, and before death entered 
the world.” P. 197. 
“If many of the lowest savages known to us entertain ideas 
of a supreme being such as we find among Fuegians, Austral- 
iangs, Bushmen, and Andamanese, are there examples besides 
the Zulus, of tribes higher in material culture, who seem to 
have had such notions, but to have partly forgotten or ne- 
glected them? Miss Kingsley, a lively, observant and un- 
prejudiced writer, gives this very account of the Bantu races. 
. To take an example; the Dinkas of the upper Nile ‘pay 
a very theoretical kind of homage to the all-powerful being, 
dwelling in Heaven, whence He sees all things. He is called 
‘Dendid’ (great rain, that is, universal benediction?).’ He is 
omnipotent, but being all beneficent, can do no evil; go, not 
being feared, he is not addressed in prayer.” P. 211. 
“The celebrated traveller, Mungo Park, who visited Africa in 
1805, had good opportunities of understanding the natives. . . 
‘I have conversed with all ranks and conditions upon the 
subject of their faith’, he says, ‘and can pronounce without 
the smallest shadow of doubt, that the belief in one God and 
in a future state of reward and punishment is entire and uni- 
versal among them.’” P. 221. 
“It is my object to set certain American creators beside the 
African beings whom we have been examining. We shall 
range from Hurons to Pawnees and Blackfeet and end with 


198 


GOD AND REASON 


Pachacamac, the supreme being of the old Inca civilization, 
with Tui Laga and Taa-Roa. It will be seen that the Hurons 
have been deprived of their benevolent Creator by a biblio- 
graphical accident, while that creator corresponds very well 
with the Peruvian Pachacamac, often regarded as a mere 
philosophical abstraction. The Pawnees will show us a Cre- 
ator involved in a sacrificial ritual .... while the Blackfeet 
present a Creator who is not envisaged as a spirit at all, and, 
on our theory, represents a very early stage of the theistic 
conception.” P. 230. 


Father Mills’ Prehistoric Religion deserves high praise. 
Everything has been done to make it complete, thorough 
and trustworthy. Witnesses on both sides of disputed 
questions are cited, their testimony weighed and sifted, 
and conservative conclusions drawn. The reliability of 
witnesses is another point to which strict attention has 
been given. One who would wish to make a thorough 
study of prehistoric religion will find Father Mills’ book 
invaluable. We have space only for a few citations. The 
first treats of the authority of his witnesses, the others 
will give a very inadequate summary of the conclusions 
drawn from the well digested testimony of those wit- 
nesses. These conclusions will be found to fully con- 
firm our thesis. 


“The field of comparative religion is a new one, that of pre- 
historic religion quite recent. The latter department is being 
pioneered by men who, whatever their powers of observation, 
are certainly beyond the average of trustworthiness. Names 
that include Catholic Bishops, like Schneider and LeRoy: Pre- 
fects Apostolic, like Mgr. Dunn; missionaries of the Divine 
Word, like Schmidt and Hestermann; apostles of the Sacred 
Heart, like Meyer and Hgedi, are apt to solicit our attention 
on the score of seriousness, if no other. But apart from this, 
they have lived, or are living, on intimate personal terms 
with the natives; they have penetrated into regions that are 
rarely, if ever, visited by the white man; and they have 
studied their customs, their folk-lore and their mythology in 
a manner that is epoch-making...... If to this be added the 
names of Breuil and Cartaillac, of Piette and Obermaier — 
experts in the allied fields of palaeontology and rock-paintings 
— the honor-list of the Catholic Church swells to a noble 
figure. 

“If, however, their writings be suspected of ‘tendency’, these 
tendencies can easily be corrected by more secular writers, 


Ae 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 199 


whose ‘tendencies’ though in an opposite direction, have in- 
voluntarily brought on the same results. Graebner, Thomas, 
Foy, and Ankermann are admittedly colorless while Mrs. 
Parker and Andrew Lang are frankly ‘converts’, who have 
been brought to change their opinions solely by an impartial 
examination of the overwhelming evidence of facts...... 
“So much for a general survey. As to special sourceg for 
particular areas, we have in addition to the above, a large num- 
ber of individual authors, whose divided voices might be open 
to question, but whose united testimony is surely powerful. 
Only the most important can be given here, 

“Thus we have Skeat, Vaughan-Stevens, and Martin, for the 
Malakkan races; Man and Portman for the Andaman Islands; 
Meyer, Reed and Montano, for the Philippines; Rawling and 
Williamson for New Guinea; Howitt and Ling-Roth for the 
Tasmanian-Australian region. For the central African Ne- 
grillos we have only one standard work, that of Mgr. LeRoy, 
Bishop of Alinda. The same for South African Bushmen, 
where the name of Stow stands easily first...... We have 
Skeat again for the Sakai; Seligman for the Veddas; and 
Sarasin for the Toalas; and in the New World, Von den Steinen 
and Ehrenreich for the lank-haired primitives of the Amazon- 
ian belt.” Pp. XXV, XXVI. 


“By the word ‘prehistoric’ is here understood that long period 
that preceded the days of the Jewish Covenant,” Prolog, p. 1. 
“To put it briefly, the ‘prehistoric’ religion of man may be 
said to embrace a belief in God as Creator and Judge, the 
binding power of the ten commandments, and the offering up 
of some kind of atonement-rites........ 

“As the golden thread of the supernatural has never been 
entirely lost in any age of the human race, whether historic 
or prehistoric, as we cannot say to what extent the primitive 
revelation has not been preserved in this or that fragment 
of prehistoric antiquity, or by this or that section of primitive 
man, it is clearly impossible to treat this subject in such a 
manner as to exclude the influx of all supernatural light from 
the rich body of folk-lore which we are about to examine.” 
Prolog, p. 2. 

“Nevertheless as the primary aim of our present study is 
simply to bring out a voluminous collection of prehistoric 
facts, and then to interpret these facts in the light of our 
supernatural standpoint, it is evident that the question of 
fact should be the primary one; theories and explanations 
should in every instance be made to follow.” Prolog, p. 3. 
“There are those who have dabbled with Tylor’s Primitive 
Culture, with Frazer’s pretentious work on Totemism and 
Exogamy, and who are firmly convinced that primitive man 
was either entirely atheistic, or if in possession of any re- 
ligion at all, that the idea of God was developed out of the 
ghost or the magical nature-cult. To them we shall oppose an 
enormous array of religious facts which have been only re- 
cently unearthed, but which in their united force point to 


200 


GOD AND REASON 


conclusions of precisely the opposite character, — it is the 
All-Father belief which precedes the totemic or animistic 
cult by indefinite ages. Prehistoric man believed in God, and 
only in later times was the belief corrupted.” Prolog, p. 4. 


And truly remarkable is the array of facts, vouched for 
by witnesses whose worth is closely scrutinized, which 
Father Mills presents as the ground-work of his con- 
clusions,—facts mythological, ethnological, sociological, 
morphological, biological, religious. Dividing the pre- 
historic period into “three wide epochs” the Primitive, 
Totemic and Neolithic, and holding as probable “the 
existence of two intermediate layers”, he arranges his 
facts accordingly. ‘Then after a painstaking and just 
exainination of them he draws his conclusions, many of 
which support our thesis as far as prehistoric man is 
concerned, whilst many others go far beyond its scope. 
Of the former we select a few. 


“On no account can the primitive type be derived from any 
existing anthropoids, as the morphological traits of these 
peoples show a striking divergence from any of the Simian 
types, aS well as an equally strong convergence into an un- 
known type, which cannot now be constructed. The combined 
evidence, however, points to a relatively symmetrical high- 
brow form. 

“The mentality of primitives is far higher than was formerly 
suspected. There is no essential difference between man re- 
cent, glacial, or preglacial, nor is there any shred of evidence 
for the ‘homo alalus’ or speechless man. In every case we 
have a ‘homo sapiens’ endowed with different degrees of 
mental facility, depending upon the complexity of his needs 
and environment. In this respect the above races compare 
favorably with the higher peoples. 

“The morality of primitives has recently been placed in a 
far more favorable light. There is considerable evidence to 
prove that the institution of monogamy is very generally 
recognized by the lowest races of man that are known to us. 
Among the Hast-Indian primitives this is especially the case. 
Furthermore, there is a very general absence, or at least a 
rarity, of gross crimes, whether as theft, murder, infanticide, 
cannibalism, or human sacrifice. On the contrary, the lessons 
of honesty, charity, kindliness and generosity are strongly 
inculeated from the tenderest years, and social and domestic 
relations reveal a simple, but attractive picture. 

“These statistics are sufficient to show that the supposed in- 
capacity of primitive man to be the recipient or the bearer of 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 201 


a relatively high order of theological truth is ipso facto an 
untenable proposition. It is further contradicted by the re- 
ports from the missionary field, which show that the despised 
primitive is as receptive of supernatural doctrines and as re- 
tentive of them, as any of his more favored or ‘civilized’ 
brethreny xs 5 ee as 

“A preliminary analysis of three wide epochs of humanity has 
revealed the fact that the institution known as totemism is 
confined to a certain group of races, which are higher than 
any of the above primitives, and lower than any of the full 
neo-lithic and civilized races of antiquity. 

“A further investigation has disclosed with some probability 
the existence of two intermediate layers, in which magic and 
spiritism respectively claim an important element in religious 
belief. 

“If, therefore, magic and totemism, spiritism and animism, 
can be proved to be absent from the earliest belt, it will stand 
to reason that they are all later developments in religious 
history, and by a similar process of exclusion it may be proved 
that they follow one another in the order indicated, or at 
least are characteristic of their respective cultures. 

“Such a proof has been outlined in the above analysis, but 
it presents the results of professional research, rather than the 
research itself. It is a broad summary of what has already 
been discovered. 

“Detailed proof will be found in the following study, in which 
each of the above statements will be made good by a rigid 
examination of the cultural and mythological data for each 
successive or typical region.” Pp. LXXI, LXXII. 

“To sum up, then, the combined religious picture for the 
prehistoric era may be gaid to reveal a development which 
seems to be traceable in at least three broad stages of mental 
and social evolution. These stages may be described as fol- 
lows:— 

“For the primitive period. Here the divinity is supreme, per- 
sonal and worshipful in the best sense by prayer and mild 
sacrifice,—without cruel rites. He is strictly suwper-natural, 
not involved or confused with nature...... He creates di- 
rectly, or by means of a demi-urge the whole universe and 
RAN Keecer al. He is supreme Lawgiver of the race, and His» 
character reveals itself in a relatively clean morality. 
“This is the Monotheistic age of humanity, in which the idea 
of transcendence is apparently uppermost. He is the only 
One, but He is all in all,—Amaka,—the universal Father, — 
sich LAV ea os Baa Obes 

“For the totemic or glacial period. This ancient divinity can 
still be traced in his main features. All the above qualities 
apply here with equal force, they can be sifted out. Never- 
theless the idea of genesis begins to attract the attention of 
man. Where did he [man] come from? Is he not intimately re- 
lated to nature? Is he not her direct offspring? By degrees the 
notion is formed that nature is nearer to man than the 


202 


GOD AND REASON 


Heavenly Father, later all thinkable things are of one Bub- 
stance, 44% 

“This 4s the age of Pantheistic Monism, in which the notion 
of immanence becomes all-important, it ig nature herself 
which is the All. And yet the idea of a unique being has not 
been entirely lost, the Wakanda is still ‘The Great Mystery’, 
‘the Creator of heaven and earth, the Fountain of Mystic 
Medicine.’ Among the righteous the totem is a blessing, the 
growing Knowledge of nature has but deepened their love for 
the Creator.” P. 573. 

“While a supreme Personality still directs the destinies of 
man in the abstract, in practice his worship is less direct, 
more mysterious, more occult, more magical, more mixed up 
with lifeless and impersonal agencies. In this we discern 
a mental tendency which is never without danger, the desire 
to know too much of the origin of things, to trace the divine 
operations in every shining crystal, in every living cell. It 
was impossible to make this experiment without the risk of a 
one-sided development, of grading into a vague mystery-cult, 
which is frankly nature-worship. Yet side by side we find 
the definition of deity as ‘The Great Mystery’; and the occa- 
sional glimpse of a ‘Man beyond’, of a ‘Father’ of all the 
totems, suggests at least that some of these practices may be 
interpreted in a higher and a better sense........ 

“The combined evidence inclines me more and more to the 
opinion, that in this ‘mediaeval’ period of the race there is 
evidence of a mental and moral dualism, of a splitting of 
belief and practice into two opposite channels, the one con- 
servative, monotheistic, and monogamous, the other associated 
more or less with a vague, pantheistic nature-cult, in which 
the primitive ideas of matrimonial chastity have been in great 
Dart Ost: oases In fact it may yet be within the power of 
proof to affirm that at no period of humanity has the cult 
of the All-Father been entirely lost, though its greater or less 
corruptions are only too evident.” P. 556. 

“Now in re-examining the data that have so far been accumu- 
lated, we shall find that the ancient concept of a personal 
Creator, though in most cases faded, may be generally recog- 
nized in the background,—He is there in a vague a haee ii ’ 
P. 545. lL 
“For the neolithic and recent period. The second stone age 
marks in many respects a reform, a revival of the primitive 
notions. The Wakanda has been disentangled from nature, 
he is no longer connected with the lower creation, he has 
become an Awonawilona, a ‘Father of All’, once more em- 
phatically a ‘Supreme Person.’ .... They [ie., the totems] 
are no longer guardian-things or guardian-animals, they 
have become guardian-spirits, endowed with mana, great per- 
sonalities, who act on the lower creation by their secret power, 
focussing their interest on certain objects, making them in- 
violable, or sacrosanct,—taboo. A neolithic tabu is therefore 
more than a totem. It is the abode of a person, and as there 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 203 


are many tabus, so there are many persons operating the tabu, 
not excluding a supreme Yabu, who thus becomes the head 
of the pantheon. 

“This is the age of Polytheistic Syncretism in which the ‘great 
Spirit’ is surrounded by a host of minor spirits of the same 
nature, who are frequently co-eternal and who contest his 
authority. But this is not the invarfable rule. The great 
Awona is still behind the tabu, willing to make it the instru- 
ment of his power...... It is not simply a case of Amaka- 
langi, ‘Our Father in Heaven’, but of A-ti-us-ta-ka-wa,, ‘Our 
Father in all places’.” P. 574. 

“Tf, therefore, the living survivors be compared with the buried 
civilizations as far as-known to us, their combined testimony 
is surely of some value. They have revealed the fact that 
the worship of the supreme Being has never been entirely 
lost, the Father-above is still with his children.” P. 570. 
‘If, then, we make one more appeal to the past records of the 
race by way of showing how essentially similar is the mani- 
festation of the religious conscience in all ages of man, it 
should make us feel more secure in the foundations of our 
own faith, more especially, because, as I say, that conscious- 
ness cannot be entirely accounted for on purely naturalistic 
lines, but presupposes some form of divine illumination, and 
thus reflects on the office of the Messiah....... 


“It should be strongly conducive to a robust form of religious 
belief of any kind to know and to feel that the common pulse 
of humanity beats as a single stroke on the all-essential 
matter of a supreme, personal, invisible cause of existence, 
however much that cause may have been mixed up in certain 
cases with its effect, and thus partially fused with its own 
creation. The argument from the universal consent of hu- 
manity appeals strongly to certain minds, and the fact that 
some kind of supreme power has always been recognized fills 
a void in the human heart which nothing else can replace— 
it is the first and fundamental dogma of all religion..... 
“Finally. we have undeniable relics of a great flood, coupled 
with a firm persuasion that the good shall in some way be 
rewarded in another world, while the wicked shall be punished 
or in some way purged for their moral perversities.” P. 594. 
Cf. also pp. 121 ff.; 501 ff.; 515 ff.; 541 ff.; 545 ff.; especially 
547, 556; 557 ff.; 571 ff.; especially 573, 574. 


DIFFICULTIES 


If many races agree in asserting a plurality of gods, their 
testimony rather denies than affirms the existence of the 
true God. 

But many races so agree. 


GOD AND REASON 


Therefore their testimony cannot prove the existence of 

the true God. 

D. Maj. If they agree in asserting a plurality of gods, 
of whom one is acknowledged to be supreme, dif- 
fering essentially from the others, and their master, 
their testimony denies, etc., N.; if one is not so 
acknowledged, Subd., their testimony would dis- 
prove the existence of God, if their consent, with 
regard to the errors it affirms concerning the nature 
of the true God, enjoyed the universality and con- 
stancy required for a judgment of the common 
consent of mankind, C.; if it does not enjoy these 
qualities with regard to these errors, but does en- 
joy them in as much as it affirms the existence of 
a supreme being, Subd.; their consent, looked at 
objectively and considered as a whole, logically in- 
volves the denial of the true God, C.; their consent 
looked at as their subjective persuasion, and only 
in as much as it asserts the existence of the supreme 
being, since with regard to this point it has the 
marks of a judgment of the common consent of 
mankind, rather denies than proves the existence of 
the true God, N. D. Con. 


If the persuasion of the human race concerning the exist- 

ence of God has grown weaker as man has grown in 

knowledge, it cannot prove the existence of God. 

But it has grown weaker. 

Therefore from it the existence of God cannot be proved. 

D. Maj. If it has grown weaker with mankind in general, 
it cannot, etc., C.; if it has grown weaker amongst 
relatively few, and that because of a perverted use 
of their intellect, it cannot, etc., NV. Cd. Min. 


If the Buddhists and other heathen peoples are Atheists, 
the consent of mankind in affirming the existence of God 


* 


ARGUMENT FROM COMMON CONSENT 205 


is not morally universal, and, hence, not worthy of trust. 
But the Buddhists and other heathen peoples are Atheists. 
Therefore the consent of mankind in affirming the exist- 
ence of God is not morally universal. 


D. Maj. If some philosophers among the Buddhists 
and other heathens are Atheists, the consent, etc., 
is not universal, N.; if the common people are Athe- 
ists, the consent is not universal, C. Cd. Min. 

There are about 130,000,000 Buddhists and count- 
less other heathens in the world at present. Of 
these some of the philosophers are atheistic; the 
common class is not. 

A similar difficulty might be urged in regard to 
the Brahmanists who number about 210,000,000. 
The Brahmanist philosophers profess Pantheism; 
the common people do not. 


If there are many Pantheists in the world, man’s consent 
in affirming the existence of God is not morally universal. 
But there are many Pantheists in the world. 
Therefore man’s consent in affirming the existence of 
God is not morally universal. 
D. Maj. If there are absolutely many, man’s consent 
is not universal, N.; if there are relatively many, 
» man’s consent, etc., is not universal, C. Cd. Min. 


If the human race erred with regard to the rotation of 
the sun, the common consent of mankind is not a source 
of certain knowledge. 

But the human race so erred. 

Therefore the common consent of mankind is not a source 
of certain knowledge. 

D. Maj. If the human race so erred, and if this judg- 
ment was of the kind described in our prenotes, the 
common consent of mankind is not, etc.,C.; if it 
were not of that kind, N. Cd. Min. 


206 


GOD AND REASON 


ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS DEMONSTRATING THE 


EXISTENCE OF GOD 


Besides the three arguments proving God’s existence al- 
ready given, modern Catholic philosophers offer nine others. 
They are not all of equal value. We shall consider briefly 
four of them. Of these four, three are given by Saint Thomas. 


I. 


The argument from motion. 

This argument is the first given by St. Thomas in the 
Summa Theologica, 1, q. 2, a. 3. His development of 
it, however, differs from the one given below. 

The argument rests on the principle: Whatever is moved, 
is moved by another. The truth of this principle is 
established :— 

1, A priori. 

“Nothing can be at the same time in act and potentiality, 
with regard to the same thing. Whatever is in motion, how- 
ever, as such, is in a state of potentiality, since motion is 
the act of a being which is in a state of potentiality, and in 
as much as it is in such a state. Now, whatever moves, in as 
much as it moves, is in act, since nothing can act unless it be 
in act. Therefore no being can be with regard to one and the 
same thing, actually mover and moved; and so nothing [unless 


it be also moved by another] moves itself.” St. Thomas, Contra 
Gentiles, Bk. I, c. 138. 


2. A posteriori. Everything which we see in 
motion, whether it be a non-living or a living being, 
is in some way or other moved from without. 


This principle being established, the argument is evolved | 
as follows: 

A is moved by B. B, the mover, is itself, in turn, 
either moved by another, or moves A and at the same time 
is unmoved. If B is moved by another, the same query 
must be repeated with regard to the being that moved 
him, and finally we must reach a mover who is unmoved 


II. 


ITT. 


f 


ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS 207 


or admit the existence of an infinite series of moved and 
moving beings independent of an unmoved being. Such 
an independent series, however, is impossible, for no- 
where in it can be found an adequately sufficient reason 
for the motion of A. Therefore we must admit the 
existence of some being who moves the others and who 
himself is unmoved. That being, then, must have of 
himself the perfection by which it communicated motion 
to the other beings. Since, however, no perfection of a 
being can exceed the perfection of the essence from 
which it flows, the unmoved mover must be a being 
whose essence is from himself. That being is God; the 
Prime Mover, who is unmoved and immovable. 


The argument from contingent being. 

This is the third argument given by St. Thomas, 1. c. 
His development of it is somewhat different from the 
one we suggest. 

A contingent being is one whose existence is not abso- 
lutely necessary. It could have not existed. 

The argument is evolved in exactly the same way as the 
Cosmological argument. 

From the fact, namely, that a contingent being exists, we 
deduce the existence of a being who is absolutely neces- 
sary. This being is God. 


The argument from the different degrees of perfection 
in creatures. 

St. Thomas, |. c., puts this argument in the fourth place. 
It is developed in different ways. We take the following: 
The creatures existing in the world possess many per- 
fections, differing in kind and in degree. All of them 
are finite. No perfection, however, which is finite or 
limited, can exist of itself, for, if it could, the sufficient 
reason for its existence in that limited way would have 
to be found in itself. Now that is impossible, for since 


208 GOD AND REASON 


perfection of itself does not say this degree rather than 
that, i.e., does not limit itself, in no limited perfection 
can be found the reason for its own existence, Nor can 
the adequately sufficient reason be found in another finite 
being, since that being in like manner, must have a suf- 
ficient reason, for its limited existence, in another. There- 
fore, that reason must be found in a being who possesses 
the perfection in question in an infinite way and of 
himself, and who, therefore exists of himself. There 
is, however, only one being who exists of himself. That 
being is God, who as is proved later in Natural Theology, 
possesses not only some perfections infinitely but all. 


IV.—The argument derived from man’s acknowledgment 
of moral obligation, i.e., of a law binding him in 
conscience. | 
It is a fact that all men admit that certain actions are 
morally good, and others morally bad; that they are 
obliged to do the good ones at times, and avoid the bad 
ones always; and this even in secret. This obligation binds 
us all; the great and the small] alike. It binds at all cost, 
no matter what may draw us in the opposite direction— 
riches, pleasures, honors. And if the warning that is 
given us in concrete cases by the voice of conscience, 
‘This action must be done’, is not heeded, we realize 
that we have done wrong, that we are worthy of blame 
and punishment, and, if the transgression be judged 
serious, we are filled with the deepest remorse. 


Now, whence comes this obligation? Certainly no in- 
ferior imposes it, for an inferior has not the right to 
command. Nor is it imposed by an equal, for an equal 
has no right to dominate me. Nor does it come from 
some human law, nor is it the outcome of social con- 
vention, for these things are changeable, and the morality 
of certain actions is absolutely changeless, and, conse- 


ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS 209 


quently, the mandate of the moral law with regard to 
them is also absolutely changeless. Of this kind are ac- 
tions which are intrinsically good or bad; actions whose 
goodness or badness is independent of all legislation. 
Nor can that obligation arise from the fact that my ac- 
tions are or are not in conformity with my human nature 
looked at merely in itself and without ascending to some 
higher principle. For my nature looked at merely in 
itself is a finite good, and it is contrary to reason to say 
that I should be bound absolutely for the ~ake of a 
limited good. 
Therefore the obligation must be imposed on me by some 
higher power, who has the right to command me, the 
right to punish me, and to whom I am responsible. That 
being is God. 
Such is the persuasion of man. Now the question is: 
Is that persuasion founded on objective evidence, and if 
so, how can that be shown? All Catholic philosophers 
agree in admitting that this persuasion is founded on 
objective evidence, and, hence, that the acknowledgment 
of the existence of the law-giver, i.e., of God, which is 
implied in that persuasion, is also founded on objective 
evidence. They differ, however, in explaining how the 
evidence of God’s existence is so implied. 

a. Some hold that at least some of the fundamental 
principles of the moral law, e.g., “Good must be 
done; evil must be avoided’, are immediately evident 
to us, and that in these judgments the existence of 
God is acknowledged on immediate evidence. They 
hold, however, that this immediate evidence is a 
posteriori, since it is bound up in, and derived from, 
a fact of experience. This opinion is held by Father 
S. Schiffini, S.J., and possibly by Cardinal Newman. 
Cf. Grammar of Assent, pp. 101-104, 106, 107. 
(Longmans. Ed, 1891) 


210 


C. 


GOD AND REASON 


This opinion is commonly rejected, and, most prob- 
ably, rightly so, on the ground that it contradicts 
experience. We have no consciousness of an imme- 
diately evident knowledge of God’s existence. 

A second opinion holds that the acknowledgment 
of a moral obligation does not presuppose, nor does 
it formally imply, an acknowledgment of the exist- 
ence of God. It so implies it, however, that, first, 
there can be no transgression of the moral law which 
is not an offence against God, and, secondly, from it 
that existence can be demonstrated. 

Most probably this opinion is erroneous. An ad- 
mission of the existence of an obligation contains 
formally an admission of the existence of the one 
who obliges. Hence one who would attempt to 
demonstrate the latter from the former commits’ the 
fallacy of petitio principu. On this ground, Father 
De San, S.J., and others reject this opinion. 

A third opinion admits that the acknowledgment 
of any moral obligation, supposes the formal ad- 
mission of the existence of the law-giver—God. In- 
directly, however, the existence of God may be proved 
from such acknowledgment; from the fact, namely 
that the opposite hypothesis would make error the 
foundation of all honesty in man’s life, and truth 
the foundation of all that is bad. In which case our 
nature would have been badly constituted. 

This form of argument must also be rejected on the 
ground that it is a petitio principu. The only argu- 
ment that we use to prove that our nature is not 
badly constituted, is to appeal to the wisdom of its 
maker—God. Yet the existence of God in the present 
case, is the point to be proved. 

Another indirect proof of the existence of God from 
the acknowledgment of moral obligation, and a 


wel 


ADDITIONAL ARGUMENTS 211 


proof which is certainly legitimate and used by 
many authors, appeals to the fact that the acknowl- 
edgment of moral obligation is a judgment of the 
common consent of mankind, of the kind described in 
the preceding thesis, and hence necessarily true. 


212 GOD AND REASON 


CONCLUSION 


To help man to reach God, the fundamental Truth of all 
truth, the author of his being, the Source of morality, the Ob- 
ject of his adoration, the End for whom he was made, is the 
highest service a sane, reason-grounded Philosophy can give. 
Natural Theology does this proximately, proving, as it does, 
God’s existence, developing a true concept of Him and His 
attributes, showing the utter dependence of creatures and all 
their actions on Him, and His all-wise providence in, governing 
them, defending these truths against attacks made on them 
by innumerable false philosophic systems, and, so, laying solidly 
the foundations of supernatural faith-knowledge without which 
salvation is impossible. Remotely, yet none the less neces- 
sarily, the other branches of Philosophy aid in this work, 
for without them there would be no science of Natural 
Theology. 

One would rightly conclude, then, that the study of Phil- 
osophy is of the utmost importance, especially in these days, 
when, as we have seen, through an arbitrary setting aside of 
reason, the nature and personality, nay more, the very reality 
of God are called in question, not alone by professed un- 
believers, but by many also who shamelessly call themselves 
followers of Christ. Nowhere, perhaps, is this importance 
more forcibly insisted on and the supreme worth of Philosophy 
as the strong ally of our Faith more clearly set forth, than in 
the Encyclical of Pope Leo XIII, Aeterni Patris, August 4, 
1879, on The Study of Scholastic Philosophy according to the 
mind of St. Thomas Aquinas. This weighty appeal of the 
Holy Pontiff should be carefully read and deeply pondered by 
all serious students of Philosophy. We quote it in part. 

“The Apostle warns us that the faithful of Christ are often 
deceived in mind ‘by philosophy and vain deceit’ (Col. ii, 8), 





CONCLUSION 213 


and that thus the sincerity of faith is corrupted in men. For 
this reason the Supreme Pastors of the Church have always 
held that it is a part of their office to advance, with all their 
power, knowledge truly so called; but at the same time to 
watch with the greatest care that all human learning shall be 
imparted according to the rule of the Catholic faith. Es- 
pecially is this true of ‘philosophy’, on which the right treat- 
ment of other sciences depends in great measure 


“Tf anyone look carefully at the bitterness of our times, 
. .. he will discover with certainty the fruitful root of the 
evils which are now overwhelming us, and of the evils which 
we greatly fear. The cause he will find to consist in this— 
evil teaching about things, human and divine, has come forth 
from the school of philosophers. ... . Now, it has been 
implanted in man by nature to follow reason as the guide of 
his actions, and therefore, if the understanding go wrong in 
anything, the will easily follows. Hence it comes about that 
wicked opinions in the understanding, flow into human actions 
and make them bad. On the other hand, if the mind of 
man be healthy, and strongly grounded in true principles, it 
will assuredly be the source of great blessings, both as regards 
the good of individuals and as regards the common weal. 


“We do not, indeed, attribute to human philosophy such 
force and authority as to judge it sufficient for the utter 
shutting out and uprooting of all errors. . . . chiefly from 
the almighty power and help of God, we may hope that the 
darkness of error will be taken away from the minds of men, 
and that they will repent. But we must not despise or under- 
value these natural helps which are given to man by the kind- 
ness and wisdom of God, Who strongly and sweetly orders 
all things ; and it stands to reason that a right use of philosophy 
is the greatest of these helps. For God did not give the light 
of reason in vain to the soul of man, nor does the superadded 
light of Faith quench, or even lessen, the strength of the 
understanding. Its effect is far from this. It perfects the 


214 GOD AND REASON 


understanding, gives it new strength and makes it fit for 
greater works. The very nature of the providence of God 
Himself, therefore, makes it needful for us to seek a safeguard 
in human knowledge when we strive to bring back the people 
to Faith and salvation. The records of antiquity bear witness 
that this method .... was used habitually by the most illus- 
trious Fathers of the Church. They, in truth, were wont to 
give to reason offices neither few nor small; and these the 
great Augustine has summed up very shortly: ‘Attributing 
to this science .. . that by which the life-giving Faith .... 
is begotten, nourished, guarded and strengthened” ..... 
Hence it has not untruly been called by the ancients ‘an educa- 
tion leading to the Christian Faith,’ ‘a prelude and help of 
Christianity,’ ‘a schoolmaster for the Gospel.” ..... 

“In the first place, then, this great and glorious fruit is 
gathered from human reason—namely, that it demonstrates 
the existence of God: ‘By the greatness of the beauty, and of 
the creature, the Creator of them may be seen, so to be 
known thereby.’ 

‘In the next place, reason shows that God, in a way belong- 
ing only to Himself, excels by the sum of all perfections— 
that is, by an infinite wisdom from which nothing can be 
hidden; and also by a supreme justice which no affection of evil 
can touch. Hence reason proves that God is not only true, 
but the very Truth itself, which cannot deceive nor be de- 
ceived. Further, it is a clear consequence from this that the 
human reason obtains for the word of God full belief and 
authority. 

“In like manner reason declares that the evangelical doc- 
trine has shone as the light from its very beginning, by signs 
and miracles which are infallible proofs of infallible truth; 
and that therefore they who receive the Faith by the Gospel, 
do not act rashly, ... but by an obedience that is altogether 
reasonable, submit their understanding and their judgment to 
the authority of God. 








CONCLUSION 215 


“Further, not less than these things in value is it that reason 
clearly shows us the truth about the Church instituted by 
Christ. That Church, as the Vatican Synod decreed—‘because 
of the wonderful way in which it spreads; because of its great 
holiness and inexhaustible fruitfulness in all places; because of 
its Catholic unity and invincible stability—is in itself a great 
and perpetual motive of credibility, and an unanswerable ar- 
gument for its own Divine legation.’ 


“The foundations, then, having been laid in the most solid 
way, there is needed, further, a use of philosophy, both per- 
petual and manifold, in order that Sacred Theology may as- 
sume and put on the nature, habit, and character of true 
Sciences (ly. 


“Nor must we pass by in silence, or reckon of little account. 
that fuller knowledge of our belief, and, as far as may be, 
that clearer understanding of the mysteries of faith which 
Augustine and other Fathers praised, and labored to attain. 
SEE Ws aN Such knowledge and understanding are certainly 
acquired more fully and more easily by those who, to integrity 
of life and study of the faith, join a mind that has been dis- 
ciplined by philosophical culture. 


“Lastly, it pertains to philosophical discipline to guard with 
religious care all truths that come to us by Divine tradition, 
and to resist those who dare to attack them. Now, as regards 
this point, the praise of philosophy is great, in that it 1s 
reckoned a bulkwark of the faith, and as a strong defence of 
religion. ‘The doctrine of our Saviour,’ as Clement of Alex- 
andria bears witness, ‘is indeed perfect in itself, and has need 
of nothing, forasmuch as it is the power and wisdom of God. 
But Greek philosophy, though it does not by its approach make 
the truth more powerful, has been called a fit hedge and ditch 
for the vineyard, because it weakens the arguments of sophists 
against the truth, and wards off the crafty tricks of those by 
whom the truth is attacked.’ 


216 GOD AND REASON 


_ “In fact, as the enemies of the Catholic name borrow their 
warlike preparations from philosophic method, when they begin 
their attacks on religion, so the defenders of the science of 
God borrow many weapons from the stores of philosophy, by 
which to defend the dogmas of revelation. Again, we must 
count it no small victory for the Christian Faith, that human 
reason powerfully and promptly wards off those very weapons 
of the enemy which have been got together by the skill of 
the same human reason for purposes of harm. .... 


“Nay, more; the Church herself not only advises Christian 
teachers, but commands them to draw this safeguard from 
philosophy. For the fifth Lateran Council decreed that ‘every 
assertion contrary to a truth of enlightened faith is altogether 
false, because truth cannot possibly contradict the truth’: and 
then it commands doctors of philosophy to apply themselves 
studiously to the refutation of fallacious arguments; . 


“But if philosophy has to be found equal to the work of 
bringing forth such previous fruits as we have mentioned, it 
must, above everything, take care never to wander from the 
path trodden by the venerable antiquity of the Fathers and 
approved in the Vatican Synod by the solemn suffrage of 
authority. It is plainly seen that we must accept many truths 
in the supernatural order which far surpass the power of any 
intellect. The human reason, therefore, conscious of its own 
weakness, must not dare to handle things greater than itself ; 
nor to deny these truths..... 


“In those heads of doctrine, however, which the human in- 
tellect naturally can take in, it is clearly just that philosophy 
should use its own method, its own principles, and its own 
arguments: yet not so as to seem to draw itself away with 
audacity from the authority of God..... | 

“We know indeed that there are to be found men who, 
exalting too highly the powers of human reason, contend that 
the understanding of man falls from its native dignity when 


it becomes subject to Divine Authority, and that being thus 





CONCLUSION 217 


found, as it were, in a yoke of slavery, it is greatly retarded 
and hindered from reaching the heights of faith and excellence. 
Such teaching as that is full of error and falsehood. The 
end of it is that men, in the height of folly and sinful thank- 
lessness, reject all higher faiths... . . . Now, the mind of 
man is shut up and held in certain bounds, and many enotigh 
these boundaries are. The consequence is that. it falls into 
many mistakes and is ignorant of many things. On the other 
hand, the Christian Faith, resting at it does on the authority 
of God, is the certain teacher of truth. He who follows this 
guidance is neither entangled in the nets of error nor tossed 
about on the waves of doubt. Hence the best philosophers are 
they who join philosophical study with the obedience of the 
Christian Faith. . .:... 


“The doctors of the Middle Ages, whom we call Scholastics, 
set themselves to do a work of very great magnitude. There 
are rich and fruitful crops of doctrine scattered everywhere 
in the mighty volumes of the Holy Fathers. The aim of the 
Scholastics was to gather these together diligently, and to 
store them up, as it were, in one place, for the use and con- 
venience of those that come after...... 


“There were especially two glorious Doctors, teachers of the 
famous science—that is, the angelic St. Thomas, and the 
seraphic St. Bonaventure. .... Now far above all other 
Scholastic Doctors towers Thomas Aquinas, their master and 
prince. Cajetan says truly of him: ‘So great was his venera- 
tion for the ancient and sacred Doctors that he may be said 
to have gained a perfect understanding of them all.’ Thomas 
gathered together their doctrines like the scattered limbs of 
a body, and moulded them into a whole. . . . His intellect 
was docile and subtle; his memory was ready and tenacious; 
his life was most holy; and he loved the truth alone. Greatly 
enriched as he was with the science of God and the science 
of man, he is likened to the sun; for he warmed the whole 


218 GOD AND REASON 


earth with the fire of his holiness, and filled the whole earth 
with the splendor of his teaching. 

“There is no part of philosophy which he did not handle 
with acuteness and solidity. He wrote about the laws of 
reasoning ; about God and incorporeal substances; about man 
and other things of sense; and about human acts and their 
principles. What is more, he wrote on these subjects in such 
a way that in him not one of the following perfections is want- 
ing: a full selection of subjects, a beautiful arrangement of their 
divisions; the best method of treating them; certainty of 
principles; strength of argument; perspicuity and propriety 
in language; and the power of explaining deep mysteries. . . 
. . With his own hand he vanquished all errors of ancient 
times ; and still he supplies an armory of weapons which brings 
us certain victory in the conflict with falsehoods ever springing 
up in the course of years.” (Translated by the Fathers of the 
English Dominican Province. Published as a Preface in 
Vol. I. of their translation of the Summa Theologica.) 


APPENDIX bole 219 


APPENDIX 


In the proofs of our theses and solutions of difficulties some 
few abbreviations occur. Those who are familiar with the 
use of the syllogism will have no difficulty in understanding 
and applying them; those who are not, will find the following 
explanation simple and yet sufficiently helpful. With very 
little practice the handling of syllogisms becomes quite easy. 

The abbreviations used are those of the corresponding Latin 
words. This choice was made because the Latin verb, ex- 
cluding as it does the separate use of the personal pronoun, 
is more easily abbreviated than its English equivalent. In 
the appended list we give the abbreviations, the correspond- 
ing Latin words, the corresponding English words, and what- 
ever explanation is necessary. 

Maj., Major, the Major, ie., the first or principal proposition, 
from which, in a syllogism, the conclusion is derived. 
When this abbreviation is used in our proofs, it is fol- 
lowed either by the proof of the Major in question or any 
other reference to it thought necessary. 

Min., Minor, the Minor, 1.e., the second or subordinate proposi- 
tion leading to the conclusion of a syllogism. In our 
proofs this abbreviation is used like the preceding one. 

Ant., Antecedens, the Antecedent. The Antecedent, referred 
to by this abbreviation, is the only expressed proposition, 
from which, in an enthymeme, the conclusion is derived. 
An enthymeme is an abbreviated syllogism; a syllogism, 
namely, the Major or Minor of which is not expressed. 
In the few cases in which enthymemes take the place of 
syllogisms in our proofs, this abbreviation is used like 
the preceding ones. 

Con., Consequens, the Consequent. The Consequent, referred 
to by this abbreviation, is the conclusion of a syllogism, 
an enthymeme, or any other form of argumentation. 


220 GOD AND REASON 


C. Maj., Concedo Majorem, I concede, i.e., I admit the truth of 
the Major. 

C. Min., Concedo Minorem, I concede the Minor. 

N. Maj., Nego Majorem, I deny, i.e., I reject as false, the 
Major. 

N. Min., Nego Minorem, I deny the Minor. 

Tr. Maj., Transmitto Majorem, I transmit, i.e., I pass no judg- 
ment on, the Major. For one reason or another, it may 
be advisable, or even necessary, at times, to pass a Maior 
by without comment. In such cases, the Major is said 
to be transmitted. 

Tr. Min., Transmitto Minorem, I transmit the Minor. 

Tr. Ant., Transmitto Antecedens, I transmit the Antecedent. 

D. Maj., Distinguo Majorem, I distinguish the Major, At 
times a Major may be understood’ in two different senses. 
When this happens, it is distinguished, or divided, accord- 
ing to these senses, into two propostions. If one of these 
is to be admitted as true, the abbreviation, C., Concedo, 
I concede, is placed after it. If one is to be denied, the 
abbreviation, N., Nego, I deny, is used. If one is to be 
transmitted, the abbreviation, Tr., Transmitto, I trans- 
mit, follows it. If, however, as not infrequently happens, 
one is still further to be distinguished, the abbreviation, 
Subd., Subdistinguo, I subdistinguish, is placed after it. 
The propositions resulting from this subdistinction, are 
treated in the same way as those resulting from the first 
distinction. 

It is quite evident that a subdistinction is a distinction 
under (sub) a distinction. 

D. Min., Pistinguo Minorem, I distinguish the Minor. When 
the Major is not distinguished, and the Minor requires 
distinction, this abbreviation is used to denote that fact. 
The remarks just made concerning the distinction of the 
Major, are to be applied here also. 


APPENDIX 221 


Cd. Min., Contradistinguo Minorem, | contradistinguish the 
Minor. When the Major ts distinguished, and the same 
distinction 1s also to be applied to the Minor, the abbre- 
viation Cd. is used to denote the fact that this application 
is to be. made contrariwise, 1.e., in a way contrary, to 
that made in the Major. To make clear just what this 
means it will be necessary to say a few words about the 
terms of a syllogism, and the application of distinctions to 
them. 


In a categorical syllogism, 1.e., one whose propositions 
are not conditional but absolute, two terms, called ex- 
tremes, are compared with a third, called the middle 
term, and from this comparison, which is made in the 
Major and Minor, is derived the Conclusion, in which 
one of the extremes, which is the predicate of the Con- 
clusion, is, according to the quality of the syllogism, 
affirmed or denied of the other, which is the subject of 
the Conclusion. As is evident, the middle term appears 
only in the Major and Minor; one of the extremes, in 
the Major, the other in the Minor, both in the Conclusion. 
When, therefore, a Major is distinguished, and the dis- 
tinction falls on one of the extremes, as this extreme 
appears again only in the Conclusion, the same distinction 
is to be applied to it there, and in the same way. In 
this case, the Minor is not distinguished; it is conceded 
or, if advisable, transmitted. Similarly, when a Minor 
is distinguished, and the distinction falls on one of the 
extremes, as this extreme appears again only in the Con- 
clusion, the same distinction is to be applied to it there, 
and in the same way. In this case the Major is not dis- 
tinguished; it is conceded or, if advisable, transmitted. 
When, however, the Major is distinguished, and the dis- 
tinction falls on the middle term, as that term appears 
again in the Minor, the same distinction is to be applied 
to it there, not, however, in the same way, but, as was 


222 


GOD AND REASON 


noted above, contrariwise, 1.e., that term of the distinction 
which was conceded with regard to one extreme in the 
Major, is to be denied with regard to the other extreme 
in the Minor, and vice versa. 

In a conditional syllogism the Major is a conditional 
proposition, and the Minor either affirms the antecedent 
of this proposition, in which case its consequent is affirmed 
in the Consequent, or Conclusion, of the syllogism; or it 
(the Minor) denies the consequent of the conditional 
proposition, in which case the antecedent of this proposi- 
tion is denied in the Consequent of the syllogism. If the 
Major of a conditional syllogism requires distinction, the 
part there distinguished is to be contradistinguished in 
the Minor, if it appears there; if it does not appear there, 
it is to be distinguished in the Conclusion, 


N. Con., Nego Consequens, I deny the Consequent. When a 


syllogism is distinguished, its conclusion is to be denied, 
according to the sense of the distinction used. 

We make no use of this abbreviation, as the denial of 
the consequent in this case is taken for granted in our 
solutions of difficulties. 

When the Major or Minor of a syllogism is denied, the 
syllogism falls. In this event nothing is said concerning 
the Consequent. 


— 


<n i> 


INDEX OF MATTER 


A Simultaneo, Argument, cf. Onto- 
logical argument 

Aesthetic order, 106 

Analogy in argument from Design, 
112, 166 

Animism, 184, 195 

Arguments, 
a priori, 64, 67 
a simultaneo (ontological), 29, 
64, 66 ff., 89, 90, 166 
from common consent, 181 ff. 
from conscience, 208 ff. 
from contingency, 207 
from design (teleological) 105 ff. 
from motion, 206 f. 
from perfections, 207 f. 
from produced being 
logical), 70 ff. 

Atheism, 25 ff., 74, 129, 184, 204 f. 

Atmosphere and Life, 145 ff. 


(cosmo- 


Beauty, Order of, 106 
Bee, Instinct of, 164 
Being, 
Bternal, 81 ff., 88 
Necessary, 87 ff. 
Self-Existing, 81 f., 87 ff. 
Belief of mankind, Religious, 185 ff., 
196 ff. 
Bird, 
its flight, 157 ff. 
its nest, 165 
Blood, 
circulation of, 153 ff. 
composition of, 156 
Brahmanism, 205 
Buddhism, 204 


Carbon dioxide, 148 
Causality, Principle of, 72, 
Cause, 
final, 116 ff. 
unproduced, 70 ff. 
Chance, 
nature of, 119 
properties of, 121 ff. 
Church, Fathers of, 


qi: 


on spontaneous knowledge of 
God, 24, 62 
Concept of God, 
popular, 23 ff, 
scientific, 25 
other concepts, 25 
Conscience, Argument from, 208 ff. 
Consent of Mankind, Argument from, 
181 ff. 
Contingency, Argument from, 207 
Cosmological argument, 70 ff. 


Darwinism, 148, 171, 1738, 176 
Deism, 13, 27 f. 
Ditheism, 92 f. 
Dogmatic Theology, 
relation to Natural Theology, 22 


End, as cause, 116 ff. 
Essence, 98 
Evil, Problem of, 101 ff., 176 
Evolution, 118, 1438, 167 ff., 169 f., 
LTD TSA sf: 
Existence of God, 
wrong sources of knowledge of, 
29. ff. 


Faith, Primitive, 96 ff., 184 ff, 
“FWaith-knowledge,” 5 
Fathers of the Church, 
on spontaneous knowledge of 
God, 24, 62 
Fetichism, 184, 195 
Final cause, 116 ff. 
Final causes, Argument from, 105 ff. 
Finite and Infinite, 79 ff. 


Ghosts, 194 ff. 
Good, Search for greatest, 63 


Heart, Human, 152 ff. 


Ideas, Universal, 61 ff. 
Ignorance, and origin of religion, 194 
Infinite, Idea of, 59 f. 


223 


Infinite and Finite, 79 ff. 
Infinite series, 73 

Innate ideas, 30 f. 
Instinct, 159 ff., 177 
Intelligence of God, 105 ff. 
Intelligibility of God, 60 f. 
Intrinsic impulse, 177 


Knowledge, Truth of, 60 


Mankind, 
consent of, 181 ff. 
errors of, 205 
Materialism, 74, 84 ff., 129, 167 ff. 
Matter, Eternal, 86 
Metaphysical argument, 70 ff. 
Modernism, 40 ff., 74, 129 
Modernism, Programme of, 42 ff., 
46 ff., 49 
Monism, 84 ff., 167 ff. 
Monotheism, 28, 90 ff., 96, 184 
Moral argument, 70, 181 ff. 
Motion, Argument from, 206 ff. 


Name of God, 23 
Natural Theology, 
and Dogmatic Theology, 22 
definition of, 21 
division of, 22 
importance of, 21 
Naturalism, 184, 195 
Necessary Being, 87 ff. 


Oneness of God, 90 ff., 179 f. 
Only one, Definition of, 91 
Ontological argument, 29, 64, 66 ff., 
89, 166 
Ontologism, 5, 29 f., 57, 60 ff. 
Opinions about God, 
Atheistic, 25 ff. 
Deistic, 27 f. 
Ditheistic, 92 
Kantian, 32 ff. 
Modernistic, 40 ff. 
Monistic (materialistic) 74, 84 
ff; 129, 4167 care 
Monotheistic, 28, 90 ff. 
Ontologistic, 5, 29 f., 57, 60 ff. 
Pantheistic, 27 
Polytheistic, 27, 94 ff. 
Pragmatistic, 50 ff. 
Traditionalistic, 29, 59 
Tritheistic, 93 


224 


Order, Argument from, 105 ff., es- 
pecially 130 ff., 139 f. ; 
of beauty (aesthetic) 106 
of finality (teleological) 106 ff, 
130 ff. 

Oxygen, 147 


Pantheism, 5, 18, 27, 28, 42 ff., 74, 
129, 205 
Pascendi Dominici Gregis, Encyclical, 
41, 44 
Perfections, Argument from, 207 f. 
Person, 
definition of, 126 ff. 
God, a person, 137 ff. 
Philosophy, 
modern, 5 ff., 32 ff. 
Scholastic, 212 ff. 
Physical argument, 70, 105 ff. 
Polytheism, 27, 94 ff., 184, 
202 ff. 
Positivism, 192 
Pragmatism, 50 ff., 58 ; 
Priests, Origin of religion attributed 
to vena], 193 
Primitive faith, 96 ff., 184 ff. 
Primitive people, 196 ff. 
Problem of evil, 101 ff., 176 
Produced beings, Argument from, 70 
iit 


194, 


Reason, Principle of Sufficient, 73 

Religion, Origin of, 184 ff., 193 ff. 

Religious belief of mankind, 62 f., 
181 ff., 196 ff. 

Rhynchites pubescens, 161 ff. 


Scholasticism and God, 212 ff. 
Self-existence, 81 f., 87 ff. 
Sentimentalism, 40 

Series, Infinite, 73 
Singularity, 98 

Singularity of God, 90 ff. 
Sitaris humeralis, 160 f. 
Space, 83 f. 

Sphex, 160 

Spider, 164 f. 

Spirits, 194 ff. 

Stomach, 164 

Sufficient Reason, Principle of, 73 





Teleological argument, 105 ff. Tritheism, 93 f. 
development of, 180 ff., 189 f. Truth, Evident, 64 ff. 
different forms of, 125 f., 189 f. Truth of knowledge, 60 
enemies of, 141 ff. 
Evolution and, 143 ff. 


i d : ‘ 
examples showing design for, en coon Ol aaa Nia 


Universal ideas and Ontologism, 61 f. 


145 ff. 

scope of, 124 ff. ; 
Teleological order, 106 ff., 130 ff. Vital immanence, Principle of, 40 ff. 
Theodicy, 21 
Time, 82 f. 
Totemism, 184, 196, 200 ff. Water vapor, 145 ff. 
Traditionalism, 29, 59 World-order, 105 ff., especially 130 ff., 
Trinity, Blessed, 100 139 f. 


225 


INDEX OF AUTHORS CITED 


Ankermann, 199 
Anselm, St., 29, 67 f. 


Balfour, 129 f. 
Bayle, 21 

Beckwith, 27, 52 ff. 
Bender, 39 

Bergson, 74 
Boedder, 172, 175 f. 
Bonaventure, St., 29, 67, 217 
Bonnety, 32 

Breuil, 198 
Brownson, 30 
Biichner, 84 
Burroughs, 39 


Caird, 177 
Calkins, 74, 85 
Cartaillac, 198 
Christlieb, 28, 185 
Conybeare, 74 
Corrance, 74, 80 


Darmesteter, 96 

Darwin, 171, 173, 176 

De Bonald, 32 

D’Harlez, 96 

Denzinger, 80, 41 

De Rouge, 96 

De San, 210 

Descartes, 29 f., 68 

Diman, 110, 118, 133 f., 144, 168 ff. 
Donat, 37 ff., 51 

Drake, 8 ff., 27,39 f., 52, 93 
Driscoll, 80, 96, 114, 117, 186 ff. 
Dunn, 188 

Dwight, 168 f. 


Ebrard, 96 
Egedi, 198 
Ebrenreich, 199 
Elliott, 39 f. 


Fairbairn, 183 
Foy, 199 
Frazer, 192, 199 


Gannon, 185 

Gerard, 118 f., 160, 169 
Gioberti, 30 

Graebner, 199 

Gratry, 40 

Gray, 119 


Haeckel, 84 ff., 167 ff. 
Hall, 144 

Haydon, 27 
Hestermann, 198 
Hettinger, 1387 

His, 168 

Hocking, 6 f., 56, 74, 95 f. 
Hoffding, 74 
Hontheim, 191 
Howitt, 199 

Hume, 179 f. 


Jacobi, 40 

James, 6 f., 10 f., 50 ff., 58 f., 74, 
78, 143 

Jodl, 39 

Johnson, 74 


Kant, 32 ff., 51, 58, 74, 77 ff, 84, 
88 ff., 129, 166 

Kellog, 96 

King, 192 

Kingsley, 197 

Kleinpeter, 38 

Kleutgen, 24, 63 

Knight, 74, 90, 108 f., 129, 141 f., 
166 f., 170, 173 


Lang, 186, 196 ff. 
Lange, 173 

Legge, 96 

Leibnitz, 21, 30 f., 68 f. 
Leo XIII, Pope, 212 ff. 
Le Roy, 198 f. 

Leuba, 9 ff., 39 
Ling-Roth, 199 

Loisy, 74 

Lubbock, 192 


226 


oe gs ae ee gf! ee ee ee 


be st pel 


; 





Malebranche, 30 Sarasin, 199 


Mallock, 74 Schiffini, 209 

Marett, 192 Schiller, 74, 78, 80, 92,128, 144, 170 
Martin, 199 Schleirmacher, 40 
Martineau, 110, 143 f., 157 ff, 174 £. | Schmidt, 198 

Meyer, 198 f. Schneider, 198 

Mill, 86, 170 Schopenhauer, 85 

Mills, 186, 196 ff. Seligman, 199 
Milne-Edwards, 165 Shallo, 137 

Montano, 199 Shaw, 40 

Muckermann, 111, 160, 170 Shearman, 118 f., 123, 161 
Miller, 96 Skeat, 199 


Smith, Robertson, 96 
Spencer, 81, 192 


Newman, Card., 209 Spinoza, 178 

Niebergall, 38 Stewart, 40 

Obermaier, 198 ‘ 

Oswald, 40 Thomas, 199 

Overstreet, 40, 74 Thomas Aquinas, St., 73, 108, 140, 


478,206 ff, 212; 217 
Tiele, 96, 192 


Park, 197 Tisdall, 96 f. 

Parker, 199 Troeltch, 74 

Paulsen, 74, 128 Tylor, 192, 199 

Phillips, 96 Tyrrell, 42 ff. 

Phin, 146 ff. 

Piette, 198 

Pius X, Pope, 41, 44 f. Vaughan-Stevens, 199 

Plate, 39 Ventura, 32 

Plutarch, 187 Von den Steinen, 199 

Portman, 199 Von Hammerstein, 122 f., 161 ff., 174 


Von Hartmann, 38, 177 f., 192 


Rawling, 199 
Rawlinson, 96 


Walter, 36 f 
Reed, 199 ; 
Reid, 40, 58 Ward, J., 26, 74, 92 
Renouf, 96 Ward, W. G., 24 
Rosmini, 30 f. Weber, 74, 143 
Ronayne, 157 ff. Wells, 40 
Royce, 40, 74, 143 Williamson, 199 
Sabatier, 74 Youtz, 74 


227 








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